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Abstract 
 
Thesis Title: Three essays in behavioural finance: An examination into non- Bayesian 
Investment behaviour 
 
by 
Constantinos Antoniou 
 
 
“There is no general principle that prevents the creation of an economic 
theory based on other hypotheses than that of rationality” 
                Kenneth Arrow (1986) 
 
 Behavioural Finance relaxes the neoclassical assumption that investors consistently 
apply Bayes Rule when updating their expectations, and identifies the behavioural attributes 
that affect asset prices. This thesis extends this literature by examining deviations from the 
Bayesian model that arise due to i) ambiguity aversion, ii) investor sentiment and iii) decision 
heuristics. 
 Bayesian Updating assumes that investors are able to always estimate a single 
generating process for expected returns. However, in reality investors analyze noisy 
information signals that relate to this unknown distribution in a latent way, and it is likely 
that they are not always able to determine a single probability distribution. Behavioural 
economists have shown that in such conditions of uncertainty about probabilities people 
become pessimistic. The first chapter examines whether the pricing of analyst earnings is 
affected by ambiguity aversion, offering confirmatory evidence. 
  A behavioural literature shows that people in good sentiment make optimistic 
choices, relative to objective probabilities. The second chapter examines whether investor 
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sentiment affects the performance of the momentum trading strategy, an anomaly related to 
the pricing of good and bad information. The results indicate that sentiment strongly affects 
the momentum phenomenon, suggesting that it is triggered from investors‟ behavioural 
biases.  
 It has been suggested that deviations from Bayesian Updating arise due to heuristics 
triggered by the characteristics of the information used. The last chapter examines the 
validity of one such important hypothesis proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992) using 
rigorous experimental economics techniques. The results confirm this hypothesis, indicating 
that investors are likely to overreact to salient information signals with low predictive 
validity. 
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Summary of contributions 
 
 Neoclassical finance applies rational expectations theory in the pricing of risky assets. 
However, in the past three decades the predictions of neoclassical theories have been 
challenged, leading to the emergence of “alternative” schools of thought.  Behavioural 
Finance is one such school, which relaxes the assumption that investors consistently use 
Bayes law when updating their expectations. It draws motivation from psychology and 
behavioural economics, in an attempt to identify the behavioural determinants of portfolio 
choice. 
 This thesis builds on this theme and examines deviations from the Bayesian model 
that arise due to i) ambiguity aversion, ii) investor sentiment and iii) decision heuristics. 
These tests contribute to the literature by highlighting behavioural factors that affect portfolio 
choice that are omitted by neoclassical theories. 
 The motivation of the third chapter stems from the fact that, contrary to the 
requirement of Bayesian Updating, investors do not have all the necessary information at 
their disposal in order to estimate a single generating process for expected returns. Rather, 
investors are endowed with noisy information signals that relate to this unknown distribution 
in a latent way, and it is likely that in certain conditions they will not be able to pin down a 
single probability distribution. Such conditions where different probability distributions are 
possible are referred to as ambiguity, and a large literature in behavioural economics shows 
that in such circumstances peoples‟ behaviour violates Bayesian Updating (see Camerer and 
Weber 1992 for a review). This finding has been confirmed in several experimental studies 
and has been used in theoretical models to explain stock market anomalies, such as the equity 
premium and excess volatility (e.g., Epstein and Schneider 2008).  However, no study 
examines whether the behaviour of aggregate stock prices exhibits evidence of ambiguity 
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aversion. The third chapter attempts to fill this gap, by examining whether the pricing of 
analyst earnings forecasts shows traces of ambiguity aversion. 
  The fourth chapter relates to a relatively new stream of literature in Finance that 
examines the effects of investors‟ mood and feelings on their trading decisions. A 
behavioural literature shows that people in positive sentiment make optimistic choices, 
relative to objective probabilities, and people in negative mood make pessimistic ones. 
Because sentiment provides a measure of the propensity of investors to form erroneous 
expectations numerous studies examine whether it relates to stock market anomalies in an 
attempt to identify whether they relate to investors behavioural biases. The fourth chapter 
extends this literature and examines the relationship between investor sentiment and price 
momentum, an anomaly that has received both rational and behavioural explanations.  
 The analysis in the fifth chapter draws on psychological studies which show that 
deviations from Bayesian Updating arise because people use heuristics that are triggered by 
the characteristics of the information used to form subjective beliefs. This chapter examines 
the validity of one such important hypothesis proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992) using 
rigorous experimental economics techniques. This chapter, apart from making several 
methodological advances, contributes to the literature by back testing the validity of a 
behavioural theory that has been extensively used in asset pricing theories (e.g., Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1998), shedding further light on the process by which information is 
transferred into asset prices.    
 The results from all three empirical chapters suggest that deviations from the 
Bayesian model can arise due to ambiguity aversion, investor sentiment and decision 
heuristics. Therefore, the thesis expands the behavioural literature by highlighting further 
behavioural factors that affect asset prices, conveying the message that the neoclassical 
definition of risk is too simplistic to consistently capture the behaviour of asset prices.  
12 
 
 The following section provides a more detailed discussion of the relevant literature, 
whilst developing the hypothesis tested in each empirical chapter. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 A shift of paradigm in financial economics 
   
The Neoclassical paradigm states that asset prices fully reflect asset risk.  This prediction 
emerges in an environment where investors analyze correctly all the available information 
that concerns financial assets‟ risk and return profile, and take positions according to their 
risk tolerance. This process determines the equilibrium price of the asset. Changes in price 
occur only when new information arrives in the market, which alters the asset‟s profile. This 
alteration prompts agents to rebalance their portfolios, leading to a new equilibrium price. 
Therefore, since asset prices always incorporate correctly all available information about 
asset risk and return, price changes are unpredictable from available information; hence 
markets are informationally efficient [Samuelson (1965), Fama (1965)].  
This paradigm evolved during the 20
th
 century, a period where economic models were 
based on solid microeconomic foundations, and derived their conclusions with mathematical 
rigor. However, rigorous mathematics came at a cost. They quickly became intractable once 
the complexity of financial markets was recognized. Thus, various simplifying assumptions 
were necessary to allow manageable calculations and closed forms solutions. These were that 
investors are fully rational. They have the resources and computing capacity to analyze all the 
available information correctly and infer assets‟ true risk and return profile. In addition, asset 
markets are frictionless, without trading costs or taxes, and the information required to 
estimate the distribution of asset returns is costless and simultaneously available to all market 
participants.  
  Clearly these assumptions are unrealistic. But, as advocated by Friedman (1952) in his 
famous essay, a theoretical economic model should not be assessed based on the realism of 
its assumptions, but on whether it can predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy the 
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quantity in question. If it can, then the assumptions should not come under scrutiny because 
they are unrealistic.  
 So, can asset pricing theories and the Efficient Market Hypothesis explain the 
behaviour of asset prices? It seems that they cannot, at least not conclusively. A large 
literature has accumulated over the past three decades that highlights patterns in the data that 
contradict the notion that prices reflect systematic risks and are unpredictable. This literature 
on “market anomalies” can be broadly classified into three categories that relate to: i) the 
time series behaviour of prices, ii) the cross sectional behaviour of prices, and iii) the general 
characteristics of financial markets. 
 In terms of the time series behaviour of prices Fama and French (1987) and Lo and 
McKinlay (1988), amongst others, show that prices exhibit positive serial correlation. Given 
that the information flow does not exhibit serial correlation this finding is difficult to explain 
in a rational and completely frictionless market.  
 More powerful evidence against the neoclassical model arises from the cross sectional 
behaviour of prices, where various factors that cannot uncontroversially be classified as 
sources of systematic risk predict returns. For example, Lakonsihok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) and Fama and French (1992) show that returns relate to book value to market value 
ratios, and Banz (1981) and Fama and French (1992) to firm size. Daniel and Titman (1997) 
in a very important study show that these patterns are inconsistent with covariance-driven 
risk-premia. In addition, prices are predictable after various events, such as earnings 
announcements [Livnat and Mendenhall (2006)] and analyst earnings forecasts [Givoly and 
Lakonishok (1979), Gleason and Lee (2003)]. Simple strategies that exploit these phenomena 
consistently earn high abnormal returns, which are unrelated to asset risk as implied by the 
CAPM.  Further, future returns are reliably predictable solely from past returns. DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985), and a large literature thereafter, document long run reversals. That is, over 
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long horizons of two to five years, past losers consistently outperform past winners. Thus, a 
strategy that is long on losers and short on winners, earns significant abnormal returns 
relative to the CAPM. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) demonstrate a medium horizon 
momentum effect. That is, over periods of three to twelve months past winners outperform 
past losers, making a strategy that is long on the former and short on the latter profitable.
1
  
This evidence from the cross sectional behaviour of returns contradicts the notion that 
prices cannot be predicted from publicly available information. 
Lastly, some of the overall characteristics of the market seem inconsistent with the 
neoclassical model.  The volatility of fundamentals is not sufficient to explain the volatility of 
prices, [Shiller (1981)], and daily trading volume is far too great to be solely driven by risk-
based rebalancing decisions [Odean (1999)].  In addition, historically stock returns have 
displayed a premium that cannot be easily reconciled with the amount of covariance risk they 
entail [Mehra and Prescott (1985)].                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 Because of these inconsistencies the paradigm that governs the practice of Financial 
Economics in the last two decades has experienced a major shift. Economists, dissatisfied 
with the inability of neoclassical theories to explain these phenomena, endeavour to create 
asset pricing models that relax the more demanding neoclassical assumptions, in an attempt 
to better understand how financial markets actually behave. This will lead to more accurate 
predictions, and ultimately increase the welfare of market participants.  
 
 1.2 Behavioural Finance 
 
 Behavioural Finance is an alternative school of thought that relaxes the assumption 
that investors are fully rational utility maximizers.  It draws from findings in experimental 
economics and psychology on how people behave in conditions of uncertainty, and develops 
                                                 
1
 See appendix 7.3 for further discussion on these anomalies. 
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models and hypotheses that examine whether the “anomalous” phenomena in financial 
markets are at least partly related to investors‟ bounded capacity to process information and 
estimate risk and return.  
 This is the underlying motivation of this thesis. My objective is to draw on the 
literature in decision making and propose behavioural hypotheses that: i) highlight conditions 
in which investors behaviour can depart from the assumption of perfect rationality, and ii) 
examine the effect of these departures on asset prices.  These tests expand the field of 
behavioural finance by increasing our understanding of the forces that operate in financial 
markets, and ultimately the price formation process.   
 In order to describe the general framework in which these hypotheses are developed it 
is useful to define what exactly is meant by the term “rational” behaviour.  Rationality relates 
to the way investors form expectations. If, on average, investors‟ expectations accurately 
describe the future performance of the economy (or a company), and if these expectations are 
used to make choices that maximize their utility, their choices are rational.  
The statistical model, which provides the basis for rational expectations, is Bayes rule. 
This is a method of combining prior knowledge with new information to form an updated 
expectation for the relevant quantity, i.e., asset prices. This rule is central in neoclassical 
theories, which view price changes as Bayesian responses to new information. Specifically, 
the assumption made by such theories is that investors correctly update their old expectations 
of the assets‟ risk and return profile using new information, and through their trades set new, 
fully revealing equilibrium prices. 
  The decision making literature, however, has identified circumstances in which the 
behaviour of investors can systematically contradict Bayesian Updating. That is, in certain 
conditions investors may overestimate the likelihood of certain events and underestimate the 
likelihood of others, which leads to erroneous expectations. Since prices will reflect these 
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erroneous expectations they will not be set relative to the fundamentals and thus will 
temporarily be out of balance. With the passage of time fundamentals become transparent and 
reveal the mispricing; therefore prices gravitate to their correct levels. This process of 
correction, however, amounts to price predictability that is incompatible with the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses and contributions 
 
 As mentioned earlier the underlying motivation of the thesis is to draw on the 
literature in decision making and propose hypotheses that examine whether in certain cases 
the behaviour of investors deviates from the optimal Bayesian model. This section outlines 
the hypotheses examined, and their contribution to the literature. 
 
 1.3.1 Ambiguity in analyst forecast accuracy 
 
 Neoclassical theories assume that investors can gather all the available information 
and estimate a single joint (Bayesian) distribution of future asset returns. Because the 
relationship between information and expected returns is so complicated, it is difficult in 
practice to always infer the latent distribution of returns. In some cases different probability 
distributions can be possible, and investors will be unable to confidently distinguish between 
them (as explained in Epstein and Schneider 2008 among others). The condition that many 
different distributions of future returns can be possible is called ambiguity, and a large 
experimental and theoretical literature shows that agents are particularly averse to ambiguity 
[see Camerer and Weber (1992) for a review of the evidence]. Specifically, when different 
distributions are possible investors form pessimistic expectations, behaving as if the worst-
case distribution that may arise is the most likely to occur. This is inconsistent with the 
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Bayesian model, which predicts that agents have at their disposal the complete information 
set and are always able to infer the correct empirical distribution.  
 In the third chapter we examine whether ambiguity aversion affects the way investors 
update their earnings expectations using analyst forecasts, when the accuracy of these 
forecasts is ambiguous. Neoclassical theories suggest that investors are always able to ex-ante 
infer the distribution of forecast accuracy for each forecast, and thus respond more strongly to 
forecasts that are expected to be accurate [Abarbanell, Lanen and Verecchia (1995)]. This 
requires that investors fully comprehend the variation in forecast accuracy, an arguably 
difficult task. If investors, in certain cases, cannot confidently determine an exact distribution 
of forecast accuracy, the concept of ambiguity can be relevant. Based on the literature in 
behavioural economics we propose the pessimism-and-correction hypothesis, which states 
that insofar the accuracy of the forecast is ambiguous, investors will respond pessimistically 
and set prices too low. As the future unfolds the mispricing becomes apparent, prices will rise 
to exhibit an ambiguity premium.  
 This chapter contributes to the literature in the following way: Whilst previous 
examinations of ambiguity have either been experimental or theoretical, this is the first study 
that provides a definition of ambiguity that can be taken into the “field” and examines 
whether ambiguity aversion operates in the real-world of financial markets. This is important, 
because ultimately the applicability of behavioural theories is validated with such empirical 
tests.  
  In addition, this study extents the literature that analyzes investors responses to 
analyst forecasts. Traditionally, the responses of investors to analysts forecasts has been 
assumed to be in accordance to Bayes law [Abarbanell, Lanen and Verecchia (1995)], but 
recently studies have shown that behavioural biases affect the way investors price analysts 
forecasts [Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006)]. This study proposes a new behavioural 
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hypothesis, which aims to examine whether ambiguity and ambiguity aversion affect 
investors responses to analyst forecasts.  
 The results provide support to the pessimism- and-correction hypothesis. Conducting 
a two-stage event study we find that when the accuracy of the forecast is ambiguous, the 
initial response is to update the expectations pessimistically and set prices too low. Then, 
during an adjustment period, prices rise to correct this initially pessimistic response.   
 
 1.3.2 The effect of Investors’ Sentiment on Price Momentum 
 
 Another source of bias that can make investors‟ decisions incompatible with Bayes 
rule is their mood or sentiment at the time of the decision. A large literature in decision 
science finds that when people in a good mood make excessively optimistic decisions, 
whereas people in bad mood make excessively pessimistic ones [Arkes, Herren and Isen 
(1988), Bower (1981), (1991); Wright and Bower (1992), among others]. 
 This finding is particularly relevant for financial theories, because prices reflect 
investors‟ expectations. If investors are prone to sentiment, prices will exhibit their 
excessively optimistic and pessimistic views, and thus will become predictable as sentiment 
dissipates and prices slowly correct. Indeed using various proxies for investors‟ sentiment, 
the literature has produced evidence that following periods of high sentiment asset returns are 
lower [Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007), Lemmon and 
Portniaquina (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2006); (2007) among others]. 
 The evidence that sentiment is priced suggests that investors‟ mood affects the pricing 
of information in financial markets. In the fourth chapter we extend the literature by 
examining whether this finding affects the performance of the momentum trading strategy, a 
phenomenon firstly documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), which has received both 
rational and behavioural explanations.  
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 Since sentiment has been shown to affect perceptions of future contingencies, it can 
affect the performance of the momentum strategy. The fourth chapter conditiones momentum 
profits on sentiment, thus sheds light on whether this market anomaly has behavioural 
foundations. Particularly, sentiment underlies the behavioural theory of momentum proposed 
by Daniel et al (1998), which states that because investors‟ expectations are miscalibrated, 
their trading actions generate momentum. It follows that when investors are optimistic, their 
beliefs will be even more miscalibrated relative to Bayesian probabilities, therefore the 
predictions of Daniel et al (1998) will be magnified. Specifically, the optimism hypothesis 
predicts that short run momentum will be higher when investors are optimistic, and these 
momentum portfolios, since they reflect overly optimistic expectations, will experience 
reversals in the long run.  
 Examining this hypothesis contributes to the literature in the following way: Price 
momentum is the only CAPM anomaly not explained by the Fama and French (1993) three 
factor model, and a major source of controversy in the literature. Some believe that the 
phenomenon reflects investors‟ behavioural biases [Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
(1998), among others], whilst others that it reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk 
[Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)]. This analysis in this chapter provides evidence that can 
relieve some of this tension, by examining whether behavioural theories fit the data better 
than rational theories.   
 Secondly, is adds to an expanding literature that examines the effects of investor 
sentiment in financial markets. Thus far, investor sentiment has been linked to the post 
earnings announcement drift [Livnat and Petrovic (2008)], corporate disclosure [Bergman 
and Roychowdhury (2008)], IPO‟s [Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2006)] and the size 
effect [Baker and Wurgler (2006; 2007)]. These studies are important because they help 
explain various anomalous phenomena in the market.  This study extends this literature by 
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analyzing the relationship between investor sentiment and momentum, another puzzling stock 
market anomaly. 
 Using the consumer confidence survey compiled by Conference Board to proxy 
investor sentiment, the results provide strong support for the optimism hypothesis. We find 
that momentum is only significant when investors are optimistic, and that these portfolios 
exhibit strong long run reversals. This result is robust to different specifications of investor 
sentiment, an alternative sentiment index, controls for company size and trading volume, 
market states, microstructure biases and risk adjustments, and is consistent with the view that 
momentum and reversals arise jointly from investors‟ optimistic biases.  
 
 1.3.3 Decision Heuristics 
 
 A large literature, principally pioneered by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, demonstrates that people in certain cases tend to make decisions using 
heuristics that lead to systematic deviations from the Bayesian model. For example, Edwards 
(1968) finds that in the presence of new information people cling excessively on their priors, 
whereas Tversky and Kanheman (1971) find the reverse. In a very influential study Griffin 
and Tversky (1992) suggest that these biases commonly arise as functions of the 
characteristics of the information used by decision makers to update their expectations. 
Specifically, when the information is salient but low in credence (high strength low weight), 
people overreact as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman. When the information is moderate 
and high in credence (low strength high weight) people underreact as suggested by Edwards.   
 The study by Griffin and Tversky (1992) can explain the evidence that in some cases 
prices overreact to information [De Bondt and Thaler (1985)], whereas in others they 
underreact to information [Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)]. This addresses a very important 
criticism voiced by Fama (1998), that in order for behavioural theories to be successful they 
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must be able to predict when investors systematically over or under react. Indeed one of the 
most important behavioural asset pricing theories proposed by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) explains the sort-run momentum and long run reversal effects by appealing to the 
hypothesis proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992).
2
  
 One limitation of these studies, however, is that the robustness of the Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) results has not been established. This is particularly worrying given the 
evidence that the behavioural biases documented by psychologists can disappear once the 
experimental design carefully addresses all the necessary requirements of a controlled 
experiment as outlined by Smith (1982) [e.g., as in Grether (1980)].  
 In the fifth chapter we address this issue and examine the robustness of the strength-
weight hypothesis proposed by Griffin and Tversky. We design a novel experiment in which 
subjects are properly incentivized to make correct decisions. Their beliefs are extracted from 
a specific betting „game‟ that avoids the use of the terms probabilities as in Fiore et al (2008). 
Further, decisions are based on real, observable information, and not hypothetical events. 
Lastly, we allow subjects to be risk averse, as opposed to assuming that they are risk neutral 
as is common in the literature, and specify a maximum likelihood model whereby all the 
parameters are estimated jointly (as in Andersen et al 2008). 
 This chapter contributes on the literature in the following way: Firstly, the experiment 
conducted offers out of sample evidence on whether the Griffin Tversky hypothesis captures 
decision making batter than Bayesian updating does, and thus can justifiably be used to 
explain the apparent over and under reactions in prices. In addition, we make several 
methodological contributions to the literature. We design a novel experiment that allows 
extracting subjective beliefs and testing Bayesian updating. In addition, we allow subjects to 
be risk averse in a framework that all parameters are estimated jointly.  
                                                 
2
 Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) also test an over-under reaction hypothesis based on the results of Griffin 
and Tversky (1992). 
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 The results broadly support the predictions of the strength-weight hypothesis, thus 
justify the use of this theory in explaining over and under reactions in financial markets. 
However, we find that the magnitude of the bias is significantly reduced in our study, 
compared to the results of Griffin and Tversky, especially when we allow for risk aversion. 
This finding suggests that it is prudent to establish the robustness of behavioural biases prior 
to applying them in economic models. 
All three empirical chapters demonstrate that deviations from Bayesian updating occur 
systematically amongst investors, due to ambiguity aversion, investor sentiment and decision 
heuristics. Since these behavioural characteristics are omitted from neoclassical theories that 
assume Bayesian updating, the evidence provided in the thesis highlights that “rational” 
theories are too simplistic to consistently capture the process by which expectations are 
updated and information is transferred into asset prices.  Rather, this evidence supports the 
notion that the “anomalies” we observe in the marketplace, defined vis-à-vis the rational 
theories, are at least partly related to investors‟ inability to consistently update their 
expectations using Bayes rule. 
 Chapter 2 in the thesis explains in more detail the mechanics of the Bayesian model, 
and the discrepancies that can arise from investors‟ behavioural characteristics. Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 present the empirical chapters, chapter 6 concludes the thesis and chapter 7 presents 
several appendices.  
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2. Bayes Rule and Investment decisions 
 
 This chapter explains the mechanics of asset pricing based on Bayes Rule, outlines 
what these mechanics imply for real financial markets, and details possible behavioural 
deviations. 
 2.1 Bayesian asset pricing 
 
 Each time period new information signals are added to the information set. The 
quality of the expectations that are formed using this ever-expanding information set depends 
on the extent that the market has comprehended the implications of the new „data‟ on the 
future streams of cash flows.  
 In the neoclassical paradigm agents can correctly analyze the information set, and 
apply Bayes rule to update their expectations. Thus asset prices are unpredictable. The 
following section details the mechanics of the Bayesian model.
 3
 
  
Assume that: 
 One asset that pays 100% of its earnings as dividends at some terminal date. 
 Assume one representative, risk-neutral agent whose earnings expectations determine the 
market price as P= F(E
e
).  
 Suppose that at time t -1 the agent, after observing the available information believes 
that the earnings generating process G (E) is as follows: 
E
1
G(E) ~ N(E, )
ρ
 . Thus the agent 
believes that earnings are (normally distributed) with a mean value E  and variance 
E
1
Var(E)=
ρ
. The parameter 
E
p  in this case is the Bayesian notation for precision.  This will 
                                                 
3
 These equations demonstrate standard updating for normally distributed variables. See Anderson (1984), Chap. 
2 for an exposition.  
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be explained in more detail shortly.  Having these expectations, E (E) = E , the agent sets the 
asset price P( E ) = P0.
4
   
Then suppose that at time t the agent observes a noisy information signal S (E) that 
suggests a different distribution of earnings, as shown below:  
2 2
'~ (0, ) ~ ( , )u ES E u u N E N E                            (2.1)
 
It is useful to think of this signal as the product of the investor‟s analysis of the 
available information. For example, the investor has gathered some information about 
company earnings, and has produced the signal S(E) that suggests a different distribution for 
the latent variable E. The signal is noisy because the information gathered is not exact. It 
contains a substantive component that relates to future earnings, but also a noisy component 
that is unrelated to fundamentals. From the normality of E’ and u it follows that the 
expectation of earnings based on this new signal is ( )E S E  and the precision 2 2
'
1
E u
sp
. 
Assume that E  > E . That is, the information signal is “good news”, and suggests that 
earnings will be higher than expected. Bayesian updating requires that the agent optimally 
combines his priors, G(E),  and the new information, S(E) to arrive at a new expectation for 
earnings, E(E / S). Using Baye‟s theorem the mean of the new conditional distribution of 
earnings is equal to: 
( / ) sE
S sE E
p p
E E S E E
p p p p
                                            (2.2)
 
 This new conditional expectation will reflect that price at time t, P1. This price is a 
precision weighted average of the prior expectation, E , and the expectation implied by the 
new signal,  E .  Rearranging and subtracting E(E) yields: 
                                                 
4
 The price is set only according to the mean of the distribution G(E) because the agent is risk neutral. 
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1 0( / ) ( ) ( )
S
S E
p
E E S E E E E P P
p p
                                 (2.3)
 
  E (E/S) is the new expectation of the agent given the observance of the signal and the 
previous unconditional expectation. Their difference between E(E/S) and E(E) reflects the 
magnitude of the update to the expectations induced by the signal, and thus the change in 
prices, P1 - P0. From the above formula it is shown that according to Bayes rule, the extent 
the new signal affects expectations and asset prices increases with: i) the amount of new 
information that it brings to the market, E E , and ii) its precision,  ρs..
5
 Given that the agent 
in the Bayesian model is fully rational these dimensions are inferred correctly from the 
available information, and the new price P1 is determined (which is unpredictable at time 
t+1).   
 The fact that the agent is assumed to be risk neutral does not affect the way 
information is used in the Bayesian model, which is what this analysis aims to highlight. If 
risk attitude is accounted for the price of the asset at any time period will reflect the expected 
utility of the expectation, i.e., P0=U [E(E)] and, insofar agents are risk averse, will carry a 
risk premium.  
 
 2.2 Bayesian asset pricing in practice  
 
The information in neoclassical Bayesian models is essentially an objective statistical 
distribution.  In practice, however, investors only observe information signals that relate to 
this distribution in a latent manner. For example, investors observe information in the form of 
newsletters, corporate announcements, analyst forecasts, macroeconomic indicators, rumours, 
word of mouth etc. From these signals investors‟ attempt to estimate the assets risk and return 
                                                 
5
 The update is also affected by the precision of the priors pE., but for the analysis only focus on the effect of the 
new information. 
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profile.  Importantly, these signals vary in their informativeness about this (latent) profile, as 
shown by Equation 2.1. That is, whilst they contain a substantive component that is related to 
fundamentals, they also contain a noisy component unrelated to fundamentals. The 
neoclassical assumption, therefore, implies that investors observe all the relevant information 
signals, extract their substantive component and estimate the Bayesian distribution.  
This task is extremely complicated. Black (1986) in a seminal paper was the first to 
point out that investors‟ will not be able to perform this task successfully because 
disentangling substance from noise can be daunting. Therefore, in some cases, investors will 
trade on information that they believe is substance, but in fact it will be noise.  Furthermore, 
the evidence from psychology and behavioural economics suggests that in such complicated 
environments such as the stock market, where the latent processes are extremely difficult to 
comprehend and feedback is slow and inconclusive, the effect of behavioural biases on the 
disentanglement of substance and noise becomes more important [Hirshleifer (2001)].  
The next section categorises and describes the main behavioural biases that have 
drawn the attention of financial economists. 
 
 2.3 Behavioural asset pricing 
 
 Hirshleifer (2001) groups the behavioural biases that may operate in financial markets 
into three categories: Biases arising from: i) heuristic simplification, ii) self-deception and iii) 
biases arising from investors‟ sentiment. Since in the thesis we refer to a bias as a deviation 
from the neoclassical model we add a fourth category as, iiii) biases that arise from investors‟ 
preferences that do not conform to the axioms of Expected Utility.  
 A complete discussion of all the behavioural biases and how they contribute to non-
Bayesian updating is beyond the scope of the thesis. Rather, the focus will be on the 
behavioural biases that are empirically examined, by providing a literature review that 
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explains the main findings and highlights the gaps that are tackled by the thesis in each 
chapter. 
 
 2.3.1 Heuristic simplification -Representativeness 
 
 A robust phenomenon firstly documented by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
(1974) is Representativeness (henceforth R). According to this decision rule people assess the 
likelihood of a hypothesis by the extent that the available information retains certain salient 
characteristics that are exhibited by the cases where the hypothesis holds. A classic 
experiment conducted by Kahneman and Tversky that illustrates R is the following: They 
provided their subjects with information about a hypothetical person named Linda: “Linda is 
31 years old, single outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student she 
was deeply concerned with the issues of discrimination and social justice, and also 
participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.” Then subjects were asked to rank possible 
alternatives about Linda according to their probability, including event A that “Linda is a 
bank teller”   and event B that “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement”. Obviously the latter event is a subsumed by the former, so its probability cannot 
be greater. However, Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973) find that 85% of the subjects 
ranked event B as more probable than A. It seems that because the description offered for 
Linda is representative of a feminist, makes subjects insensitive to the statistical fact that the 
frequency of bank tellers is larger than the frequency of bank tellers that are feminists.  
 The effects of R in the model described above can be captured if the investor makes 
his expectations based on the signal, E , more extreme by a factor λ >1. Thus, whilst the 
correct expectation is E(E)= E , the agent believes that the new signal implies E . If the 
signal is good news, and E  > E , the price update will be affected by λ as λP1>P1, and will 
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thus be more extreme. Because the investor, when updating his expectation, has over 
weighted the signal, the price of the asset λP1 will be too high relative to the fundamental 
value (by the proportion λ). As the future unfolds the mispricing becomes apparent, and 
prices revert to fundamental values. This however induces price predictability since the 
behavioural bias of representativeness has induced serial correlation in prices. 
 Representativeness has been incorporated into asset pricing theories. For example, in 
Barberis et al (1998), an investor observes a sequence of good (or bad) news for a company. 
This makes the investor who displays R believe that this good performance is likely to 
continue in the future, failing to recognize that most companies cannot grow (or lose) 
indefinitely. This makes the stock of the company mispriced, inducing a period of correction, 
as the price slowly returns to fundamental value. R is also studied by Rabin and Vayanos 
(2009) in a theoretical asset pricing context, and is able to explain a number of anomalies 
including fund-flow puzzles and the presence of momentum and reversal in returns. 
 The empirical literature has produced evidence that support the existence of 
representativeness. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) show that stocks that have been 
performing poorly during the last 3-5 years, consistently outperform companies that have 
been performing well during the same period. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show 
that companies that have experienced extreme sales growth underperform those that have 
experienced poor sales growth.  LaPorta (1996) shows that companies that are associated 
with high forecasts for long run growth issued by security analysts, also experience lower 
average returns. This evidence suggests that the market becomes very excited when it 
analyzes representative information for companies that are performing extraordinarily well or 
extraordinarily poor, and omits to recognize that the performance of the company is likely to 
regress to “normal” performance. Therefore, the market exhibits the fallacy of 
representativeness, and extrapolates these trends into the future, overvaluing the winners and 
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undervaluing the losers. With the passage of time, as these mispricings becomes apparent, 
prices drift to fundamental values, with past “losers” outperforming past “winners”. 
 A caveat of these studies however, is that the robustness of decision heuristics such as 
representativeness has not been fully established in the literature. If these heuristics are not 
genuine their application in financial markets is erroneous. To illustrate, representativeness 
has been identified in psychological experiments conducted by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1971, 1972). Economists, however, generally oppose the methods used by psychologists 
such as Kahneman and Tversky. Grether (1980, 1992) addresses this debate and tests whether 
R is found in experiments that satisfy the necessary experimental conditions (these conditions 
are explained in more detail in chapter 5). His results show that the evidence of R is much 
weaker, casting doubt on the robustness of the relation between decision heuristics identified 
by psychologists and asset pricing anomalies. In the fifth empirical chapter the thesis 
addresses this issue and, similarly to Grether, back-tests an important behavioural theory 
proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992), which has been used to explain the behaviour of 
asset prices, both theoretically (Barberis et al 1998) and empirically (Sorescu and 
Subrahmanyam 2006).  
 
 2.3.2 Self deception- Overconfidence 
 
 Overconfidence is the tendency to place an irrationally excessive degree of 
confidence in ones abilities and beliefs, and is manifested in two ways; the better than 
average effect, and miscalibration.
6
 According to the former investors are overconfident 
because they believe that they are better at selecting stocks relative to their peers. According 
to the latter they are overconfident because the confidence in their beliefs is higher than what 
                                                 
6
 Overconfidence can also arise from heuristic simplification, as suggested by Griffin and Tversky (1992). In 
fact overconfidence is the end product of any non-Bayesian decision rule since the decision maker holds 
erroneous beliefs which are believed to be correct.  
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is merited by objective probabilities. Both types of overconfidence imply that investors 
falsely believe that the investment signals they have generated are of better quality than what 
they really are. Classic studies that demonstrate that individuals are overconfident include 
Oskamp (1965), Alpert and Raiffa and Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Philips in Kaheneman et 
al (Eds) (1982). 
 In the Bayesian model outlined above an overconfident investor constructs a signal 
that he believes is more accurate than what it really is, inflating its precision by an 
overconfidence factor k>1. This means that whilst the true precision of the signal is ps, the 
investor who displays the fallacy of overconfidence believes that the precision of the signal is 
greater than what it really is, i.e., kps> pss.    Since, as shown by Equation 2.3, the impact of 
the signal on expectations depends on its (perceived) accuracy, an overconfident investor will 
overweight his private signal, as he believes that its accuracy is better than what it really is.   
 Overconfidence has received considerable attention in the finance literature, both 
theoretically and empirically. Odean (1998) in a theoretical study, demonstrates that 
overconfidence can lead to serial correlation in prices, and explains the high trading volume 
and volatility in stock markets. Same conclusions are drawn in the theory proposed by 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). 
 These predictions have received support from the empirical studies. Odean (1999) 
analyzes the trading behaviour of a large number of individual investors and comes to the 
conclusion that they trade excessively and, consequently, lower their returns. Similar results 
are reported by Barber and Odean (2000) who conclude that investors‟ positions do not 
generate enough return to cover the transaction costs. In a rational framework whereby an 
investor correctly anticipates the future return of the asset, a trade takes place insofar the 
expected benefit offsets the cost. Odean and Barber suggest that their findings are consistent 
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with overconfidence, whereby investors believe that their signals are more accurate than what 
they really are, and thus overweight them when they update their expectations and trade. 
 Barber and Odean (2001) further test the prediction that overconfident investors will 
trade excessively by examining the trade behaviour of males and females. The prediction is 
that, since males are in general more overconfident than females [see references in Barber 
and Odean (2001)], they will trade more and realize lower returns. Their results confirm this 
hypothesis.  The finding that overconfidence investors trade more heavily is also supported 
by Glaser and Weber (2009). 
 A noteworthy study in the field is conducted by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2008). They 
have access to the entire database of trades in the Finnish market, as well as information on 
the characteristics of traders, such as their aptitude, sex etc. This information about investors‟ 
aptitude comes from various tests and questions that all males in Finland answer when they 
enrol for their compulsory military service. Grinblatt and Keloharju measure overconfidence 
by regressing the aptitude of investors (based on their IQ test) on their perceived self-reported 
ability and use the residuals from this regression as their overconfidence measure. This 
measure is a cleaner proxy for overconfidence than the measures used in the previous studies, 
such as gender. The results of Grinblatt and Keloharju also support the overconfidence 
hypothesis, as they show that overconfident investors trade more aggressively. 
 The application of overconfidence in financial markets has provided a behavioural 
explanation for the excessive volatility and high trading volume that is observed. 
Furthermore, models of overconfidence can also explain serial correlation in prices.
 7
   
                                                 
7
 With no other assumptions overconfidence leads to negative serial correlation. However, with additional 
assumptions it can also explain positive serial correlation [Daniel et al (1998), Odean (1998)]. For example, in 
the static version of the Daniel et al (1998) model the effect of the private signal on asset prices is excessive due 
to overconfidence. When the terminal value of the asset is revealed prices return to fundamental values. If the 
private signal was positive (negative) it pushed prices too high (low), inducing an opposite adjustment in the 
next period, therefore negative serial correlation. However, when dynamic overconfidence is introduced due to 
self attribution, confirming news in  a second round can push the prices further from fundamental values before 
returning to equilibrium, inducing first positive and then negative serial correlation.   
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2.3.3 Mood and Feelings- Investor sentiment 
 
Sentiment refers to whether an individual, for whatever extraneous reason, feels 
excessively optimistic or pessimistic about a situation. A large body of the psychology 
literature finds that peoples‟ current sentiment affects their judgment of future events. For 
example, Johnson and Tversky (1983) show that people that read sad newspaper articles 
subsequently view various causes of death, such as disease etc., as more likely than people 
who read pleasant newspaper articles. In general, the evidence from experimental psychology 
shows that people with positive sentiment make optimistic judgments and choices, whereas 
people with negative sentiment make pessimistic ones [Bower (1981, 1991); Arkes, Herren, 
and Isen (1988); Wright and Bower (1992); among others].  
This finding has been applied in financial markets. The general result is that after 
periods of high sentiment, stock returns are lower, especially for stocks that entail more 
subjective valuations. This is in line with the evidence from psychology that people with 
optimistic sentiment excessively inflate the likelihood of good future contingencies, and vice-
versa.   For example, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) use the psychological evidence that 
mood is related to the weather, and that particularly people are in a better mood during 
sunnier days [see references in Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003)]. They collect data on daily 
cloudiness and daily nominal return of stock market indices. Their results uncover a 
significant “weather effect”, which supports the predictions of the sentiment hypothesis. For 
example, the annualized New York market return is a significant 24.8% on sunnier days, 
versus 8.7% on cloudy days.   This finding is robust in 25 out of 26 cities used in the analysis, 
and thus it is unlikely to have arisen by chance.  
In another interesting study Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007) capture investors‟ 
mood using soccer results, based on the findings that sports results have a significant effect 
on mood [see references in Edmans et al (2007)].  Using a cross section of 39 countries they 
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find that loses in international football games have an economically and statistically 
significant negative effect on the losing country‟s stock market. Particularly they show that 
the next day return of the stock market index is 38 basis points lower that the average, and 
that this decrease in market returns is unrelated to productivity or lost revenue issues. Further, 
the authors document this loss effect after international cricket, rugby and basketball games.  
Kaplanski and Levy (2009) capture the effects of sentiment using aviation disasters. 
They argue that because such events are very salient and attract substantial and vivid media 
coverage, they cultivate negative sentiment amongst the investing public (and the general 
population), which they hypothesize will negatively impact on their future expectations. 
Consistent with this view Kaplanski and Levy find that the market records an average loss of 
60 billion dollars per aviation disaster, which is fully recouped during the next trading days. 
This reversal indicates a temporary sentiment-related overreaction.   
Although these studies do not by themselves resolve any significant puzzle they 
demonstrate one important result: That investors‟ sentiment affects their trading behaviour 
and feeds into prices in a manner that is unrelated to fundamentals.  
Another stream of literature uses indices of consumer confidence to measure 
sentiment, such as the index compiled by the University of Michigan, the Conference Board 
and Investor Intelligence. The findings from such studies are in line with the aforementioned 
results. For example, Brown and Cliff (2005) use the Investor Intelligence index and find that 
this index is related to pricing errors derived independently from a valuation model, and 
negatively relationship to future returns. Similar results are shown derived by Lemmon and 
Portniaquina (2006). 
 Lastly, some studies extract sentiment proxies from market data that reveal investors‟ 
propensity to invest in the stock market. The intuition is that when investors engage in stock 
investing more aggressively, it is because they are feeling optimistic about the capacity of the 
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market to generate profits.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) create a sentiment index from such 
sentiment revealing variables, such as trading volume, first day returns of IPO‟s the closed 
end fund discount. Frazzini and Lammont (2008) construct such a measure using flows of 
capital into mutual funds. Both studies demonstrate that returns are lower after periods of low 
sentiment. 
 These results suggest that investor sentiment does affect asset prices, contrary to the 
notion that investors form Bayesian beliefs and maximize their expected utility. Motivated 
from this finding several studies examine whether any of the market anomalies are due to 
sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) explain the size effect using a sentiment variable 
constructed from market data. They find that after periods of pessimism smaller companies 
outperform larger ones, giving rise to the well known size premium identified by Banz 
(1981). However, this size premium disappears after periods of market optimism. Baker and 
Wurgler explain that sentiment affects the way investors respond to uncertainty. When they 
are pessimistic they tend to overweight the negative scenarios that may arise, therefore are 
repelled by smaller stocks that entail more subjective valuations. This reduces the prices of 
small stocks relative to larger ones, inducing a size premium in the next period. On the 
contrary, when investors are optimistic they are drawn to the uncertainty that surrounds 
smaller companies as they tend to overweight the optimistic scenarios that may arise, 
increasing their current price and lowering their future return. 
 In a recent study Livnat and Petrovic (2009) explain the post-earnings announcement 
drift anomaly firstly documented by Ball and Brown (1968) using sentiment (for details on 
this anomaly see appendix 7.3.5). These authors find that the drift is stronger for firms with 
positive surprises when sentiment is pessimistic. This is in line with the view that pessimists 
relatively disregard the good news in the earnings surprise because their future expectations 
are generally pessimistic; therefore they underweight to information content of the earnings 
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announcement. As the future unfolds and fundamentals are slowly revealed prices slowly 
gravitate toward their correct levels, which results to a more pronounced post-earnings 
announcement drift. On the contrary, when investors are optimistic the drift is less 
pronounced because the initial reaction to the good news is stronger, due to the fact that 
investors are expecting the economy to grow. These results suggest that the post-earnings 
announcement drift, a phenomenon coined by Fama as “the granddaddy of all anomalies”, is 
to an extent related to investors‟ tendency to form erroneous expectations.      
 Cornelli et al (2006) highlight a link between investors‟ sentiment and the long run 
underperformance of Initial Public Offerings (IPO‟s), a phenomenon principally documented 
by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). Cornelli et al (2006) find that first day 
returns to IPO‟s are positively related to an index of sentiment of the small investors. They 
also find that long run underperformance is much greater when the initial value of the index 
is high. This suggests that small investors become over-excited about new companies when 
they are optimistic, and overvalue their growth opportunities. As the future unfolds, however, 
these growth opportunities do not materialize therefore prices regress to fundamental values. 
 The application of sentiment in the context of the size effect, the post-earnings 
announcement drift and the long run underperformance of IPO‟s has provided some support 
to the notion that these anomalies are at least party driven by investors irrational behaviour. 
Since sentiment provides an indication of the extent to which investors‟ expectations deviate 
from Bayesian, this approach of conditioning market anomalies on sentiment seems fruitful 
in terms of disentangling rational from behavioural explanations for various other anomalies.  
 Another market anomaly that has received both types of explanations is price 
momentum. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) observed that stocks that performed well in the 
recent past (winners) continue to outperform stocks that performed poorly. One obvious 
explanation for this anomaly is that it reflects compensation for systematic risk [Johnson 
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(2002), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)]. This means that winners are riskier than losers 
therefore command a higher expected return. The behavioural explanations for momentum 
suggest that it arises because investors‟ behaviour deviates from Bayesian [Barberis et al 
(1998), Daniel et al (1998)]. Both rational and behavioural explanations have received 
support in the literature [Zhang (2006), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002)]. A natural way to disentangle these explanations is to condition the 
performance of the momentum strategy on the initial sentiment state of investors, similarly to 
Cornelli et al (2006) and Livnat and Petrovic (2009). Chapter 4 discusses in more detail why 
behavioural theories of momentum allow an implicit ink between investor sentiment and 
price momentum, and conditions the strategy suggested by Jegadeesh and Titman on investor 
sentiment.   
 
2.3.4 Non- Expected Utility Preferences  
 
 The neoclassical model assumes that investors‟ choose between actions based on their 
expected utility by exactly figuring out the possible alternatives that are associated with each 
action, and weighing the utility of each alternative with its corresponding probability.  
 A large body of evidence has accumulated that shows decision makers systematically 
violate the axioms of Expected Utility. Consequently, various alternatives theories of 
decision making have emerged that modify the traditional axioms and assumptions in an 
attempt to explain these observed inconsistencies. The most prominent models of non-EU 
preferences that have attracted the attention of financial economists are Prospect theory and 
models that incorporate ambiguity aversion. However, we want to stress that the literature in 
non-expected utility preferences is vast and many important theories are not mentioned in this 
section as the criterion of inclusion is the extent that the theory has been applied in Finance. 
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For more details on non-Expected utility models see reviews by Shoemaker (1982), Fishburn 
(1988) and Starmer (2000). 
 
 2.3.4.1 Prospect theory 
 
 Prospect Theory (PT), developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), departs from 
EUT in three fundamental ways. Firstly, in PT actions are not evaluated as final wealth 
positions, but relative to a reference point. Secondly, the shape of the utility function differs 
depending on whether the decision lies in the domain of gains or losses. Specifically, decision 
makers are risk seeking in the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain of gains, a 
property labelled as “loss-aversion”. And finally, in PT alternatives are not assessed based on 
their objective probabilities, but a transformation of them.  
 Prospect theory has received substantial attention from financial economists. The 
results suggest that models that incorporate investors with PT preferences can explain 
phenomena that seem anomalous to EUT-based models. For example, Barberis, Huang and 
Santos (2001) demonstrate that a model with loss-averse investors can explain the high mean, 
excess volatility and predictability of stock returns. Barberis and Huang (2008) focus on the 
probability weighting component of PT, and construct a model that explains the long run 
underperformance of Initial Public Offerings [Ritter (1991)], the private equity premium 
puzzle [Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)], and the undepricing of distressed stocks 
[Campbell, Hilscher and Szilaqyi (2008)]. Further, Frazzini (2008) in an innovative empirical 
study shows that PT preferences can explain the post-earnings announcement drift [Bernard 
and Thomas (1992)]. 
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2.3.4.2 Ambiguity aversion 
 
 A strong assumption of Expected Utility and the Bayesian paradigm is that investors 
can determine all the possible future contingencies of each asset and their associated 
probabilities. In reality however, probabilities are never objectively known. Nor investors 
receive information that explicitly refers to these probabilities. Rather, probabilities have to 
be determined from available information, and in certain cases they may be uncertain.
8
 
 Starting from the seminal work of Daniel Ellsberg (1961), it has been demonstrated 
that in conditions that probabilities are uncertain decision makers violate the predictions of 
expected utility (or subjective expected utility). In order to better illustrate the contradiction 
consider the typical finding in an Ellsberg-type experiment. Decision makers are asked to 
state their willingness to accept a gamble on the draw of a ball from two urns. The first urn 
contains 50% white and 50% blue balls. This urn is referred to as the “risky” urn because the 
decision is made in conditions of risk where the probabilities associated with the expected 
payoff are known with certainty. The second urn also contains white and blue balls, but in 
unknown proportion. Therefore, different probability distributions are possible. The decision 
problem is constructed as follows: in the first stage decision makers have to choose between 
two bets:  
Bet 1: A white ball being drawn from the “risky” urn 
Bet 2: A white ball being drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
 
In the second stage choose between: 
Bet 3: A blue ball being drawn from the “risky” urn 
Bet 4: A blue ball being drawn from the ambiguous urn. 
 
                                                 
8
 Savage (1954) contradicted this view and suggested that subjective probabilities always exist, thus ruled out 
the notion of uncertain probabilities, and extended EUT to Subjective Expected Utility.  
40 
 
 In both cases if the subjects bet on the ball that is actually drawn they receive a 
payment, otherwise they receive nothing. A robust finding in the literature is that the same 
individuals choose bet 1 in the first stage and bet 3 in the second one. This is inconsistent 
with any kind of belief about the distribution of balls in the ambiguous urn. Since individuals 
choose bet 1 in the first stage they behave as if they believe that the white balls are less than 
50% in the ambiguous urn. However, their betting preferences in the second stage suggest 
that they believe that the ambiguous urn contains less than 50% blue balls, a contradiction of 
the Savage axioms. Such findings demonstrate that decision makers dislike situations with 
uncertain or ambiguous probabilities, or that they are ambiguity averse (for a review of the 
evidence see Camerer and Weber 1992 and Keren and Gerritsen 1999). 
 Ellsberg (1961) provides a simple explanation for this phenomenon. He suggests that 
decision makers tend to focus on the “worst-case” probability distributions that are possible. 
For example, a decision maker faced with the bets in stage 1 prefers bet 1 because he thinks 
“what if I choose bet 2 and the frequency of white balls in the urn is too low?”, failing to 
acknowledge that it is equally likely that the frequency of the white balls may also be high. 
Ellsberg explains that decision makers in the face of ambiguity use a max-min decision 
criterion, whereby they maximise utility under the worst case scenario that may occur. 
Several models have been proposed that capture these pessimistic preferences, including 
multiple priors [Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)], smooth ambiguity [Klibanoff et al (2005)] 
and variational preferences [Marinacci et al (2006)]. Section 3.2 in the thesis develops in 
more detail the model of recursive multiple priors used by Epstein and Schneider (2008) to 
illustrate the economics of decision making under ambiguity.  
 Since the seminal work of Ellsberg ambiguity aversion has been shown to be one of 
the most robust findings in behavioural economics.   A large literature, starting with Becker 
and Brownson (1964) and up to the present day (Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv, 2009), shows 
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that situations that involve ambiguity are treated differently from those that involve risk as 
suggested by the original thought experiment described by Ellsberg (1961). Interestingly 
studies in neuroeconomics, such as Hsu, Meghna, Adolphs, Tranel and Camerer (2005), 
present evidence that ambiguous situations produce a unique neurological fingerprint, 
suggesting that ambiguity aversion is rooted in the fundamentals of human cognition.  
 The question that follows is whether ambiguity matters for financial markets. In 
traditional theories such as the Markowitz portfolio construction technique and the CAPM 
investors have complete knowledge of the distribution of expected returns, and using this 
information they then take positions that maximize their expected utility (see section 2.1). 
However, as explained in section 2.2, the probability distribution is not explicitly known but 
these probabilities have to be inferred from available information set. This is arguably a very 
difficult task because the future is highly uncertain. Imagine having to specify a single 
probability distribution that describes the future performance of a company. It is logical to 
expect that at least in some circumstances where investors do not have enough information it 
will be difficult to pin-down a single probability distribution. Such situations where different 
distributions may be possible resembles the ambiguous Urn described in this section. In such 
conditions assets are expected to be priced pessimistically, as shown by the large literature in 
decision making, contrasting the predictions of risk-based asset pricing theories.      
 Several studies examine the effect of ambiguity in asset markets. The general result 
from these studies is that assets that entail ambiguity are priced lower than what they would 
be if they only entailed risk, exhibiting an ambiguity premium. This ambiguity premium has 
been able to explain several market anomalies, such as the familiarity bias and the equity 
premium puzzle. The familiarity bias is the tendency of investors to prefer familiar stocks, in 
either their own country (the home bias), or the company in which they are employed. This 
tendency however, contradicts the basic prediction of neoclassical theories that investors seek 
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to diversify their risk. Uppal and Wang (2003) use an ambiguity aversion model and explain 
this anomaly. The intuition of their model is that investors are faced with less ambiguity 
when investing in familiar assets (either the company where they work or companies in their 
own country) as they have more information on which to draw and estimate their distribution 
of returns. Being ambiguity averse they thus prefer these investments.  In addition, ambiguity 
aversion models explain the equity premium and the excess volatility puzzles. The equity 
premium puzzle, first identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985) is that historically returns on 
common stocks are too high, and can only be explained using unrealistically high coefficients 
of risk aversion. Models that incorporate ambiguity, such as Maenhout (2004), Chen and 
Epstein (2002) and Epstein and Schneider (2008), have been able to explain this phenomenon 
as they demonstrate that asset returns reflect compensation to both risk and ambiguity 
aversion. Therefore, when one uses a risk-only model to explain them the ambiguity premium 
is “anomalous”.  
 Although the theoretical literature on ambiguity is vast very few studies empirically 
examine whether ambiguous assets are priced pessimistically. One such study is by Sarin and 
Weber (1993), whereby in an experimental asset market they demonstrate that ambiguous 
assets are priced lower than risky ones having the same fundamental value. This finding 
provides empirical support to the individual experiments conducted by Becker and Brownson 
(1964), Bossaerts et al (2010) and Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv (2009), and asset pricing 
theories, such as Epstein and Schneider (2008). However, the literature lacks a “field-study” 
that examines whether the day-to-day behavior of investors exhibits traces of ambiguity 
aversion. The third chapter in the thesis attempts to fill this gap by examining how investors 
respond to ambiguity in analyst earnings forecasts. A more detailed development of the 
hypothesis examined and the relevant literature is given in that chapter. 
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 The evidence reviewed in sections 2.3.4.1 and 2.3.4.2 suggest that the failure of 
neoclassical models to explain the functioning of financial markets may in fact lie in the 
assumptions of expected utility. Once we construct more realistic models of decision-making 
under risk we can explain many aspects of the “puzzling” behaviour of financial markets. 
 
2.4 Limits to Arbitrage 
 
 The evidence in the previous section show that investors‟ behaviour can 
systematically deviate from the Bayesian model. The systematic nature of these deviations 
rules out the notion that if the deviations from the Bayesian model are random, prices on 
average prices will be set correctly [Fama (1998)]. Rather, the evidence highlighted show that 
the deviations are correlated, and induce effects in the stock market that cannot be reconciled 
with the neoclassical model. 
 The main criticism against behavioural asset pricing, even in the presence of 
correlated mistakes, is the argument that behavioural biases will be more pronounced 
amongst individual investors, whereas institutional investors, often referred to as arbitragers,  
will behave according to the Bayesian model. Since institutional investors are fully rational, 
they will immediately spot any mispricing, and as they trade to exploit it they will return the 
price to its fundamental value. During this process capital will flow from “dumb” to “smart” 
investors, eventually driving the former out of the market. The arbitrage argument thus relies 
on two premises: i) that institutional investors do not exhibit any behavioural biases, and ii) 
arbitragers are a fully diversified army of traders with deep enough pockets that allow them 
to trade against a mispricing indefinitely until the price is returned to fundamental value. 
  The notion that behavioural biases are stronger amongst small investors has received 
support in the literature [Bonner, Walther and Young (2003), Hvidkjaer (2006), Malmendier 
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and Shanthikumar (2007)].
9
 However, the arbitrage argument fails in its description of risk 
and of arbitragers. 
  Firstly, the arbitrage argument omits the role of noise trader risk. Delong, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldman (1990) (DSSW) explain that arbitragers do not know when the 
mispricing will be eliminated. This is because the sentiment of behavioural traders is 
unpredictable, and they can become even more optimistic or pessimistic before realizing their 
mistake, temporarily exacerbating the mispricing. Therefore, the model of DSSW expands 
the traditional notion of risk, to incorporate the unpredictable fluctuations in price caused by 
the sentiment of behavioural traders.  
 So, how does noise trader risk affect arbitrage? It is tempting to think that it makes it 
more profitable. That is, if the mispricing widens due to an increase in the sentiment of 
behavioural traders, arbitragers should engage in further arbitrage, since the opportunity to 
earn profits is now even greater (assuming that the asset price will eventually return to 
fundamental value). However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain why the existence of noise 
trader risk, coupled with the liquidity constraints faced by arbitragers, bounds the process of 
arbitrage. Arbitragers are not an army of fully diversified traders; rather they are a relatively 
small group of highly skilled professionals employed in the various mutual and hedge funds. 
Secondly, they are trading other peoples‟ money. This separation of brain and capital gives 
rise to an agency problem, and it is precisely this agency problem that inhibits arbitrage. The 
argument is as follows: Arbitragers are assessed based on their performance. The holders of 
capital do not have the knowledge to understand the efforts of the arbitrager to exploit a 
mispricing, and how this mispricing can temporarily widen. For example, suppose that the 
arbitrager spots an overpriced stock, let‟s call it A, and sells it short, expecting to make 
money when the stock price declines. At the same time the arbitrager buys a perfect substitute 
                                                 
9
 Although evidence exist that professional investors are not completely immune from behavioural trading, e.g., 
Coval and Shumway (2005). 
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stock, B, so he is perfectly hedged.  If in the intermediate term, noise traders become even 
more optimistic about A and push its price higher, whilst they become pessimistic about B 
and push its price lower, the arbitrager will lose money. He will have to return stock A to its 
owner, thus will have to buy it at a higher price, incurring a loss, which will not be countered 
by his position in B. In the neoclassical model this situation is a profit opportunity, as both A 
and B are mispriced. Therefore the arbitrager should ideally buy more of B and sell more of 
A. So long as the arbitrager has a large enough time horizon and a large amount of capital 
noise trader risk does not matter. However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain, this does 
not occur. If the mispricing widens, the position will temporarily seem as erroneous. Capital 
holders, who do not have the skills to indentify the mispricing, will infer that the arbitrager is 
not as skilful as originally thought, and will deny or withdraw their capital. Arbitragers, being 
fearful of this scenario tend to take prudent positions, which make them more ineffective in 
establishing market efficiency. 
 Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) highlight another caveat of the arbitrage argument. 
They demonstrate that hedge funds (the arbitragers according to the neoclassical model) 
where long on technology stocks during the technology bubble at the turn of the century, 
managed to ride the upswing and sold before the market crashed. This evidence indicates that 
arbitragers timed the market and contributed to the mispricing. That is, they were able to 
identify that the average investor would continue to be optimistic about technology stocks 
and that prices would climb even further. Therefore, despite the fact that technology stocks 
with P/E ratios in the vicinity of 50 definitely seemed overpriced, they exploited the 
excessively optimistic sentiment of the average investor, and profited accordingly.  This 
suggests that arbitragers are not always trading in terms of fundamental value, but rather by 
predicting the response of the average investor.  
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 This section discussed in detail the two fundamental pillars of behaviour finance. 
Investors commit to correlated behavioural errors that are inconsistent with Bayesian 
updating, and that arbitrage is limited and cannot swiftly eliminate all mispricings. Thus, 
informational inefficiency can survive in the stock market.  
 The next chapters present the empirical work conducted in this thesis, explaining in 
detail the motivation, contribution and methodology of each chapter. 
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3. Ambiguity aversion and the pricing of analyst forecasts 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
On May 30
th
 1996, Intel announced that its earnings would be sharply higher than the 
previous quarter, yet lower than what analysts had predicted (by 3% it turned out). This 
caused the price of the Intel stock to fall by 16% [Dreman (1998)]. This example illustrates 
that analysts‟ forecasts exert a powerful effect on investors‟ expectations, and heavily 
influence the allocation of wealth in the market. However, despite the value of analyst 
forecasts to the investment community they are noisy predictors of future earnings [Clement 
and Tse (2003)]. An enduring issue in finance is to identify whether investors understand the 
noisy properties of earnings forecasts, so that their “true” informational content is transmitted 
into prices efficiently [Kothari (2001)]. 
    Rational Bayesian investors, using available information, will ex-ante identify the 
true distribution of forecast accuracy. Armed with this information they will respond more 
forcefully to forecasts that contain less noise, as shown by Equation 2.3. The result of this 
Bayesian updating process is that, upon impact, prices will correctly adjust to the substantive 
component of the earnings forecast, and will not demonstrate any subsequent period of 
adjustment. 
 The Bayesian approach requires that investors fully understand the behaviour of 
forecast accuracy, and thus the earnings process itself. However, it is unlikely that investors 
are able to perform this task consistently because earnings, therefore forecast accuracy, are 
determined in a complicated stochastic process of market-wide, industry and company- 
specific forces. When these processes are opaque investors may feel unable to confidently 
distinguish whether a particular forecast is likely to be accurate or inaccurate.  
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 Such conditions, where the likelihoods associated with a decision are unknown, are 
referred to in the literature as ambiguity. A large literature in decision making demonstrates 
that people when faced with ambiguity become pessimistic and react as if the worst-case 
likelihood is the correct one [Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Cohen et al., (2000)]. This 
finding has been incorporated in models of asset prices, which predict that investors‟ 
pessimism toward ambiguous assets will induce an ambiguity premium [Chen and Epstein 
(2002), Maenhout (2004), Cao, Wang and Zhang (2005), Epstein and Schneider (2008), 
Leippold, Trojani and Vanini (2008)]. This prediction has been confirmed in experimental 
asset markets in which ambiguous assets consistently achieve a lower price than 
unambiguous ones having the same fundamental value [e.g., Camerer and Kunreuther, 
(1989); Sarin and Weber (1993)].    
     In this chapter we investigate whether ambiguity aversion affects the pricing of 
analyst forecasts.  Specifically, we propose the pessimism-and-correction hypothesis. The 
initial response to ambiguous analyst revisions will be to set prices too low; downward 
revisions will be treated as overly bad news, while upward revisions will be treated as not 
such good news. Therefore, because investors will overreact to ambiguous downward 
forecasts and underreact to ambiguous upward ones, prices, after an initial impact period, will 
exhibit an upwards adjustment toward their correct levels. On the contrary, because the 
response of investors towards forecasts that do not involve ambiguity will not entail 
pessimism, we should not observe any subsequent adjustment after such forecasts. 
 To test the pessimism-and-correction hypothesis we must identify which factors 
trigger feelings of ambiguity in investors. To this end, we turn towards important theorists 
that have provided guidance in terms of the circumstances that can be called ambiguous. 
Daniel Ellsberg (1961), whose seminal paper remains the most influential, proposed that 
feelings of ambiguity will be related to the amount, reliability and quality of the available 
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information concerning the relative likelihood of events.  When there is little information, or 
else it is unreliable or of low quality, then decision makers will feel they face a situation that 
is not just risky, but ambiguous.  Similar epistemic definitions of ambiguity have been 
advanced by other economists and psychologists. Frisch and Baron (1998), for example, 
proposed that “ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by missing information 
that is relevant and could be known” (P. 1988). Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) suggest that 
ambiguous situations arise when the available information is vague, and does not allow one 
to confidently rule out alternative possibilities, while Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982, 1983) 
argue that feelings of ambiguity are produced when the relevance of the available information 
is low. For all these authors the underlying theme is that ambiguity is negatively related to 
what might be called the “richness” of the information that can be used to compute relative 
likelihoods. 
  In this chapter we proxy this information richness using company size. This choice is 
based on previous evidence showing that in general there is less reliable information 
available about small companies relative to larger ones. Smaller companies receive less 
media coverage and they are followed by fewer analysts [Waymire (1985); Bhushan, (1989); 
Hong et al., (2000)], they have lower earnings quality [Imhoff (1992); Lang and Lindholm 
(1993), Dechow and Dichev (2002)] and higher dispersion in analyst forecasts [Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina (2002), Thomas (2002)].  In sum, there is less information available 
concerning the earnings of smaller companies, and what information there is is harder to 
interpret.   This, we suggest, makes forecast accuracy less predictable, and the forecast more 
ambiguous.  
 We are not the first to suggest that information about smaller companies is inherently 
more ambiguous. Olsen and Troughton (2000) state that because small firms entail more 
marginal efficiency and weaker competitive positions, it is more difficult to quantitatively 
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estimate their future distribution of returns. Olsen and Troughton found that professional 
investors agreed with them, with an overwhelming majority of respondents to a survey 
judging the return distributions were more ambiguous than those of large ones.  As we report 
below, our quantitative tests of ambiguity and company size reach the same conclusion. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first we examine whether the size of a 
company for which a revision is targeted reflects ambiguity, or the degree to which forecast 
accuracy can be successfully predicted from available information. To perform this test we 
appeal to evidence that forecast accuracy can be partly predicted from publicly available 
information [Clement (1999), Brown (2001), Clement and Tse (2003)]. Using the 
comprehensive model proposed by Clement and Tse (2003) we firstly predict forecast 
accuracy, and then compare these predictions to actual accuracy.  We hypothesized that the 
relationship between predicted and actual accuracy is weaker for smaller companies than for 
larger ones. This would indicate that for smaller companies forecast accuracy is more 
ambiguous, because the formation of a single posterior distribution of earnings is more 
difficult. Our results strongly confirm this prediction, and so support the notion that company 
size is a proxy for forecast ambiguity. 
We then test the pessimism-and-correction hypothesis. We obtain a sample of 
earnings forecasts varying in their ambiguity (i.e., for companies of different size), and 
measure the market response to this ambiguity.  We use a two-stage event study, where the 
first stage shows the initial impact and the second whether adjustments bring prices up to 
their “correct” levels.  We find strong evidence for this hypothesis.  Returns after ambiguous 
downward revisions exhibit significant reversals, while those after ambiguous upward 
revisions exhibit continuations. Conversely, as predicted by our hypothesis, returns after 
forecasts of low ambiguity do not exhibit any adjustment. These results are robust to both 
univariate and multivariate analysis.  
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 In addition to the main test of pessimism-and-correction, we also investigated whether 
this pattern is moderated by the investor‟s baseline state of pessimism or optimism. We use 
the E/P ratio of the market to capture this baseline, because high values of this ratio indicate 
pessimistic investors (prices are low relative to earnings), and vice versa. Our findings show 
that ambiguity aversion is much stronger when the market E/P ratio is high, which suggests 
that the pessimism induced by ambiguous earnings forecasts is magnified when investors are 
generally pessimistic. This finding is in line with results from psychology showing that the 
degree of ambiguity aversion depends on the initial state of pessimism or optimism [Bier and 
Connel (1994), Pulford (2009)].  
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways: Firstly, we test the generality of 
neoclassical theories that predict investors‟ responses to analyst forecasts are neither 
optimistic nor pessimistic [Abarbanell et al (1995)]. Consistent with the pessimism-and-
correction hypothesis, we find that investors react pessimistically towards ambiguous forecast 
revisions, which produces price predictability.  
Secondly, our results relate to the size premium [Banz (1981)]. One explanation given 
for this pattern is that it reflects undiversifiable covariance risk [Fama and French (1993), 
(1995)].  Another is that it reflects a mispricing induced by investors‟ behavioural biases 
[Baker and Wurgler (2005), Zhang (2006)]. These explanations assert that investors‟ estimate 
a single return generating process for small companies from the available information, either 
correctly or incorrectly. We suggest that because it is difficult to estimate a single return 
generating process for small companies, investors respond pessimistically to information 
about them, generating the size premium.  
Finally, whereas previous discussions of ambiguity aversion in asset markets have 
either been theoretical or based on laboratory experiments [Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) 
and Sarin and Weber (1993), Chen and Epstein (2002)], our study provides an operational 
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definition of ambiguity that can be tested empirically, and tests whether ambiguity aversion 
affects the day-to-day behaviour of investors. Our results show that ambiguity aversion has 
real economic effects. These results support the view that the traditional notion of risk needs 
to be updated to accommodate investor‟s response to their feelings of ambiguity.    
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes our 
methods and the sample test we conduct to examine whether our proxies relate to ambiguity. 
Section 3.3 defines the variables used and describes the sample. Section 3.4 presents and 
discusses the results, and Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 The theory of ambiguity aversion 
 
In order to better illustrate the theoretical underpinning of the pessimism and 
correction  hypothesis we use the ambiguity model of information processing proposed in a 
recent study by Epstein and Schneider (2008) (henceforth ES).  
ES model the response of a representative investor towards ambiguous information. 
The information is ambiguous because the signal may or may not be an accurate predictor of 
future performance, and the investor cannot confidently separate between the two. In the 
model ambiguity aversion is incorporated via the investor‟s utility function, namely recursive 
multiple priors utility [Epstein and Schneider (2003)]. This functional form incorporates 
Gilboa and Schmeider‟s (1985) maximin decision criterion whereby that agent chooses the 
alternative with the highest minimum utility outcome. This decision criterion implies that 
agents update their expectations using ambiguous information  pessimistically. Therefore, on 
impact, the ambiguous information signal sends prices too low, causing an upward 
adjustment during an adjustment period, reflecting an ambiguity premium.  
Assume a representative agent who sets prices. This agent is interested in an objective 
variable, θ, e.g., earnings. He has a unique and unambiguous prior over θ, defined as 
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2
θθ~N(m,σ ) . This agent then receives an ambiguous information signal which yields some 
new information about θ defined as S = θ + ε, where 2 2 2 2
s s s,min s,maxε~N(0,σ ), σ [σ ,σ ] . 
Because the signal is ambiguous its true variance (precision) is unknown. Therefore the agent 
forms a family of possible variances that reflect that the signal may be reliable ( 2
s,minσ ), or 
unreliable ( 2
s,maxσ ). The agent updates in a Bayesian fashion for each different variance in the 
set 2 2 2
s s,min s,maxσ [σ ,σ ] , which results to a family of posterior distributions for the parameter θ: 
2 2 2
2 2 2θ s θ
s s,min s,max2 2 2 2
θ s s θ
σ σ σ
θ~N(m+ (s-m), ), σ [σ ,σ ]
σ +σ σ +σ
                 (3.1) 
Being averse to ambiguity the agent makes choices according to the maximin criterion 
and maximizes expected utility under the worst case belief from the above set of θ posteriors. 
This means that the agent maximises expected utility using as an expectation the posterior 
distribution that entails the lowest θ value.  This is where the asymmetric response to good 
and bad information derives. If the signal is good, s > m, the worst case scenario that entails 
the lower θ is when 2 2
s s,maxσ =σ . This implies that the investor believes that the good signal is 
unreliable (i.e., that it has the maximum possible variance).  However, the actual realization 
of θ will on average be higher that the investor‟s expectation; therefore the investor 
systematically underreacts towards ambiguous good information. Conversely, after bad 
information (s < m) the worst case scenario is that the information signal is totally reliable, 
therefore expected utility is maximised under 2 2
s s,minσ =σ . In this case the actual realization of θ 
is not as bad, therefore on average the investor overreacts towards ambiguous bad 
information. In both cases the expectation of the investor is the posterior that implies the 
lowest θ value, and it is, therefore, pessimistic.  
Epstein and Schneider (2008) use this model to explain in relation to the rapid 
collapse of the markets in response to the 9/11 attack, followed by their gradual reversion.    
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Although Epstein and Schneider investigated a market-wide increase in ambiguity, we argue 
that a similar, albeit much smaller scale, effect operates at the firm level as well.   Ambiguous 
news (i.e., forecast revisions) about an individual firm will lead to the same pessimism-and-
correction pattern for that firm as the 9/11 attack did for the market as a whole.    
 
3.3 Methodology and Data 
 
3.3.1 Definition of Variables and method that ambiguity is measured 
 
A detailed data description is provided in the next section. However, in order for the 
econometric methodology to be clearer to the reader we provide some information on the data 
used. We use analyst forecasts for quarterly earnings from the IBES database. Each forecast 
by each analyst for each company has a forecast release date, which in our framework is the 
event date. Therefore, the data in our sample are organised in a three dimensional panel 
related to analysts, companies and time of issuance.    
Our measure of ambiguity is company size, defined as the company‟s market 
capitalization (price x shares outstanding) three days prior to the release of a forecast 
revision. We validated whether company size is associated with the ambiguity of forecast 
revisions by testing for a systematic relationship between company size and the predictability 
of forecast accuracy.  As discussed above, it is not the accuracy of forecasts themselves that 
determine ambiguity, but the predictability of that accuracy.  For instance, if an agent knows 
the error distribution associated with a specific forecast, she can use Bayes‟ rule to update her 
beliefs.  But if the distribution is not known and different alternatives can arise, the agent will 
become pessimistic, as shown in Equation (3.1). In this chapter we suggest that company size 
relates to the extent investors can estimate the distribution of forecast accuracy. 
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 We validate our intuition by first predicting forecast accuracy from available 
information using the model proposed by Clement and Tse (2003), and then examining how 
predicted accuracy explains actual accuracy for companies of different size. Our hypothesis is 
that for smaller companies actual accuracy will be more unpredictable, pointing to higher 
ambiguity.  
In order to perform the test we firstly standardise forecast accuracy as in Clement and 
Tse (2003), using the following formula: 
 
jtq
jtq jtq
max ijtq
ijtq
max min
AFE -AFE
Accuracy =
AFE -AFE
                                                    (3.2) 
  
That is, the accuracy of a forecast issued by analyst i for company j in year t and quarter q is 
given by the absolute value of its forecast error,
10
 subtracted from the largest absolute error 
for company j in year t and quarter q made by any analyst, divided by the range of absolute 
errors for forecasts issued by company j in year t and quarter q. Accuracy ranges from 0 to 1, 
where a higher value indicates higher accuracy.  
For each forecast we then computed the following variables that have been found to 
predict accuracy: 
1) Forecast horizon: The days that separate a forecast by analyst i for company j in year t 
and quarter q with the corresponding earnings announcement date. The larger the 
distance between the two the less precise is the information used by the analyst, 
therefore the lower the accuracy.  
2)  Days elapsed: This variable is equal to the days intervening between a forecast issued 
by analyst i for company j in year t and quarter q, with the previous forecast issued by 
                                                 
10 Forecast error =| (Forecast – actual)| / actual. 
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any analyst for that company, year and quarter. Clement and Tse (2003) suggest that this 
variable captures the rate at which information for the company is flowing in. Large 
values indicate smaller flow thereby decreasing forecast accuracy.  
3) Lag accuracy: This is a proxy for analysts‟ ability. It equals the absolute forecast error 
that analyst i has made in his last forecast for company j in quarter q-1. The rationale is 
that analysts who have been accurate in the past continue to be accurate in the future. 
Brown (2001) finds that lag accuracy is one of the most important predictors of current 
accuracy.  This variable is expected to relate positively to forecast accuracy. 
4) Broker size: A proxy for the reputation of the brokerage house that the analyst is 
employed. It equals the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house in which 
analyst j is employed in year t that the forecast is issued. This is expected to correlate 
positively with accuracy.   
5) Forecast frequency: This variable captures the effort that analysts‟ devote to forecasting 
earnings for that company. It equals the amount of forecasts that analyst i has issued for 
company j in year t and quarter q. It is expected to correlate positively with accuracy. 
6) Firm experience: Another proxy for analysts‟ ability. It equals the amount of time 
(measured in quarters) that analyst i has been covering company j. This variable also is 
expected to relate positively to forecast accuracy. 
7) Industries: This is a proxy for the complexity of each analyst‟s job. It equals the number 
of industries (4-digit SIC) the analyst is following in the year the forecast is issued. It is 
expected to relate negatively to accuracy. 
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8) Companies. Another proxy for the complexity of the task the analyst undertakes. It 
equals the number of companies the analyst is following in the year the forecast is 
issued. It is expected to relate negatively to accuracy. 
 
These variables (except lag accuracy which is standardised as in equation 3.2) are 
standardised in the following way: 
 
jtq
jtq jtq
ijtq min
ijtq
max min
Raw characteristic -Raw characteristic
Characteristic =
Raw characteristic -Raw characteristic
                              (3.3) 
 
For example, if the analyst who issues a forecast for IBM in the first quarter of 2000 follows 
3 industries, and the IBM-covering analyst who, for the same period, covers the smallest 
number of industries covers 1 industry, and the one who covers the largest number covers 10, 
then the variable in (2) for this forecast would equal (3 – 1)/ (10-3) = 0.28. In this way all 
variables are standardised to vary between 0 and 1, with a higher value showing that the 
forecast is predicted to be higher for that characteristic.
 11
  
Subsequently we estimate the predicted accuracy of each forecast using the following 
cross sectional regression in each year t (subsuming analyst and company subscripts):
12
 
 
1t 2t
3t 4t 5t
6t 7t t
t t t t
t t t
t t 8 tt+b u
Accuracy = a  + b Company experience  + b Broker size
+ b Companies  + b forecast frequency  + b Days elapsed  
+ b Forecast horizon + b Industries Lag accuracy +
 
                                                 
11
 Typically studies that analyze forecast errors and their association with returns do some form of 
standardisation because the market evaluates forecasts in a relative sense (see Brown 2001, Bonner, Walther and 
Young 2003, Clement and Tse 2003).  
12
 We run the regression yearly, as opposed to quarterly, because accounting quarters frequently correspond to 
different calendar months for different companies. By running the regression in calendar time we ensure that 
investors can estimate expected accuracy in year t using factor loadings from t-1, regardless of quarter ends.  
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       (3.4) 
Using these coefficients and constant, we derive the Expected accuracy of forecasts issued in 
year t+1 as follows:
13
 
 
1t
2t 3t 4t
5t 6t 7t
t+1 t t+1
t+1 t+1 t+1
t+1 t+1 t+1
8 t+1t+b
Expected Accuracy = a  + b Company experience  
+ b Broker size + b Companies  + b forecast frequency
+ b Days elapsed  + b Forecast horizon + b Industries
Lag accuracy
 
                      (3.5) 
Expected Accuracy
   
is therefore an estimate of forecast accuracy using information available 
to the investor. As explained above, ambiguity arises when expected accuracy (Eq. 3.5) does 
not successfully capture actual accuracy (Eq. 3.2).   To examine whether company size 
predicts ambiguity in this sense we regress actual accuracy on expected accuracy using 
dummy variables for company size:
14
 
 
i 1 i
2 i 3 i i
1 2Actual Accuracy =a+a Middle+a Small+θ Expected Accuracy
+θ Expected Accuracy *Middle+θ Expected Accuracy *Small+u
            (3.6) 
 
Where Middle is a dummy that equals 1 if the size of the company belongs in the 2nd, 3rd or 
4th quintile (i.e., is of intermediate size) and Small equals 1 if company is in the 1
st
 quintile.    
The coefficient of “predictability”, θ1, shows how well expected accuracy (Eq. 3.5) predicts 
actual accuracy (Eq. 3.2) for the largest companies, those predicted to have low ambiguity. 
We predicted that as ambiguity increases, this relationship would become weaker, so that θ2 
                                                 
13
 This method of estimating expected accuracy has been used previously, e.g., Brown (2001). 
14 To identify the levels of ambiguity we split our sample into quintiles based on company size. We use the 
breakpoints from Kenneth French‟s website in month t-1 to assign the forecasts in month t in size deciles.   
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and θ3 would be significantly negative, and that θ3 would be less than θ2.  That is, the smaller 
the company, the more accuracy is subjected to unpredictable variation that cannot be 
predicted from available information, and therefore the more ambiguity.    
Our test of ambiguity is meaningful insofar as the market uses available information 
to estimate forecast accuracy, as shown in Equation 3.4. If the market does use this 
information it will identify a relationship, if one exists, between company size and the 
predictability of forecast accuracy. Although there exist plentiful evidence to suggest that 
investors use information cues such as those in Equation 3.4 to estimate forecast accuracy 
[see Clement and Tse (2003), Bonner et al (2003), Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2003); 
(2004)], we examine whether these findings emerge in our sample. We do this by running the 
following regression: 
 
1 2
3 4 5
6 7 ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt8+b u
Car(-1,1) = a + b Company experience  + b Broker size
+ b Companies  + b forecast frequency  + b Days elapsed  
+ b Forecast horizon + b Industries Lag accuracy +
       (3.7)            
 
CARijt (from trading days -1 to 1 where 0 is the date the forecast is issued) is the cumulative 
market adjusted abnormal return following a revision from analyst i for company j in period t, 
and the dependent variables are the predictors of forecast accuracy used in Equation 3.4. We 
run the regression separately for upward and downward forecasts. This regression will show 
whether the market relies on predictors of accuracy to evaluate forecast quality. 
 
 3.3.2 The event study 
 
Once we have demonstrated the validity of the ambiguity measures, we test the 
pessimism-and-correction hypothesis, which is that more ambiguous forecasts will be treated 
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more pessimistically. We group forecasts according to the size of the targeted company, and 
perform a two-stage event study to examine whether the average returns in each group 
support the existence of ambiguity aversion.  
 Diagram 1 below explains the intuition of the event study. The 21 trading days period 
after the revision, is divided into two sub-periods. The period from trading day -2 to 2, where 
date 0 is the date that the forecast is issued,
15
 is called the impact period and measures how 
expectations and prices are updated in the light of analyst forecasts revisions. The second 
period, from trading days 3 to 20, is called the adjustment period and shows how prices 
adjust to the initial impact.  An efficient response requires that returns in the adjustment 
period are insignificant as the information content of the revision was fully and correctly 
incorporated in the asset price during the impact period.  
 
Diagram1. The specification of the windows used. 
 
However if returns continue on the same direction we can argue that the analyst forecast was 
underused (underreaction) and prices exhibited a drift to the equilibrium. On the contrary if 
returns revert the analyst forecast was overused (overreaction) and prices were temporarily 
sent to high or low and then mean reverted to equilibrium. The pessimism-and-correction 
                                                 
15
 For date 0 the study uses the variable estdats in the IBES detail files. 
 3 -2 
Impact period 
Adjustment period 
20 2 
Trading Days 
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hypothesis is that, during the impact period, investors set prices of firms with ambiguous 
forecast accuracy too low, and prices increase during the adjustment period to correct this 
initial pessimism.   This means that investors are overreacting towards downward forecast 
revisions with ambiguous accuracy, and underreacting towards upward forecast revisions 
with ambiguous accuracy.   
This short-run methodology has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, Kothari and 
Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) find that the statistical reliability of long-run firm 
specific event studies is debatable. In addition, the frequency of earnings related information, 
such as forecasts by other analysts and earnings announcements is so large that it is hard to 
disentangle the extend to which long run returns relate to one particular forecast.  
 Returns are risk adjusted using the modified market model.
16
 The market adjusted 
return method is an approximation of the market model where α = 0 and β = 1, for all firms. 
This model has been used widely in the literature [see for example DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)]. The benefit of this approach is that it does 
not require a pre-event estimation period in which to estimate the parameters, which will be 
contaminated by prior revisions that may relate to the current one, especially for closely 
followed larger firms skewing the results. The chapter follows the original Brown and 
Warner‟s (1985) standard event study to calculate Cumulative Average Returns (CAR) for 
the impact and the adjustment periods. Returns are defined as the logarithmic change of the 
return for the firm‟s security within a one day interval, Rit. Therefore, mtitit RRAR   is the 
abnormal return for security i at day t, where Rit is the return of the security on that day and 
Rmt  is the return of a value weighted market index including dividends.  Finally, in order to 
calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for the two periods we sum up daily 
                                                 
16. The reason we choose the market model is that, as noted by Cambell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997), such 
statistical models suffice when one seeks to investigate the effect of an event on asset prices. This is because in 
smaller time horizons (i.e., less than a month) expected returns are close to 0, therefore an economic model, 
such as the CAPM, is not necessary.  
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abnormal returns for the impact and adjustment periods. In order to test the statistical 
significance of the CAR‟s we use t-statistics estimated using the cross-sectional variation of 
abnormal returns. More specifically, the test statistic of the null hypothesis that the mean 
CAR‟s (MCAR) is equal to zero for a sample of n firms is as follows: 
 
CAR
MCAR
MCAR
t
/ n
                                                          (3.8)
 
 
Where MCAR denotes the sample average, σ(MCAR) denotes the cross-sectional sample 
standard deviation of the abnormal returns and n is the sample size. To test the significance of 
the difference between MCAR‟s for small and large companies in the impact and adjustment 
period using a two sample t-test as shown below: 
 
22
Small Larg eMCAR MCAR
t
s
N                                                            (3.9)
 
 
where the sample variance, given by: 
 
  (3.10) 
 
 
3.3.3  Market reaction to ambiguity under general optimism and pessimism 
 
 There is evidence that the degree of ambiguity aversion is moderated when decision 
makers are generally optimistic [Bier and Connell (1994), Pulford et al. (2009)].   We tested 
for this by examining whether the magnitude of the pessimism and correction effect is also 
attenuated when the market is generally optimistic.  The intuition is that when the market is 
overvalued relative to earnings (low E/P ratio) investors will be generally optimistic about the 
22
2 2
2 1 1
2 2 1
N N
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N
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future growth rate of the economy, and so show less ambiguity aversion than when the 
market is undervalued relative to earnings (high E/P ratio). 
Following Conrad et. al. (2002) we proxy market optimism using the de-trended 
market E/P ratio.  Lower values mean more optimism, because it means investors are driving 
up the price of assets relative to earnings.  Higher values of the ratio mean prices are being 
driven down.  The market E/P ratio is calculated by dividing total earnings by total market 
value for a representative sample of companies from the US market.
17
 To eliminate the time 
trend from the E/P ratio we follow Conrad et al (2002) and standardise the time series by 
subtracting from each month‟s market E/P ratio the average market E/P ratio for the preceding 
12 months. Based on this standardised time series we construct deciles of (de-trended) market 
E/P ratio. The bottom 30% of the observations in this distribution constitutes the “good” 
times, and the top 30% the “bad” times. We analyze the response of the market towards low 
and high ambiguity forecasts in the impact and adjustment periods separately for the three 
market states. 
 
 3.3.4 Multivariate analysis 
 
Our univariate analysis is complemented by regression analyses that control for other 
variables known to affect post-revision returns [Clement and Tse (2003)]. These are the 
forecast horizon (the days intervening between a forecast revision and the earnings 
announcement), broker size (the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house 
employing the analyst who issued a forecast) and revision magnitude. In addition, we control 
for analyst forecast bias (signed forecast error) to ensure that the pricing patterns we 
document are due to ambiguity aversion and not analysts systematically under predicting 
                                                 
17 This variable is downloaded from Thomson Financial, and is coded as TOTMKUS. Thomson report that this 
variable is calculated using the 1000 largest companies in the U.S.   
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earnings.
18
  Further, we include interactions of the logarithm of company size and the 
valuation of the market to examine whether the response to company size differs according to 
these variables.   The multivariate regression is of the form:   
 
ijt 0 1 ijt 2 ijt t
3 t 4 ijt
5 it 6 ijt 7 ijt ijt
CAR =α +β log(size) +β log(size) *market E/P
+β Market E/P+β Forecast Horizon +
β Broker size +β Forecast error +β Rev.magnitude +u
                              (3.11)
 
 
The dependent variable, CARijt, is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal return for 
company j at time t after the forecast revision issued by analyst i, while log (size)ijt is the 
natural logarithm of company size. We conduct four regressions, for returns during the 
impact period and adjustment period, separately for upward and downward forecasts.  
 Because we are using a panel data set with repeated observations for the same 
companies the models in (3.6),(3.7) and (3.11) are estimated using a fixed effects regression 
technique that eliminates the effect of clustered residuals on the basis of year-firm 
combinations.  
 Fixed effects regressions are aimed to alleviate the fact that inevitably regression 
models are imperfect. They omit important covariates, potentially biasing the relevant 
estimates. Fixed effects regressions alleviate these misspecification problems by essentially 
disregarding between-cluster heterogeneity that arises due to such omitted variables, 
producing estimates that depend only on within-cluster variation.  
Specifically, the model estimated is: 
 
                          (3.12) 
 
                                                 
18
 See Matsumoto (2002).  
it 0 it i i ity = b + X b + Z γ + a + u
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Where yit is the dependent variable for observation (i.e., company) i at time t, Xit is the time-
variant regressor, Zi is the time-invariant regressor, αi is the unobserved individual effect, and 
uit is the error term.
19
 Clearly our model demonstrates that the observations for company i in 
the sample are contaminated by the factor ai. This violates the assumption of serially 
uncorrelated and homoscedastic residuals. Fixed effects regression eliminates this company 
specific component by estimating:  
 
                          (3.13) 
 
where  
T T
i it i it
t=1 t=1
1 1
X = X u =
T T
and u  
 Therefore the parameter of interest b is estimated from an OLS regression whereby 
from each observation on both the dependent and independent variables the average cluster 
effect is removed.
20
 
 As mentioned above the estimations of models (3.6),(3.7) and (3.11) use Fixed effects 
regressions for clusters, i.e., α‟s, based on years and companies. Year effects may arise if the 
application of the model for certain years differs. For example, in 2002 the SEC has approved 
a scheme whereby brokerages are required to have independent research and investment 
banking departments. If the market responded positively to this bill, we may find a stronger 
response to analyst forecasts subsequent that date. This would induce a year related ai in the 
market response model. By including year related fixed effects, our model is robust to such 
between year effects. 
                                                 
19
 Note that the procedure is named fixed effects exactly because the effect is fixed, i.e., time invariant. If the 
effect of thought to be time variant a random effects model should be employed. 
20
 Numerically the estimate of b is identical to the estimate produced from the procedure outlined above if a 
dummy variable is included to indicate each cluster. 
it i it i it iy - y = (X - X )b +(u - u )
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 Clustering on the basis of companies is more obvious. Whereas all the multivariate 
models used apply an average relationship between the dependent and the independent 
variables, the relationship between yi and xi will most likely differ for each company in an 
unobserved manner. For example, assume that company i may be more transparent that 
company j. If transparency is not captured endogenously in the model, the residuals of these 
two companies will encompass an omitted transparency effect. Therefore including a 
company related fixed effect the model is robust to such unobserved heterogeneity.
21
  
 
 3.3.5  Sample construction and descriptive statistics 
 
Data on all quarterly US analyst forecast revisions and actual earnings are from the 
IBES detail files. The sample period spans from January 1994 to December 2008.
22
  Data on 
returns and shares outstanding are from CRSP. We apply the following filters to the sample: 
 First, a company must have data from both CRSP and IBES. Second, if the forecast 
estimation date is after the earnings announcement date the observation is deleted. Third all 
revisions greater than 100% and all revisions which entail an error in excess of 100% of the 
actual earnings are removed from the sample [Capstaff et al (1995), observe that these are 
likely to be errors]. Fourth, all revisions equal to 0 are deleted. Finally, and consistent with 
other studies [Clement and Tse (2003), Clement (1999), O‟Brien (1990)] only the last 
forecast issued by each analyst-firm pair for each quarter is retained. After these filters are 
applied we end up with 620,179 earnings forecast revisions, from 8,513 analysts for 6,843 
companies. 
Panel A of Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used. The means 
and medians for the accuracy related variables are comparable to Clement and Tse (2003).  
                                                 
21
 For an in depth discussion of panel data econometrics see Petersen (2009).  
22
 Similar to Clement and Tse (2003) we choose 1994 as the cut-off point to ensure that the issuance date of the 
revision reported in the IBES files is accurate.  
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The average revision is -4.00%, and the average forecast error is -3.63%. These figures are 
consistent with prior evidence showing that on average analysts initially issue optimistic 
forecasts and gradually walk them down so that actual earnings meet or beat expectations 
[Richardson et al (2004), Matsumoto (2002)]. In terms of company size we observe that the 
mean size decile rank (using end of previous month breakpoints) for the firms in the sample 
is 6.6, which indicates the sample is slightly tilted towards large companies. This is a 
common finding when IBES data are used because large companies have larger analyst 
coverage. However the sample does include small firms, as 25% percent are below a decile 
rank of 4. 
Panel B shows the annual frequency of analyst forecasts according to revision 
direction and company size. Our sample is comprised of 269,955 upward forecasts (43.4%) 
and 350,224 downward ones (56.6%).  
Panel D1 shows that the accuracy related variables are correlated, but not to a degree 
that suggests problems with multicollinearity.  
 
3.4 Results 
 
  3.4.1 Estimating forecast ambiguity 
 
Panel A in Table 3.2 shows the output from the regression which examines whether 
accuracy is predictable from available information.   Our results are consistent with earlier 
work. Accuracy increases with company experience, broker size, forecast frequency and lag 
accuracy, and decreases with the number of industries followed by the analyst, days elapsed 
and forecast horizon.  
We now examine whether the market is responding to factors that predict forecast 
accuracy. We estimate Equation 6, whereby we regress these accuracy factors on the market 
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adjusted cumulative return from days -1 to 1, where 0 is the date the forecast was released. 
The coefficients of these factors provide information on whether the market attempts to 
estimate forecast accuracy when responding to the forecast. 
Panel B in Table 2 shows the output from this regression.
23
 Consistent with previous 
literature [e.g., Clement and Tse (2003), Bonner et al (2003), Mikhail, Walther and Willis 
(2003; 2004)], we find the market is sensitive to these accuracy factors. In terms of upward 
forecasts, the market responds more strongly to analysts with more experience (coefficient of 
0.0008 p-value=0.024), to forecasts issued from larger brokerage houses (0.0023 with p-value 
<0.001), and to analysts that issue more forecasts during the quarter (forecast frequency: 
0.001 with p-value 0.0148). In addition, it responds less strongly to analysts who follow 
many industries (-0.0017 with p-value <0.0001), and to forecasts with more days elapsed (-
0.0042 with p-value<0.0001). Similar relationships are found for downward forecasts.
24
  
 At this point a brief detour in the literature of forecast accuracy would be helpful to 
position this finding in the literature. As mentioned, because analyst earnings forecasts are 
very important to the investment community, an enduring issue in finance and accounting is 
to identify whether variations in forecast accuracy can be predicted a priory so that 
investment strategies that utilize analyst forecasts can be made more profitable. The early 
literature has produced inconclusive results, as no systematic differences in accuracy were 
identified (Richards 1976; Brown and Rozeff 1980; O‟Brien 1987; Butler and Lang 1991, 
                                                 
23
 Notice that the constant term in the regression is not reported. This applies for all the regressions in the 
chapter. This is because the SAS absorb procedure (in Proc GLM) was used to eliminate year-firm effects. This 
procedure yields identical results as the procedure outlined in Equation 3.1, but just requires significantly less 
computing resources. This is important because in our case we have a very large number of year-firm 
observations, therefore defining each pair as a fixed effect (i.e., a dummy) substantially increase computing 
time, whilst producing the same output. However, for robustness, we have replicated the analysis for a 
subsection of the data to compare the two procedures, and the results are identical.      
24
 However, as reported by previous studies such as Clement and Tse (2003), we find that in some cases the 
market responds more strongly to variables that are less predicative of accuracy. For example, the market reacts 
more strongly to forecasts issued earlier in the quarter (0.005 p-value <0.0001) and to analysts who follow more 
companies. See Clement and Tse (2003) for possible explanations for the former finding. The latter finding may 
indicate that analysts who follow more companies are more well known, and therefore elicit more stronger 
responses, all else equal.  
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among others). However, as research progressed several patterns begun to emerge that 
highlight that forecast accuracy can be predicted from various factors that are observable ex-
ante. For example, Stickel (1992) finds that analysts who are ranked as All-Stars are more 
accurate than non All-Stars. Clement (1999) finds that accuracy decreases with the number of 
companies and industries an analyst follows, and increases with the resources available to the 
analyst. Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999) find that forecast accuracy increases with the effort the 
analyst is expensing in the forecasting task. In a more recent study Clement and Tse (2003) 
comprehensively encompass many of these factors in a single model, and offer conclusive 
evidence that forecast accuracy does indeed vary with ex-ante forecast characteristics. The 
results shown in Panel A of Table 3.2 corroborate the recent findings. That is, forecast 
accuracy can be partly predicted from publicly available information. In addition, the results 
found in Panel B of table 3.2 suggest that the market is taking these factors that predict 
forecast accuracy into consideration when it reacts to analyst forecasts, as shown by Clement 
and Tse (2003), Bonner et al (2003), Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2003; 2004).  These results 
send a clear message: investors are aware of the factors that predict forecast accuracy, and 
take them under consideration when they rebalance their portfolios using analyst forecast 
revisions. 
   We now estimate whether company size is associated with the predictability of 
forecast accuracy.   Panel C in Table 3.2 shows estimates of the models in (Eq. 4) and (Eq. 5). 
The coefficient of predictability, θ1, for large companies (low ambiguity forecasts) is 0.861. 
Since a coefficient of 1 indicates a perfect fit, this magnitude is substantial, and suggests that 
the available information for larger companies can be used to predict forecast accuracy fairly 
accurately. The coefficient is lower for mid-sized companies (Middle = -0.0917, p-value 
<0.0001) and much smaller for small ones (Small = -0.1897, p-value <.0001). In other words, 
the predictability of forecast accuracy from expected accuracy decreases by 22% when we 
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move from the largest to the smallest companies.  This suggests that for smaller companies 
the factors that the market is using to predict forecast accuracy are in significantly less 
relevant, therefore investors will have more difficulty distinguishing forecasts that are likely 
to be accurate or inaccurate. This translates to uncertainty about forecast precision for smaller 
companies, or, in other words, more ambiguity.     
This result deserves a caveat because although we have documented the relationship 
between company size and forecast accuracy, size is only a noisy proxy of ambiguity. 
Therefore, we cannot be completely certain that the driving force behind our results is indeed 
ambiguity or some other characteristic that relates to company size. However, this is a 
general problem of empirical studies in finance, as we often have to measure latent quantities 
with observable and imperfect proxies.   
 
 3.4.2 Impact and adjustment period returns by ambiguity proxy  
 
Table 3.3 presents market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for equally weighted 
portfolios formed according to company size for the impact (-2, 2) and the adjustment (3, 20) 
periods.  Panels A and B presents returns after, respectively, upward and downward forecasts.  
We control for the magnitude of the revision, in order to measure the “quantity” of the 
news that each forecast releases. We measure revision magnitude as the difference between 
the two most recent forecasts issued by a particular analyst for a given company and quarter, 
scaled by the penultimate forecast. We firstly independently sort the sample into quintiles 
according to revision magnitude and company size.
25
 This means that each forecast is 
independently put into a quintile according to firm size and revision magnitude. In order to 
calculate average event time returns in the impact and adjustment periods we subdivide all 
                                                 
25
 The breakpoints used to classify companies in size deciles are from Kenneth French‟s website. In order to 
derive breakpoints for revision magnitude we sort in each month all forecasts into quintiles according to 
magnitude, and then use these breakpoints to assign the forecasts into revision quintiles in the next month. 
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forecasts in each revision magnitude quintile according to size using the original size 
classifications, and average the returns for each size group. This is done in order to capture 
the effect of company size on the pricing of analyst forecast, controlling for the magnitude of 
the revision.  However, we also present results whereby we only sort forecasts according to 
company size.               
Before we continue to present evidence for the ambiguity aversion hypothesis we 
examine whether the general finding of an unconditional underreaction toward analyst 
forecasts emerges in our sample [Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Stickel (1992), Gleason and 
Lee (2003)]. According to this finding prices respond sluggishly to analyst forecasts, 
therefore continue to rise (fall) after an upward (downward) revision. It is important to verify 
this robust result, as we would like our sample to be representative. To check whether this 
holds in our sample we calculate cumulative market adjusted returns 40 days after the 
revision (not reported result). Consistent with previous research, we find that post revision 
returns drift in the direction of the revision (Givoly and Lakonishok 1979, Stickel 1991, 
Gleason and Lee 2003) as the average market adjusted cumulative abnormal return in the 40 
day period after upward revisions is 1.89% and -2.14% after downward ones. However, our 
tests are different from these results because we are interested to decompose this post revision 
period in an impact and an adjustment period, and examine for patterns of adjustment that 
resemble the existence of ambiguity aversion. 
We now continue to examine the pricing of analyst forecasts in the impact period.        
Impact periods returns also show that investors generally react more strongly to revisions 
issued for smaller companies. The finding is consistent with Stickel (1992) and highlights 
how the information set of smaller companies is poorer, which makes the market more reliant 
on analyst forecasts. However, we also observe that for downward forecasts the pattern is 
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significantly less obvious as in many cases we observe that the market is responding more 
strongly to larger companies (i.e., for revision magnitude quintiles 1,2 and 3 and 4). 
To test the ambiguity aversion hypothesis we turn to adjustment period returns. For 
upward forecasts (Panel A), we observe that return continuations occur exclusively amongst 
smaller companies. For larger companies, regardless of the magnitude of the revision, 
adjustment period returns are close to zero, suggesting that the initial response has 
transmitted the information in analysts‟ forecasts into prices efficiently. However, as we 
move towards smaller companies returns increase monotonically in the adjustment period. 
For the smallest companies (Quintile 1), there is an upward adjustment in prices for all 
revision magnitude categories, equal to roughly 50% of impact period returns. This generates 
an economically and statistically significant differential in the adjustment period returns of 
small and large companies, which ranges from 0.50% for small revisions to 1.54% for large 
revisions. In short, and consistent with the pessimism and correction hypothesis, for smaller 
companies there is a significant upward price movement during the adjustment period.     
  A similar picture emerges when we consider downward revisions (Panel B). For 
large companies adjustment period returns for all magnitude categories are slightly negative, 
indicate that prices continue to drop in the adjustment period. However, as we move towards 
smaller companies the returns become positive, creating a significant differential between the 
returns of small and large companies, which ranges from 0.35% for smaller revisions to 
1.35% for large revisions. This again shows that prices in the adjustment period for small 
companies increased substantially to push the valuation towards its correct level. This pattern 
is consistent with an initial overreaction which is then corrected.  
Overall, the behaviour of returns in the adjustment period is consistent with the 
pessimism-and-correction hypothesis.  In the light of ambiguous forecasts, investors 
overweight the pessimistic scenarios that may arise, and consequently set prices too low. As 
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the mispricing becomes apparent, prices drift upward to their “correct” levels in the 
adjustment period.
26
 
 
  3.4.3 Impact and Adjustment Period Returns and the Level of the Market 
 
 In this section we examine whether the pessimism-and-correction effect is attenuated 
when the market is generally optimistic. We repeat the analysis in Table 3.3, by further 
partitioning on the E/P ratio. 
Table 3.4 shows that the response of investors towards analyst forecasts does depend 
on whether times are good or bad. First, the market responds more strongly to upward 
forecasts when times are bad (i.e., the market E/P ratio is high). This is reasonable because 
during bad times the general price level is low and there is therefore there is more capacity 
for upward movements in prices. For downward forecasts impact period returns suggest that 
no clear relationship exists between investors‟ responses and market states. 
 Adjustment period returns for both upward and downward forecasts show that returns 
are higher after ambiguous forecasts. For example, continuations after upward forecasts for 
smaller companies increase from 0.37% in good states, to 1.78% in bad states.  The 
corresponding figures for downward forecasts are -0.77% to 1.86%.  
 Although ambiguity aversion is by far the most common attitude towards ambiguity, 
it has been found that in certain circumstances this pattern of behaviour is reversed. This 
implies ambiguity-seeking behaviour, whereby people when faced with ambiguity make 
optimistic choices as opposed to pessimistic ones.   Various explanations have been proposed 
for this finding, including the competence hypothesis [Heath and Tversky (1991)], and the 
status-quo bias [Roca, Hogarth and Maule (2006)]. In a recent study Bracha and Brown 
                                                 
26
 One alternative possibility is that these patterns are caused by time varying expected returns. It is unlikely, 
however, that company risk changes so dramatically from the impact to the adjustment period, so that the 
continuations and reversals we document reflect compensation for bearing it. 
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(2009) propose that the optimistic bias can also explain ambiguity seeking behaviour.
 27
 Our 
findings in this section support the argument made by Bracha and Brown, as we find that in 
periods of general optimism, the traces of ambiguity aversion become weaker.   
   
 3.4.4  Multivariate analysis 
 
We now examine the robustness of our results in a multivariate setting. Panels A and 
B of Table 3.5 show impact and adjustment stage returns for upward and downward forecasts 
respectively. Most results are consistent with the univariate analysis. Adjustment period 
returns decrease after for downward forecasts when the revision is targeted towards larger 
companies (-0.1581 with p-value <0.001), especially if the revision was issued during 
undervalued markets (coefficient of interaction term between company size and market E/P is 
-0.0006 with p-value <0.001). 
  Similar results are found for upward forecasts, as adjustment period returns decrease 
when the revision is targeted towards larger companies (-0.1441 with p-value <0.001). In 
contrast with the univariate analysis, however, we find that the interaction term between 
company size and market E/P is insignificant.  This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that the 
relationship between company size and market E/P for upward forecasts is not monotonic 
across size groups. For example, for small companies adjustment-period returns decrease 
with the E/P ratio, equaling 1.78% when the E/P ratio is low, 0.89% when it is medium and 
0.37% when it is high. However, for large companies no distinguishable pattern appears as 
the corresponding figures are -0.32%, 0.22% and 0.17%.   
 Impact period returns produce a less consistent picture. For upward revisions impact 
period returns decrease with company size, showing that the response of the market is 
stronger when the upward revision is issued for a small company. This is in line with the 
                                                 
27
 For studies in the optimistic bias and applications see Bracha and Brown (2009) and references therein. 
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univariate analysis shown in Panel A of Table 3.3, where for all revision magnitude quintiles 
returns are higher for smaller as opposed to larger companies. For downward revisions the 
coefficient of size is negative, suggesting that larger companies elicit a stronger response. 
This contradicts the last column in Panel B of Table 3.3, which shows that the response is 
unconditionally larger for smaller companies. However, upon closer inspection, this 
contradiction is captured in Table 3.3 since the unconditional effect shown in the last column 
only holds for the largest revisions (quintile 5 which constitutes the majority of revisions for 
smaller companies as shown by table 5.1), whereas for the remaining quintiles the results 
show that, either larger companies elicit a larger response (quintiles 2, 3 and 4) or the 
difference is insignificant (quintile 1). Therefore overall, the effect that dominates is that 
larger firms elicit a stronger response for downward forecasts.
28
 
   
3.4.5 Revision magnitude, company size and earnings announcements 
 
The adjustment period in our study serves as a period in which the market adjusts its 
expectations in relation to its initial reaction to analyst forecasts. In this section we examine 
whether expectations fully adjusted during this period, or if there remains some residual 
pessimism that only gets corrected when the earnings announcement is made.  If the 
adjustment period was not sufficient to fully correct earnings expectations, returns around 
earnings announcements will be positive and increasing with our measure of forecast 
ambiguity.  
Table 3.6 presents the results when we link impact period returns with returns during 
the earnings announcement. We observe that for both downward and upward forecasts, 
                                                 
28
 Note that impact period returns do not directly relate to the hypothesis we test in this chapter. Our hypothesis 
is that prices will exhibit an upward movement during the adjustment period for both upward and downward 
forecast revisions for small companies, indicating that for small companies the initial impact was either 
insufficient or excessive (regardless of how it compares with the initial impact to large companies).   
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returns around earnings announcement increase with company size. For upward forecasts 
they increase from 0.37% for large companies to 1.01% for small ones, and for downward 
forecasts they increase from -0.19% for large companies to 0.44% for small ones. This 
suggests that earnings expectations did not fully adjust during the adjustment stage, therefore 
earnings surprises are to an extent affected by the initial pessimistic response of the market 
towards analyst forecasts. 
 
3.5 Further discussion 
 
In order to illustrate the effects of ambiguity aversion in the market, this section 
provides some examples where the response of the market toward ambiguous information 
resembled the patterns of pessimism and correction we document towards analyst forecasts. 
There is evidence to suggest that aggregate market movements may also be related to 
ambiguity aversion.  Epstein and Schneider (2008) used the theory of ambiguity aversion to 
explain the rapid collapse of stock prices in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, where the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) recorded its largest ever one-day fall on the 17
th
 of 
September equal to 7.1%,
29
 followed by the Dow‟s second worst week ever, with losses of 
14.2%.  Epstein and Schneider argued that because the 9/11 attacks were unprecedented, 
investors did not know how to assess their value as a “signal.”  They might have been a 
reliable predictor of a sharp drop in economic growth, in which case the fall in prices would 
have been justified.   Or, they might have been a highly unreliable predictor, in which case 
they should have been disregarded and the market unaffected. 
The pessimism-and-correction hypothesis predicts that investors based their initial 
reaction on the worst-case evaluation (that the attack was a highly reliable predictor of 
                                                 
29
 The Dow was closed for four days after the attacks. 
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depressed economic growth) and set prices too low. Indeed, by the end of the first week of 
October the DJIA returned to its pre-attack level, indicating that investors responded 
pessimistically, inducing an upward correction in prices during the following weeks. 
 A similar example may have occurred during the recent financial crisis, where the 
DJIA lost 56% of its value from September 2008 until March 2009. This precipitous drop 
might have been a rational response to news about the insolvency of major financial 
institutions, or it could have been an overreaction.  According to the theory tested in this 
chapter it might have been an overreaction.  Investors had no personal experience of such a 
crisis.  Media coverage was highly equivocal, with some analysts being (relatively) optimistic 
and others turning to despair.   Henry M. Paulson jr., in a New York Times Op-Ed from 
November 2008, took both positions.  He started his piece with the observation that “We are 
going through a financial crisis more severe and unpredictable than any in our lifetimes,” and 
concluded it with “I am confident of success, because our economy is flexible and resilient, 
rooted in the entrepreneurial spirit and productivity of the American people.” 30   If our view 
is correct, such ambiguous circumstances are likely to be responded to pessimistically, and 
that does appear to have been what happened:  At the time of this writing the DJIA has 
recouped almost half of that loss and continues to go up. Note that we not claiming that the 
drop in prices was not warranted by fundamentals (which certainly was) but rather that it may 
have been excessive, so markets will recoup some of that loss.   
These market movements, along with the patterns of pessimism-and-correction in the 
pricing of analyst forecasts we have documented in this study, confirm the prediction of 
theoretical ambiguity models that investors price ambiguous assets pessimistically, and 
support the notion that the current definition of risk should be expanded to account for 
investors‟ feelings toward ambiguity.  
                                                 
30
 The relevant report can be found online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/opinion/18paulson.html?_r=1. 
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 3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we draw on a large literature in behavioural economics, which 
documents that people are ambiguity averse. When a single probability distribution over 
possible outcomes cannot be formed, people become pessimistic and react as if  the worst 
case posterior distribution that may arise is the most likely to occur [Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989), Cohen et al.(2000)]. Based on this finding we formulate the pessimism-and-
correction hypothesis. If the accuracy of a forecast is ambiguous and the forecast brings good 
news (i.e., an upward revision) the pessimistic scenario is that it is not so good news, 
therefore investors‟ underreact to it. Conversely, if it is ambiguous and brings bad news (i.e., 
a downward revision), the pessimistic scenario is that it is very bad news, therefore investors 
overreact.
31
 
The decision making literature, suggests that ambiguity arises when the likelihood of 
future events cannot be estimated successfully from available information. Based on this 
definition we define as being the degree to which the market can foresee the factors that 
affect forecast accuracy. If forecast accuracy behaves in an unpredictable manner, investors‟ 
will not be able to confidently distinguish accurate from inaccurate forecasts, and will thus 
treat them as ambiguous.  
We measure the predictability of forecast accuracy using company size. As noted in 
the literature, smaller companies have a poorer information environment compared to larger 
companies, and therefore can entail unpredictable variation in their earnings, making 
estimates of forecast accuracy less reliable. 
                                                 
31 Another case of a psychological bias affecting the response of investors towards analyst forecasts is described 
by Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006). They find that while moderate recommendations made by reliable 
analysts (e.g., experienced analysts in prestigious brokerages) lead to underreaction, extreme recommendations 
made by unreliable analysts (e.g., inexperienced analysts in less prestigious brokerages) actually produce 
overreaction.  Sorescu and Subrahmanymam explain this in terms of a psychological theory due to Griffin and 
Tversky (1992), who argued that whilst decision makers overreact to the extremity of information, they 
underreact to its reliability.    
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The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first we validate that company size does 
indeed capture the extent that forecast accuracy is predictable. We use the comprehensive 
model proposed by Clement and Tse (2003) to predict forecast accuracy for companies of 
different size. Our results show that smaller companies entail a significant reduction in the 
predictability of forecast accuracy, thus support the notion that company size can index 
forecast ambiguity.   
 Next, we examine the pessimism-and-correction hypothesis. Our results confirm the 
predictions of this hypothesis, as we find greater continuations after upward forecasts, and 
greater reversals after downward ones, when these forecasts are targeted to smaller 
companies. When the forecasts are targeted to larger companies these patterns disappear. This 
suggests that for smaller companies, which entail more unpredictable forecast accuracy, the 
initial price was set too low, and prices rebounded to correct this initial mispricing.  
These results suggest that ambiguity aversion affects the process with which analyst 
forecasts are transmitted into asset prices. Because investors cannot always unambiguously 
determine the quality of forecasts ex-ante, they update their expectations pessimistically. This 
response, however, leads to periods of adjustments because on average earnings are better 
than expected.  
These results, in conjunction to an extant experimental and theoretical literature, 
suggest that the neoclassical definition of risk where investors have complete knowledge of 
the associated distributions is too simplistic. Our theories will be more descriptive if the 
definition of risk is expanded to account for investors feelings toward ambiguity. 
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Table 3.1  
Descriptive statistics for analyst forecasts 
Panel A presents the general characteristics of the sample. Panels B and C presents forecast frequencies in the sample partitioned by revision direction and 
company size in each year.  To assign companies in size quintiles in month t+1 we use the breakpoints from Kenneth French‟s website in month t. Panel D 
shows pair wise correlation coefficients for the variables used to predict forecast accuracy. These variables are calculated as follows: forecast accuracy 
(defined in equation 1) on company experience (the years that analyst i has followed company j), broker size (the number of analysts employed in the 
brokerage of analyst i who issued the revision), companies (the number of companies followed by analyst i in year t), forecast frequency (the number of 
forecasts issued by analyst i for company j in year t and quarter q), days elapsed (the days that separate the forecast made by analyst i for company j in year t 
and quarter q with any other forecast by any analyst for the same company and period), forecast horizon (the days that separate the forecast made by analyst i 
for company j and the corresponding earnings announcement date), industries (the number of 4-digit SIC codes followed by analyst i in year t) and lag 
accuracy (the absolute error of the last forecast made by analyst i for company j in the previous quarter). These variables (except lag accuracy which is 
standardised according to equation 1) are standardised according to equation 2. 
   Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Units of measurement Mean Q1 Median Q3 
 Company experience Years analyst follows firm 3.06 0.83 1.92 4.17 
 Broker size Number of analysts employed in brokerage in year t 59.59 23 51 93 
 Companies Number of companies followed by analyst in year t 16.94 12 16 20 
 Forecast frequency Number of forecasts issued by analyst 3.6 2 3 4 
 Forecast horizon Days between forecast and earnings announcement 86.76 35 85 100 
 Industries Number of industries followed by analyst in year t 4.63 3 4 6 
 Revision magnitude (Forecast-previous forecast)/previous forecast *100 -4.00% -11.00% -2.30% 5.00% 
 Company size decile Using end of previous month breakpoints 6.5 4 7 9 
 Forecast error (forecast - actual)/actual*100 -3.63% -11.00% -3.03% 1.56% 
 Panel B: Frequencies        
         
  By revision direction: Rev > 0 Rev < 0 Total     
  269955 350224 620179     
         
   1 (Small) 2 3 4 5 (Large) Total 
 By size quintile: Rev < 0 47559 55600 60094 78339 108632 350224 
    Rev > 0 26734 36200 45270 62916 98835 269955 
 
  Panel C: Year by year frequencies      
              Year Number of forecasts Year Number of forecasts  
  1995 26870 2002 48283  
  1996 28538 2003 50416  
  1997 31930 2004 61087  
  1998 37453 2005 66898  
  1999 41835 2006 68301  
  2000 39211 2007 71894  
  2001 42932 2008 4531  
        Total 620179   
81 
 
 
Panel D: Correlation coefficients of variables to predict accuracy 
          
 accuracy comp. experience broker size companies Forecast frequency days elapsed forecast horizon industries lag accuracy 
accuracy 1 0.0056 0.0047 -0.0081 0.063 -0.037 -0.218 -0.016 0.131 
  <0.0001 0.000 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
company experience  1 0.0461 0.184 0.112 0.119 -0.046 0.117 -0.009 
   <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
broker size   1 0.074 0.008 0.031 -0.006 -0.020 0.006 
    <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
companies    1 0.047 0.054 -0.009 0.514 -0.012 
     <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
forecast frequency     1 0.071 -0.219 0.023 0.039 
      <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
days elapsed      1 -0.076 0.047 -0.027 
       <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
forecast horizon       1 0.006 -0.067 
        <0.0001 <0.0001 
industries        1 -0.016 
         <0.0001 
Lag accuracy         1 
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Table 3.2 
 Ambiguity test 
In Panel A we perform on OLS regression of forecast accuracy (defined in equation 1) 
on company experience (the years that analyst i has followed company j), broker size 
(the number of analysts employed in the brokerage of analyst i who issued the revision), 
companies (the number of companies followed by analyst i in year t), forecast frequency 
(the number of forecasts issued by analyst i for company j in year t and quarter q), days 
elapsed (the days that separate the forecast made by analyst i for company j in year t and 
quarter q with any other forecast by any analyst for the same company and period), 
forecast horizon (the days that separate the forecast made by analyst i for company j and 
the corresponding earnings announcement date), industries (the number of 4-digit SIC 
codes followed by analyst i in year t) and lag accuracy (the absolute error of the last 
forecast made by analyst i for company j in the previous quarter). These variables 
(except lag accuracy which is standardised according to equation 1) are standardised 
according to equation 2. A fixed effects regression is used to absorb firm-year effects. 
The model estimated is:  
t
1 2
3 4 5
6 7 t
t t t
t t t
t t 8+ b u
Accuracy = a + b Company experience  + b Broker size
+ b Companies  + b forecast frequency  + b Days elapsed  
+ b Forecast horizon + b Industries Lag accuracy +   
 
Panel A: The forecast accuracy model 
 Parameter Estimate Prob-t 
company experience β1 0.0097 <.0001 
broker size β2 0.0112 <.0001 
companies β3 -0.0008 0.6313 
forecast frequency β4 0.0230 <.0001 
days elapsed β5 -0.0351 <.0001 
forecast horizon β6 -0.1981 <.0001 
industries β7 -0.0049 0.0022 
lag accuracy β8 0.0818 <.0001 
Pr>F   <.0001 
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Table 3.2: Continued 
In the top half of Panel B we regress these variables on the cumulative market 
adjusted return from trading days -1 to 1, where date 0 is the date the forecast was 
issued. The top half shows the results for upward forecasts and in the bottom half 
for downward. A fixed effects regression is used with dummy variables to control 
for fixed firm and year effects. The model estimated is:  
1 2
3 4 5
6 7 ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt8+ b u
Car( 1,1) = a + b Company experience  + b Broker size
+ b Companies  + b forecast frequency  + b Days elapsed  
+ b Forecast horizon + b Industries Lag accuracy +   
 
Panel B: CAR (-1,1) returns on accuracy variables 
REV > 0 (n=350,224) 
 Estimate p-value 
company experience β1 0.0008 0.024 
broker size β2 0.0023 <.0001 
companies β3 0.0014 0.0032 
forecast frequency β4 0.0009 0.0148 
days elapsed β5 -0.0042 <.0001 
forecast horizon β6 0.0047 <.0001 
industries β7 -0.0017 <.0001 
lag accuracy β8 0.0004 0.2082 
Pr>F  
 <.0001 
  
  
REV < 0 (n=269,055)  
  
company experience β1 -0.0003 0.3694 
broker size β2 -0.0038 <.0001 
companies β3 -0.0016 0.0006 
forecast frequency β4 -0.0013 0.0001 
days elapsed β5 0.0056 <.0001 
forecast horizon β6 -0.0095 <.0001 
industries β7 0.0008 0.0699 
lag accuracy β8 -0.0022 <.0001 
Pr>F   <.0001 
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Table 3.2: Continued 
In Panel C we regress actual accuracy (defined in equation 1) on predicted 
accuracy (defined in equation 3 and 4), with dummy variables to indicate the 
size quintile of the company. D1 equals to 1 if the size of the company 
belongs in the 2, 3 or 4
th
 quintile, and 0 otherwise. D2 equals to 1 if the size 
of the company belongs in quintile 1 and 0 otherwise. A fixed effects 
regression is used to absorb firm-year effects. The model estimated is:  
A E E
i 1 i 2 i
E
3 i i
1 2Accuracy = a + a D1+ a D2 + θ Accuracy + θ Accuracy *D1+
θ Accuracy *D2 + u  
 
Panel C: Ambiguity test. 
 
Parameter Estimate Prob-t 
Dmidsize (D1) a1 0.1105 <.0001 
Dsmall (D2) a2 0.0606 <.0001 
expected Accuracy θ1 0.8622 <.0001 
Expected accuracy*Dmidsize θ2 -0.0917 <.0001 
Expected accuracy*Dsmall θ3 -0.1897 <.0001 
Pr > F     <.0001 
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Table 3.3:  
Two-way classification of market adjusted abnormal returns for impact (-2, 2) and adjustment (3, 20) periods 
Panel A presents returns after upward and Panel B after downward forecasts. Forecast magnitude is defined as New forecast by analyst i for firm j and quarter t 
minus the previous forecast by the same analyst for the same company, divided by the previous forecast.  Size is defined as the market capitalization of company j 
(price 3 days prior to the forecast x shares outstanding). To assign companies in size quintiles in month t+1 we use the breakpoints from Kenneth French‟s website 
in month t. The table provides p-values for the significance of the differentials that are adjusted for unequal variances.  
 
 
 
Panel A: REV > 0   Panel B: REV < 0  
(-2,2) Revision Magnitude   Revision Magnitude  
Company size 1(Small) 2 3 4 5(Large) All  1(Small) 2 3 4 5 (Large) All 
1(Large) 0.72 1.04 1.21 1.53 1.68 1.09  -0.39 -0.99 -1.78 -2.81 -3.80 -1.65 
2 1.27 1.61 2.00 2.60 2.48 1.9  -0.33 -0.93 -1.72 -2.50 -3.73 -1.86 
3 1.65 1.94 2.43 2.70 3.09 2.32  -0.25 -0.90 -1.85 -3.04 -4.95 -2.48 
4 1.64 2.33 2.64 3.14 4.01 2.8  -0.33 -0.79 -2.01 -3.04 -5.09 -2.86 
5(Small) 1.27 1.88 2.30 2.55 3.82 2.59  -0.40 -0.81 -1.39 -2.55 -4.68 -2.93 
              
Dif 5-1 0.55 0.84 1.10 1.02 2.14 1.50  -0.01 0.18 0.39 0.27 -0.88 -1.28 
p-value 0.060 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
<.0001 
 0.970 0.17 0.00 0.03 <0.0001 
<.0001 
              
(3,20)              
1(Large)) -0.03 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.06  -0.18 -0.27 -0.33 -0.16 -0.25 -0.23 
2 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.34 0.52 0.22  0.06 -0.15 0.26 0.03 0.55 0.15 
3 -0.03 0.11 0.34 0.47 0.80 0.31  -0.17 0.12 -0.01 0.40 0.37 0.17 
4 0.32 0.21 0.59 0.49 1.04 0.53  0.34 0.48 0.44 0.55 0.69 0.54 
5(Small) 0.50 0.83 0.93 1.23 1.54 1.1  0.17 0.39 0.60 0.54 1.09 0.74 
              
Dif 5-1 0.53 0.72 0.81 1.09 1.50 1.04  0.35 0.66 0.92 0.70 1.35 0.97 
p-value 0.070 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
<.0001 
 0.180 0.00 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
<.0001 
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Table 3.4: 
Two-way classification of market adjusted abnormal returns for impact and adjustment periods by company size and market P/E ratio 
Panel A presents returns after upward forecasts and Panel B after downward. Size is defined as the market capitalization of company j (price 3 days prior to the 
forecast x shares outstanding). To assign companies in size quintiles in month t+1 we use the breakpoints from Kenneth French‟s website in month t.  Market 
E/P is calculated as the ratio of total earnings divided by total market values of the 100 largest US companies. This variable is readily available from Thomson.  
In order to de-trend the time series each months market E/P is subtracted from the average market P/E for the preceding 12 months. The bottom 30% of this 
standardised time series is classified as “low” and the top 30% as “high”. The table provides p-values for the significance of the differentials calculated using 
standard errors adjusted for unequal variances. 
                                                            Market E/P ratio     
 Panel A:Rev > 0  Panel B: Rev < 0 
    
company size 1(High) 2 3(Low) Dif 3-1 P value  1(High) 2 3(Low) Dif 3-1 P value 
(-2,2)            
1(Large) 1.29 1.12 0.88 -0.41 <.0001  -1.61 -1.60 -1.78 -0.17 0.01 
2 2.36 1.80 1.56 -0.80 <.0001  -2.09 -1.64 -1.98 0.11 0.18 
3 2.72 2.38 1.77 -0.95 <.0001  -2.39 -2.24 -3.02 -0.63 <.0001 
4 2.84 3.20 1.97 -0.87 <.0001  -3.09 -2.56 -3.14 -0.05 0.75 
5(Small) 2.92 2.57 1.96 -0.96 <.0001  -3.46 -2.51 -3.10 0.36 0.03 
Dif 5-1 1.63 1.45 1.08    -1.85 -0.91 -1.32   
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
            
            
(3,20)            
1(Large) -0.32 0.22 0.17 -0.50 <.0001  0.14 -0.17 -0.70 -0.84 <.0001 
2 0.12 0.32 0.18 0.06 0.56  1.01 0.00 -0.65 -1.66 <.0001 
3 0.66 0.33 -0.11 -0.77 <.0001  0.94 0.00 -0.53 -1.47 <.0001 
4 0.54 0.80 0.00 -0.54 0.002  1.16 0.71 -0.56 -1.72 <.0001 
5(Small) 1.78 0.89 0.37 -1.41 <.0001  1.86 0.62 -0.77 -2.63 <.0001 
Dif 5-1 2.10 0.67 0.20    1.72 0.79 -0.07   
p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.40    <.0001 <.0001 0.66   
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Table 3.5 
 Multivariable regressions 
 Impact (-2,2) and adjustment (3,20) period returns for upward (Panel A) and downward (Panel B) forecasts are 
regressed on the inverse of the logarithm of company size (price 3 days prior to the forecast x shares outstanding) with 
interactions with the de-trended market P/E ratio (the ratio of total market values divided by total earnings of the 100 
largest US companies, which is available from Thomson) and revision magnitude ((the difference between the two most 
recent forecasts issued by analyst i for company j during period t, scaled by the penultimate forecast),the market E/P 
ratio, forecast horizon (the days that separate a particular forecast with the corresponding earnings announcement date), 
broker size (the number of analysts employed in the brokerage during the year the analyst j has issued a forecast), 
forecast error (the difference between forecasted value and actual value, scaled by actual value) and revision magnitude. 
A fixed effects regression is used to absorb firm-year effects. The model estimated is:  
ijt 0 1 ijt 2 ijt t 3 t 4 ijt
5 it 6 ijt 7 ijt ijt
CAR = α +β log(size) +β log(size) *market E / P +β Market P / E + β Forecast Horizon +
β Broker size +β Forecast error +β Rev.magnitude + u
 
Panel A: Rev > 0   Impact period Adjustment period. 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
log(size) 
b1 -0.0898 <.0001 -0.1441 <.0001 
log(size)*market P/E 
b2 -0.0006 <.0001 0.0000 0.5954 
Market P/E 
b3 0.0062 <.0001 0.0018 0.0042 
Forecast Horizon 
b4 0.0000 0.9827 0.0000 0.0017 
Broker size 
b5 0.0000 <.0001 0.0000 0.1265 
Forecast error 
b6 0.0004 0.6555 -0.0208 <.0001 
Revision magnitude 
b7 0.0279 <.0001 0.0042 0.0041 
Pr > F
   <.0001   <.0001 
Panel B: Rev < 0       
log(size) 
b1 -0.1076 <.0001 -0.1581 <.0001 
log(size)*market P/E 
b2 -0.0012 <.0001 -0.0006 <.0001 
Market P/E 
b3 0.0138 <.0001 0.0067 <.0001 
Forecast Horizon 
b4 0.0000 <.0001 0.0000 <.0001 
Broker size 
b5 0.0000 <.0001 0.0000 0.7025 
Forecast error 
b6 -0.0096 <.0001 -0.0199 <.0001 
Revision magnitude 
b7 -0.0799 <.0001 -0.0113 <.0001 
Pr > F
   <.0001  <.0001 
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Table 3.6  
Returns around earnings announcements 
 
 Returns are the cumulative market adjusted returns for the period -
5,0, where 0 is the announcement date. Size is defined as the market 
capitalization of company j (price 3 days prior to the forecast x 
shares outstanding). To assign companies in size quintiles in month 
t+1 we use the breakpoints from Kenneth French‟s website in month 
t. The table provides p-values for the return differential between the 
extreme portfolios which is adjusted for unequal variances. 
 Panel A: Rev > 0 
1/company size Impact earnings announcement 
1=Low 1.09 0.37 
2 1.90 0.53 
3 2.32 0.68 
4 2.80 0.79 
5=High 2.59 1.01 
   
Dif (5-1) 1.5 0.64 
prob-t 
<.0001 <.0001 
   
 Panel B: Rev < 0 
1=Low -1.65 -0.19 
2 -1.86 0.15 
3 -2.48 0.39 
4 -2.86 0.34 
5=High -2.93 0.44 
   
Dif (5-1) -1.28 0.63 
prob-t 
<.0001 <.0001 
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4. Investor Sentiment and Price Momentum 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
  An extensive body of literature documents that short-run stock returns are positively 
correlated with past returns, a phenomenon referred to as price momentum [Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993, 2001), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)]. This return pattern is found 
to be robust in different markets [Rouwenhorst (1999), Doukas and McKnight (2002)], and 
different asset classes [Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2008)]. The explanations for 
momentum proposed in the literature fall into three general categories: theories of market 
frictions [Hong and Stein (1999)], theories of time-varying expected returns [Johnson 
(2002)], and behavioural theories of market inefficiency [Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998)].  
 Theories of market frictions suggest that the positive autocorrelation in returns arises 
because the market responds to information with a lag. This is because information is not 
instantaneously available to all market participants, therefore, it is sluggishly transmitted into  
prices. This induces positive correlation in returns, which appears anomalous in the 
neoclassical model which assumes that prices immediately adjust to new information. The 
explanation of time-varying expected returns suggests that the spread between winner and 
loser portfolios arises due to some form of undiversifiable covariance risk. That is, for some 
reason past winners are riskier relative to past losers, inducing a positive and significant 
spread. For example Johnson (2002) suggests that growth rate risk rises with actual growth in 
prices, therefore past winners are riskier. Lastly, theories of market inefficiency suggest that 
momentum reflects a mispricing. That is, initially information was not transferred into prices 
efficiently, which induces an adjustment in prices making prices predictable. These theories 
of market inefficiency can be divided into behavioural theories of under and over reaction.  
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Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) suggest that investors‟ underrreact to information, 
therefore underpricing the winners and overpricing the losers, which induces momentum in 
the next period. Daniel et al (1998) suggest that momentum is actually overreaction induced 
by overconfidence and biased self attribution. The difference between these two classes of 
theories is that the overreaction story predicts that momentum profits will revert in the long 
run.    
 These explanations for momentum have received support from empirical studies, 
creating tension in the literature. For example, Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) show that, 
controlling for firm size, momentum profits are decreasing in analyst coverage, thus support 
the notion that momentum is caused by slow information diffusion. Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) find that momentum profits are entirely predictable from a set of macroeconomic 
variables, proposing a rational explanation of momentum. Cooper, Gutierrez and Martin 
(2004) find that momentum returns are entirely captured by lagged market returns, and 
suggest a behavioural explanation of momentum.
32
   
 
Resolving this tension is important. This 
chapter examines whether behavioural theories provide an adequate explanation for 
momentum profits by examining the relationship between momentum profits and investor 
sentiment.     
Sentiment, broadly defined, refers to whether an individual, for whatever extraneous 
reason, feels excessively optimistic or pessimistic about a situation. A large body of the 
psychology literature finds that peoples‟ current sentiment affects their judgment of future 
events. For example, Johnson and Tversky (1983) show that people that read sad newspaper 
articles subsequently view various causes of death, such as disease etc., as more likely than 
people who read pleasant newspaper articles. In general, the evidence from experimental 
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 For further discussions on the origins of momentum see Conrad and Kaul (1998), Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999), Grundy and Martin (2001) and Grinblatt and Han (2005).  
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psychology shows that people with positive sentiment make optimistic judgments and 
choices, whereas people with negative sentiment make pessimistic ones [Bower (1981, 
1991); Arkes, Herren, and Isen (1988); Wright and Bower (1992); among others].  
Investor sentiment is relevant to the behavioral theory proposed by Daniel et al. 
(1998). In their model, overconfident investors analyze information and form overly extreme 
expectations about the future prospects of companies. Investors tend to disregard news that is 
contrary to these expectations, which can create momentum, pushing prices above 
fundamental values, ultimately leading to reversals. The arguments of Daniel et al. (1998) 
indicate that when investors are generally optimistic, they will ignore new contradictory 
information about firms due to their self-attribution bias. This activity, in turn, will positively 
impact stock prices, and amplify the momentum effect. Short-selling constraints will prevent 
arbitrage from correcting prices. A symmetric effect need not obtain in the case where 
investors are pessimistic, because even if pessimists ignore good news about a firm, arbitrage 
forces will incent them to buy stocks and correct prices accordingly. In this study, we 
examine the short- and long-run performance of momentum portfolios that are conditional on 
investor sentiment. We predict that when investors are optimistic, short-run momentum 
profits will be higher, and will exhibit long-run reversals. 
The studies by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper et al. (2004) are related to 
our analysis. Cooper et al. (2004) suggest that investors‟ behavioral biases will be more 
accentuated after market gains, and show that momentum is profitable only after increases. 
They interpret this finding as supportive of behavioral explanations for momentum. Our 
study corroborates this evidence by partitioning momentum profits on investor sentiment, a 
potentially more direct proxy of investors‟ propensity to form erroneous beliefs. We show 
that sentiment has incremental power to explain momentum-induced profits even after 
accounting for market returns. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that momentum profits 
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are only significant in periods in which the economy is expanding, and put forward a rational 
explanation of momentum. However, these authors are careful to point out that their findings 
are entirely consistent with a behavioral story where investors generate momentum during 
market expansions because they are excessively optimistic.
33
 This is precisely the avenue we 
pursue in our study. We condition momentum profits on investor sentiment, and predict that 
momentum profits will be higher when investors are optimistic, and will eventually lead to 
long-term reversals as this optimism is reversed.  
To ensure that our CB Index is free of macroeconomic influences, our investigation 
uses an orthogonal version of the index, which is obtained by regressing the CB Index on a 
set of macroeconomic variables. The variables include growth in industrial production, real 
growth in durable, non-durable, and services consumption, growth in employment, and a 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession indicator. Furthermore, we 
examine the sensitivity of our results to an alternative index for investor sentiment 
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) (BW). 
We show that when investor sentiment is optimistic, the six-month momentum 
strategy yields significant profits, equal to an average monthly return of 2.00%.  However, 
when investor sentiment is pessimistic, momentum profits decrease dramatically to an 
insignificant monthly average of 0.34%.  We also find that investor sentiment provides an 
important link between short-run continuation and long-run stock price reversal.  We 
examine the long-run behavior of optimistic and pessimistic momentum portfolios six years 
after portfolio formation, and find that momentum profits revert after optimistic periods, with 
a substantial average monthly loss of -0.56%, whereas momentum profits after pessimistic 
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 Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) suggest that the challenge to this rationale would be to provide an 
explanation of why investors misinterpret market-wide information and become overly optimistic, misreacting 
to company-specific information. Investor sentiment provides such an explanation, since the general finding is 
that optimism that is unrelated to the decision at hand, i.e., optimism related to the state of the economy and not 
the individual company, can alter the choice made.  
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periods do not.  
Our tests help disentangle rational from behavioural explanations of momentum. We 
note that rational theories do not allow a role for investor sentiment in causing momentum or 
reversals.   Further, we show that our results are robust to different size- and volume-sorted 
portfolios, alternative proxies for investor sentiment, the CAPM with conditional and 
unconditional betas, Fama-French (1993) risk adjustments, and controls for microstructure 
biases.  Since our findings do not have any obvious rational explanation based on frictions or 
risk, our study indicates that behavioural theories are a more appropriate fit for the data.  
Secondly, our study is related to the sentiment literature, which has produced 
important evidence that suggests that sentiment is priced. This has led several authors to 
explore the relationship between investor sentiment and various stock market anomalies. 
Along these lines, investor sentiment has been linked to the post earnings announcement drift 
[Livnat and Petrovic (2008)], fund flows and the value effect [Frazzini and Lamont (2008)], 
corporate disclosure [Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008)], IPOs [Cornelli, Goldreich, and 
Ljungqvist (2006)], and the size effect [Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007)]. Our study extends 
this literature by analyzing the relationship between investor sentiment and momentum, an 
important stock market anomaly. 
Further, our results expand the literature that views momentum as a behavioural 
phenomenon. Zhang (2006) shows that because investors have a tendency to underreact, they 
underreact even more generating higher momentum when companies are perceived to be 
subject to higher information uncertainty. Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) investigate 
the relationship between investor overconfidence and momentum, using UP market 
conditions to proxy for investor overconfidence resulting from self-attribution bias. They 
confirm that higher overconfidence leads to higher momentum returns [see also Daniel and 
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Titman 1999]. Our study extends this literature by investigating whether investor sentiment, a 
purely behavioural attribute, affects momentum profits. 
Our results also disentangle theories of underreaction [Barberis et al (1998)] and 
theories of continued overreaction [Daniel et al (1998), Hong and Stein (1999)], which have 
received support in the literature. For example, Cooper et al (2004) and Lee et al (2000) 
provide evidence that in certain conditions momentum profits revert, supporting the 
overreaction theory, whereas Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) show that momentum 
does not revert, supporting the underreaction theory. Our study shows that momentum profits 
revert after optimistic periods, which provides strong support to the overreaction theories of 
momentum.  
This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 1 describes the data and the empirical 
methodology. Section 2 presents the results, along with a discussion of the sensitivity 
analysis and robustness checks. Section 3 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
 
 We use all common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) listed in the New York and 
American Stock Exchanges (NYSE and AMEX respectively) from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) monthly file.  The sample time period is from February 1967 to 
December 2008, for which the monthly CB Index is available.  
We construct momentum portfolios using the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993).  In each month t, we sort all stocks on their returns for the past J months. Based on 
these rankings, ten equally weighted portfolios are formed.  The top decile is called the 
“losers” portfolio, and the bottom decile the “winners” portfolio.  Every month, the strategy 
takes a long position in the winner portfolio and a short position in the loser portfolio, held 
for K months.  We construct overlapping portfolios to increase the power of our tests.  
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Specifically, we close the position initiated in month t-K in both the winner and loser 
portfolios, and take a new position using the winners and losers of month t. Therefore, in 
each month, we revise 1/K of the stocks in the winner and loser portfolios, and carry over the 
rest from the previous month.
34
  In order to avoid microstructure biases, we allow one month 
between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period, and delete 
all stocks that are priced less than one dollar at the beginning of the holding period.  
As mentioned earlier, for the main part of our analysis we measure investor sentiment 
using the monthly time series of consumer confidence sentiment constructed by the CB.  This 
survey began on a bimonthly basis in 1967 and turned into a monthly series in 1977.
35
  The 
CB questionnaire is sent to 5,000 randomly selected households in the United States, and asks 
participants five questions about their outlook for the economy.
36
  The scores for each 
question are calculated as the number of favorable replies, divided by the sum of favorable 
and unfavorable replies.  The scores on the five questions are amalgamated to form the 
overall Consumer Confidence Index.  The Index is one of the ten leading economic indicators 
published by the CB, and has been used in studies to predict household spending activity 
[Acemoglu and Scott (1994); Ludvigson (2004)].  Further, such measures of consumer 
confidence are positively related to investor optimism [Fisher and Statman (2002)], and have 
been used as proxies for investor sentiment [e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)]. 
In order to purge the effects of macroeconomic conditions from the CB Index, we 
regress this monthly index on six macroeconomic indicators: growth in industrial production, 
                                                 
34
 For example, for the six-month formation-holding period strategy (J, K=6), in each month t+1, the winner 
portfolio is comprised of 1/6 (winners from t-1) + 1/6 (winners from t-2) +…+ 1/6 (winners from t-6), and 
correspondingly for the loser portfolio. Note that month t is skipped. 
35
 For the period that the index is available on a bimonthly basis, we follow Qiu and Welch (2006) in using 
linear interpolation to obtain monthly observations.  
36
 The questions are the following: 1) How would you rate present general business conditions in your area? 2) 
What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? 3) Six months from now, do you think that the 
business conditions in your area will be better, same or worse? 4) Six months from now, do you think there will 
be more, same, or fewer jobs available in your area? 5) Would you guess your total family income to be higher, 
same, or lower 6 months from now?  
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real growth in durable consumption, non-durable consumption, services consumption, growth 
in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and use the residuals from this regression 
as the sentiment proxy.
37
 
To identify whether a particular formation period is optimistic or pessimistic, we 
calculate a weighted rolling average of the sentiment level for the three months prior to the 
end of the formation period.  We give a weight of three to sentiment in the prior month, two 
to the one in the month prior to that and one to the month three months prior to the current 
month.
38,39
 In order to ensure that our analysis is not sensitive to the definition of sentiment 
states, we report results using three different classifications of optimistic and pessimistic 
investor sentiment states.  In the first specification a formation period is classified as 
optimistic (pessimistic) if the three-month rolling average ending in month t belongs in the 
top (bottom) 30% of the three-month rolling average sentiment time series, whereas for the 
second and third specifications we consider 20% and 40% cut-off points.   
Because we form overlapping portfolios, in each holding period month we hold stocks 
from K different formation periods, across which sentiment can differ.  In order to calculate 
the average sentiment in these K formation periods, we first calculate whether each of these K 
formation periods was optimistic or pessimistic as explained above, and then tally how many 
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 This sentiment indicator is also used by McLean and Zhao (2009). 
38
 The CB Index for month t-1 is made publicly available from the beginning of month t.  Thus, to make sure 
that all the information we use is available upon portfolio construction, we classify the momentum portfolio 
formed at the end of month t as optimistic or pessimistic using the weighted average of the residual sentiment 
from the three previous months as follows: 3/6*residual(t) + 2/6*residual(t-1) +1/6*residual(t-2). This 
weighting scheme is chosen in order to assign more weight on the most recent sentiment observation when we 
predict momentum profits, and is similar to the one used in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994, p. 1550). 
However, our main results remain unchanged when we use a simple arithmetic average.  
39
 Since sentiment is announced with a one-month delay, the use of residuals from month t, t-1 and t-2 to 
calculate the rolling sentiment measure actually corresponds to sentiment during months t-1, t-2, and t-3.  We 
also consider alternative sentiment specifications based on two and four month lags and find that our results 
continue to hold.  These results are reported later in the paper. 
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were optimistic or pessimistic.
40
  If, all the K formation periods were classified as optimistic 
(pessimistic) the particular holding period month is classified as optimistic (pessimistic), with 
the rest being the “mild” sentiment months.  
To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state are equal to zero, and 
regress the time series of average monthly momentum profits on an OPTIMISTIC sentiment 
dummy variable, a MILD sentiment dummy variable and a PESSIMISTIC sentiment dummy 
variable, with no intercept.  To test if mean profits in optimistic sentiment periods are 
different from profits in pessimistic sentiment periods, we regress average monthly 
momentum profits on a MILD sentiment dummy variable and an OPTIMISTIC sentiment 
dummy variable with a constant. This approach, which is similar to that of Cooper et al 
(2004), helps preserve the full-time series of returns, and allows us to estimate t-statistics that 
are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using Newey and West (1987) standard 
errors. 
We also calculate the long-run performance of the momentum portfolios, focusing on 
the six-month formation/holding period strategy.  We follow the methodology employed by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), whereby for each momentum portfolio constructed, we define 
an event time that is equal to 13 months following the initial formation date.
41
  After this 
event date, we hold the portfolio for six years, and test whether portfolios formed in 
optimistic formation periods behave differently from those formed after pessimistic formation 
periods.  
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for our sentiment index. Panel A is based on 
                                                 
40
 For example, assuming K=6, in June 1980 we hold stocks selected from six ranking periods ending in May, 
April, March, February, and January. For each of the six ranking periods, we calculate the sentiment level in the 
previous three months, and classify each formation period as being high, mild, or low sentiment.  
41
 Thua, the portfolio held in June 1980, for instance, was initiated in November 1979 (skipping December).  
This portfolio is based on overlapping returns, thus it is an equally-weighted portfolio of the positions initiated 
in January, February, March, April, and June.  For this portfolio, the post-holding period starts in January 1981, 
after which we continue to hold the same portfolio using the equally-weighted structure for a period of six years. 
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the raw data of consumer confidence provided by the CB. Panel B reports the three-month 
rolling average using the residuals from regressing the raw CB data on a set of 
macroeconomic variables.  The raw CB Index, as shown in Figure 4.1, rises during the late 
1960s, mid 1980s, and late 1990s, and falls during the 1970s and early 1990s. These patterns 
are in line with the evidence for investor sentiment discussed by Baker and Wurgler (2006).  
The fall in sentiment for the period 2006-2008 seems to be a reflection of the early signs of 
the current recession. As shown in Figure 1, the 3-month rolling weighted average of this 
residual, which is the sentiment measure used in our main analysis, tracks the raw CB index 
closely (i.e., shows an upward trend when the index is rising and vice versa).
42
 
A robust finding in the literature is that investor sentiment is reflected in the size 
premium [Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991); Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007); Lemmon and 
Portniaguina (2006)]. The interpretation given to this finding is that optimistic investors are 
drawn to small stocks, thereby reducing the size premium in the following period.  In order to 
validate our sentiment proxy, we test whether it captures this negative relationship with the 
size premium. Specifically, we regress the three-month average of residual sentiment ending 
in month t on the return of the Small minus Big portfolio (SMB) in month t+1 and a 
constant.
43
 Indeed, as expected, we obtain a coefficient of -0.023 (t-value = -3.16), which 
corroborates our proxy as a sentiment index.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 The fact that the orthogonalization does not materially affect the behaviour of the index is in line with the 
findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
43
We thank Kenneth French for making the SMB data available on his website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). 
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4.3 The Empirical Evidence on Momentum Profits across Sentiment States 
 
4.3.1 Investor Sentiment and Short-Run Momentum Profits 
 
Our first empirical test examines the profitability of the momentum strategy conditioning on 
pessimistic and optimistic investor sentiment states. Table 2 presents the results for strategies 
that are based on a six-month ranking period (J) and holding periods (K) of three, six, and 
twelve months sorted by investor sentiment. In Panel A (B, C) pessimistic sentiment is 
defined as the bottom 30% (20%, 40%) of the rolling average sentiment time series. 
The unconditional momentum strategy for the period 1966-2008, based on J, K=6, 
yields an average monthly profit of 1.38% (unreported result).  This figure is comparable 
with studies of momentum for analogous time periods [Lee and Swaminathan (2000); 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)].  Note, however, that momentum profits are extremely 
sensitive to investor sentiment.  In Panel A of Table 4.2, the six-month strategy (J=6, K=6) 
shows that the average monthly profits in optimistic periods are highly significant, at an 
average of 2.00% per month.  These profits decrease to 1.46% per month in mild sentiment 
months, and shrink to a statistically insignificant monthly average of 0.34% in pessimistic 
sentiment months.  When the holding period is extended to twelve months (J=6, K=12), 
average monthly profits in optimistic (mild) periods are 1.27% (0.85%), and while they 
decline to 0.09% in pessimistic periods.  Similarly, when the holding period is condensed to 
three months (J=6, K=3), average monthly profits in optimistic (mild) periods are 2.28% 
(1.44%), declining to an insignificant 0.28% in pessimistic periods.  Comparable results are 
shown in Panels B and C of Table 4.2, confirming that the choice of cut-off point for 
optimistic and pessimistic sentiment does not materially affect our conclusions.
44
 
                                                 
44
 In Panel B3 (J=6,K=12 with 20%-20% sentiment states) if we identify sentiment states using the method 
described in Table 2 we end up with a very small number of observations in the optimistic and pessimistic 
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 The finding that momentum profits are significant in “mild” sentiment months 
suggests that on average investors beliefs are optimistic, which is in line with extant 
empirical evidence [e.g., Weinstein (1980), Slovic (2000), Puri and Robinson (2007)].
 
 
Consequently, momentum profits arise in “normal” sentiment periods, increasing 
(decreasing) dramatically when sentiment becomes more optimistic (pessimistic).  As stated 
earlier, these results corroborate the analysis of Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Cooper, 
Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004), who respectively find that momentum profits vary 
significantly according to whether the market has been rising or falling or whether the 
economy has been expanding or contracting.  Going further, however, our analysis explicitly 
links the time series of momentum profits to investor sentiment.  
Another interesting result that emerges from Table 4.2 is that returns of all momentum 
portfolios during pessimistic periods are higher than those in optimistic periods across all 
holding period horizons.  This result is consistent with previous findings [Baker and Wurgler 
(2006, 2007)], suggesting that investors tend to overestimate the likelihood of negative events 
when they are pessimistic, setting prices lower.  Furthermore, Table 2 demonstrates that 
higher profits due to momentum strategies in optimistic periods arise primarily because loser 
stocks exhibit higher momentum than winner stocks during pessimistic periods.  This is 
consistent with the notion that optimistic investors disregard negative information about loser 
stocks and short-selling constraints limit arbitrage activity.  This negative information, 
however, is eventually incorporated into prices, causing underperformance in the loser 
portfolio, generating momentum profits.  A symmetric effect does not obtain during 
pessimistic periods because investors who ignore positive information during pessimistic 
                                                                                                                                                        
sentiment group. For this reason we identify optimistic and pessimistic states as follows: we assign a score to 
each formation period depending on its sentiment. If the particular formation period is optimistic we assign it a 
score of 2, a score of 1 if it is mild and a score of 0 if it is pessimistic. When we average returns for the 
particular holding period month we also average the sentiment score of that holding period (from the K 
formation periods). If the average sentiment score is > 1.5 (≤ 0.5) the month is identified as optimistic 
(pessimistic). The rest are the mild sentiment months. 
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periods have their bias countervailed by arbitrage buyers.  
Our results suggest that the momentum trading style is not a risk-free arbitrage 
opportunity, as the returns of the winner and the loser portfolios do not preserve their spread 
across both optimistic and pessimistic sentiment states.  Significant profits obtain, however, 
when the momentum strategy is implemented only after optimistic periods.  
 
4.3.2 Is the Effect of Investor Sentiment on Momentum Profits Robust? 
 
This section examines the robustness of the evidence that momentum profits are only 
significant during optimistic investor sentiment periods.  Throughout this section we continue 
to analyze the six-month formation and holding period strategy (J=6, K=6), and define 
sentiment as in Table 2.  
4.3.3 Investor Sentiment, Momentum, and Market States 
 
Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) propose that investors‟ behavioral biases will be 
accentuated after market gains and test whether the momentum profits are related to past 
market returns.  They identify UP and DOWN market states using the returns of the market 
for a 36-month period prior to the beginning of the strategy‟s holding period.  If this return is 
positive (negative), they classify the market state as UP (DOWN).  Then, they compute 
momentum profits after UP and DOWN markets.  Their results indicate that momentum 
profits are significant only after UP markets.  This leads the authors to conclude that positive 
market returns amplify behavioral biases, which ultimately lead to momentum.  
Market returns can, of course, be related to investor sentiment [Otoo (1999)], because, 
for example, as market returns increase, investors may potentially become more optimistic.  
However, the relationship may not be exact for two reasons.  First, some investors may hold 
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contrarian expectations.
45
  These investors may become pessimistic when they perceive that 
the market has climbed too high.  Second, our measure of sentiment is a broad survey on 
aspects other than financial markets, and is likely to be affected by factors over and beyond 
market returns.  Indeed, for our entire sample period, we find that the correlation of the time 
series of lagged 36-month market returns and the average residual sentiment for the past three 
months is 0.24.  This confirms that the relationship between market returns and investor 
sentiment is less than perfect.  
Nevertheless, a correlation of 0.24 is significant and merits investigation.  Therefore, 
we also classify each formation period as belonging to an UP or DOWN market 
independently of investor sentiment as in Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004).  We 
calculate the return of the value-weighted index including dividends for the 36-month (Panels 
A1 and B1), 24-month (Panels A2 and B2) and 12-month (Panels A3 and C3) period prior to 
the beginning of the strategy‟s holding period.  If this return is positive (negative), we 
classify the market state as UP or (DOWN).  We then derive momentum profits for optimistic 
and pessimistic periods during UP (Panel A) and DOWN (Panel B) markets.  
These results are reported in Table 4.3.  From Panels A1 and B1 it can be seen that of 
the 500 holding period months in the sample, 436 (87.2%) occur in UP markets and only 64 
(12.8%) in DOWN markets. Interestingly, in UP market states, we find considerable variation 
in investor sentiment, as 69 periods (or 16%) are classified as pessimistic, 254 (or 58%) as 
mild and 113 (or 26%) as optimistic.  This provides support to the notion that market run-ups 
do not completely overlap with investor optimism.   
Momentum strategies in DOWN markets, as shown in Panel B of Table 4.3, generally 
produce insignificant momentum profits, regardless of investor sentiment.  However, the 
number of observations in each sentiment group is very small and, therefore, these results do 
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 See Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002), and Goetzmann and Massa 
(2002) for evidence on contrarian investors. 
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not allow meaningful interpretation.  Momentum profits in UP markets, as Panel A of Table 
4.3 shows, vary with investor sentiment.  Specifically, in Panel A1 (36-month market return), 
momentum profits in optimistic periods are highly significant at a monthly average of 2.12%. 
This average decreases to 1.55% in mild sentiment months, and to an insignificant 0.87 (t-
value = 1.51) in pessimistic months.  Similar, albeit stronger, results are reported in Panels 
A2 (24-month market) and A3 (12-month market).  These results are consistent with our 
previous findings, which show that momentum profits are significantly larger when investor 
sentiment is optimistic 
 For robustness we also derive the results reported in Table 4.2 using a sentiment 
measure that is orthogonal to the macroeconomic variables and lagged market returns. These 
results are shown in Table 4.4, and generally reveal the same patterns. This further 
demonstrates that the sentiment effect we demonstrate is not an alternative representation of 
the Cooper et al (2004) findings. 
In Table 4.5 we report regression results.  Panel A presents estimates based on the 
regression model of Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) (Table V, p. 1361), augmented 
with investor sentiment. Specifically, we estimate the following model (omitting time 
subscripts): 
 
Profits=b0+b1 Sentiment+b2Market+b3Market
2
+u                                      (1) 
 
The variable Profits is the time series of average monthly momentum profits.  
Because we are conducting overlapping strategies, each observation of momentum profits 
corresponds to K formation periods, and thus K observations for investor sentiment. In the 
regression Sentiment is defined as the average sentiment calculated from these K 
observations. Market is the lagged market return of the value weighted index including 
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dividends during the 36, 24 and 12- month periods prior to the beginning of the strategy‟s 
holding period. Market
2
 is the square of the market return.  
The regression results in Panel A of Table 4.5 show that momentum profits increase 
with the market return, but decrease with the squared market term, indicating a nonlinear 
relationship, and confirming the results of Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004).
46
 Our 
results also show that the coefficient of Sentiment is positive and significant across all market 
return specifications (36, 24 and 12-months). Specifically, in Panel A, when we use a 36-
month lagged market return, the coefficient on Sentiment is equal to 0.0002 with a t-value of 
2.36. Whereas the magnitude of the coefficient is similar, its t-value increases to 3.02 when 
the 24-month lagged market return is used and to 3.05 when the 12-month lagged market 
return is used in the regressions. Likewise, the coefficient and t-value of the Market return 
decreases from 0.1143 with t-value 3.61 for the 36-month return, to 0.0666 with t-value 1.78 
for the12-month return. Interestingly, while the results in Panel A display that Sentiment 
predicts momentum profits independently of market returns they also show that it is a 
stronger predictor when the market return is calculated over shorter periods. This is consistent 
with the results reported in Table 4.4. 
In Panels B of Table 4.5 we report results by excluding momentum profits in DOWN 
markets. We choose to leave out these observations because they are associated with 
extremely adverse market conditions, characterized by reductions in liquidity [Chordia, Roll 
and Subrahmanyam (2001)], and increases in volatility [Bekaert and Wu (2000)]. During 
such times an aggressive investment style such as momentum cannot be easily implemented. 
Thus, by directing our attention to UP market states, we examine the relationship between 
momentum profits, market returns and investor sentiment during “normal” market conditions 
when momentum investing can be implemented more easily.  
                                                 
46
 In unreported analysis (available on request) we run a regression identical to that of Cooper, Gutierrez, and 
Hameed (2004) (without the sentiment variables) and find results similar to theirs.  
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The results in Panel B demonstrate that the only significant variable in all three 
regression specifications of Market return (36, 24 and 12-month return) is Sentiment. This 
suggests that investor sentiment has a distinct and positive association with momentum 
profits during UP market states in that momentum profits in UP market conditions are related 
to Sentiment much more strongly than to past market returns. 
In Panel C, we report the results of a horse race regression between optimistic 
sentiment, pessimistic sentiment and market returns. These results confirm those in Panel A. 
As before, Sentiment is positive and significant in all three specifications of the market return. 
In addition, the results show that the effect of Market return on momentum decreases when 
market returns are calculated over shorter time periods. For the 36-month period in Panel C 
the coefficient on Market return is 0.04 with t-value 2.15 and decreases to an insignificant 
0.052 with t-value 1.55 for the 12-month period. 
Overall the results in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show that the investor sentiment effect, 
reported in Table 4.2, is not a manifestation of the UP market effect documented by Cooper, 
Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004). Our findings instead suggest that investor sentiment captures 
a significant variation in momentum profits even after controlling for the state of the capital 
market. 
 
4.3.4 Investor Sentiment, Momentum, and Trading Volume  
 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000), argue that trading volume is related to momentum profits and 
show that high volume portfolios generate higher momentum returns. Trading volume has 
also been linked to investors‟ behavioral biases [Odean (1999); Statman, Thorley, and 
Vorkink (2006)]. In light of this evidence, we examine how sentiment affects the momentum 
profits generated by the different volume portfolios.  
As before, we use the same methodology to construct momentum portfolios. 
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However, during the formation period, in addition to sorting stocks on their past returns, we 
also rank them on their average monthly turnover (trading volume/shares outstanding). 
Consistent with Lee and Swaminathan (2001), we form ten momentum groups and three 
trading volume groups and derive momentum returns for each combination, separately for 
optimistic and pessimistic formation periods.  
Table 4.6 presents momentum profits for each trading volume portfolio conditional on 
investor sentiment.  The sentiment effect is documented in all volume portfolios as 
momentum profits increase with sentiment.  While in optimistic periods, momentum profits 
are highly significant for all volume portfolios, they tend to be less significant or insignificant 
in pessimistic periods. Interestingly, in Panel A, we observe that the high volume portfolio 
generates significant momentum even in pessimistic periods (0.98, t-value 2.02), 
approximately halved relative to optimistic periods.  This result is not so surprising in light of 
the evidence that larger overconfidence translates to higher trading volume [Odean (1999), 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009)]. Therefore, since the high volume portfolio is indicative of 
larger overconfidence, it should generate momentum as suggested by the theory of Daniel et 
al (1998).  Or, in other words, the momentum profits generated by the high volume portfolio 
should be less sensitive to variations in overconfidence induced by miscalibrated signals due 
to investor sentiment.  
Mid-volume (Panel B) and low volume portfolios (Panel C), however, reveal a strong 
sentiment effect.  In Panel B (C) for the mid (low) volume portfolio, the momentum profits 
decline from an average monthly return of 2.37% (2.30%) in optimistic periods to an 
insignificant average of 0.13% (0.04%) in pessimistic periods.  In sum, while the evidence 
appears to be consistent with the results of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) in high volume 
portfolios, our results continue to highlight that momentum gains are more pronounced in 
optimistic states for both mild and low volume portfolios.  
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4.3.5 Is it a Size Effect?   
 
A large literature suggests that return predictability is stronger for smaller companies, which 
are held mostly by individual investors [Nagel (2005)], and entail higher arbitrage costs 
[D‟Avolio (2002), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)], show that momentum strategies are 
more profitable amongst smaller companies. In this section, we explore whether our previous 
results, reported in Table 4. 2, depend on the size of the company. 
We rank stocks at the end of the formation period according to firm size, and apply 
our momentum strategy separately to the 50% smallest and 50% largest companies.
47
  These 
results are reported in Table 4.7 and show that sentiment affects momentum for both small 
and large stocks.  For small stocks (Panel A), we observe that momentum profits in optimistic 
periods decline from a monthly average of 2.14% to 1.72% in mild sentiment periods and to 
an insignificant 0.46% in pessimistic periods.  The corresponding figures for large companies 
are 0.86%, 0.81%, and 0.26%.  
 Our evidence that momentum is generally larger for smaller companies confirms the 
findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001).  Further, the evidence that the effect of 
sentiment is much more dramatic in smaller companies (an average monthly return 
differential of 1.68% vis-à-vis 0.60% for large companies) in Panel A) supports the argument 
of Baker and Wurgler (2006) that the effects of investor sentiment tend to be more 
pronounced in the smaller companies that are harder to value and hence more prone to 
subjective evaluations.  This momentum differential between large and small firms appears 
also to be consistent with the prediction of the gradual-information-diffusion  theory of Hong 
and Stein (1999) that momentum strategies are more profitable in small firms because the 
information about small firms gets out more slowly and investors face fixed costs of 
information acquisition. Overall, the sentiment effect documented in Table 4.2 is robust to 
                                                 
47
 The size breakpoints are from Ken French‟s data library (mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). 
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firm size, as momentum profits are insignificant for both small and large companies in 
periods of pessimistic investor sentiment.  
 
4.3.6 Is it Risk? 
 
While the evidence so far suggests that conditioning on investor sentiment has a dramatic 
impact on the profits of momentum strategies, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
higher (lower) returns of the winner (loser) portfolio during periods of optimism load more 
(less) strongly on economically meaningful risk factors. We address this issue by estimating 
CAPM, Fama and French (FF), and Conditional CAPM (CCAPM)-adjusted momentum 
returns across different investor sentiment states.  
Following the method in Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004), we perform the risk 
adjustment by forming a time series of raw momentum returns corresponding to each event 
month of the holding period.  Specifically, to form CAPM- and FF-risk adjusted profits, for 
each holding period month, portfolio returns are regressed on the appropriate factors and a 
constant. In this manner, we obtain estimated factor loadings for each portfolio and holding 
period month, which we use to derive risk-adjusted profits as follows: 
 
t
itikkt
adj
kt frr ,                                              (2) 
where rkt represents the raw returns of each momentum portfolio for the strategy in the 
holding period month K, in calendar month t, fit is the realization of factor i in calendar month 
t, and βik is the estimated factor loading in month K on fit. We use the excess return of the 
value-weighted market index, Rm, over the one-month Treasury-bill return, Rf as the market 
portfolio in the CAPM, and, additionally, the return differential between small and big 
companies (SMB), and high and low book-to-market companies (HML), for the FF risk 
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adjustment.
48
 
For the CCAPM we allow the covariance between the returns of momentum 
portfolios with the excess market return to vary with investor sentiment.  Particularly we 
estimate risk adjusted returns using the following model: 
 
))(*( fmjt
sent
ikikkt
adj
kt RRSentimentrr ,                               (3) 
where rkt represents the raw returns of each momentum portfolio for the strategy in the 
holding period month K, in calendar month t, βik is the estimated factor loading in month K on 
the excess market return and βik
sent
 is the factor loading in month K on the interaction between 
the excess market return and investor sentiment during the formation period.
49
 The time-
varying betas argument predicts that the covariance between momentum profits and excess 
market returns increases when sentiment is optimistic; therefore returns increase accordingly 
to compensate for the increase in the co-variation between momentum portfolios and the 
excess market return.
50
  
Table 4.8 shows the CAPM, FF and CCAPM-adjusted momentum profits. The pattern 
of momentum profits, reported in Table 2, remains robust to these risk adjustments. 
Momentum profits are highly significant, at a monthly average of 2.03% (CAPM), 2.08% 
(FF) and 2.03% (CCAPM), respectively, when the strategy is implemented in optimistic 
investor sentiment periods. However, in pessimistic periods momentum profits drop 
remarkably to a monthly average return of 0.48% (CAPM), 0.96% (FF) and 0.47% 
(CCAPM), respectively. Note that the CAPM and the CCAPM-adjusted returns are virtually 
                                                 
48
 We thank Eugene Fama and Kenneth French for providing the data on Fama and French (1993) factors on the 
WRDS website.   
49
 Because we perform overlapping strategies for each portfolio return observation we have CB residuals from K 
formation periods.  In Equation (4), Sentiment is the average sentiment from these K formation periods.  
50
 We do not perform a conditional FF specification because the SMB and HML factors may be related to 
sentiment in a manner that is consistent with a behavioral story.  Therefore, allowing factor loadings between 
momentum returns and the HML and SMB portfolios to vary according to investor sentiment will produce 
inconclusive results.  
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indistinguishable, suggesting that beta does not depend on investor sentiment. This result is in 
line with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006).  
Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that rational risk premia, at least in the context of 
the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) models, are not able to explain the superior 
performance of momentum strategy in periods of optimistic investor sentiment.  
 
4.3.7 Is the CB Sentiment Index Forecasting Future Macroeconomic Conditions? 
 
 Although the sentiment effect on momentum profits cannot be explained by 
traditional asset pricing theories it may still be related to some form of rational pricing if our 
sentiment measure reflects future macroeconomic activity, which determines holding period 
returns. In this section we construct our sentiment measure by controlling for proxies for 
future macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, we replicate the analysis in Panel A of Table 
4.2 by orthogonalizing the CB index on current macroeconomic indicators (described in 
Section 1), their one-quarter ahead values,
51
 and the closing value of the VIX at the end of the 
month in which sentiment is measured.
52
 The inclusion of the one-quarter ahead 
macroeconomic variables allows us to control for future macroeconomic conditions. Since 
the VIX is obtained primarily from the activity of sophisticated investors [Lakonishok, 
Pearson and Poteshman (2007)] who participate in the options market, it is included in the 
regression as a  proxy for macroeconomic expectations.
53
 All of the other calculations remain 
                                                 
51
 Only the current value of the NBER recession dummy is included. 
52
 VIX stands for Market Volatility Index, and is based on index option prices. For a general discussion on the 
VIX see Whaley (2008).  
53
 The level of the VIX may also be related to sentiment, as shown by Kaplanski and Levi (2009). However, 
since options are primarily traded by sophisticated investors it is reasonable to assume that the sentiment 
displayed by the VIX is not as dramatic as that displayed by the CB index. Therefore, at least, some of the 
variability in the VIX is related to expectations about future macroeconomic conditions.  
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unchanged, with the difference that the sample period of this test is shorter as the VIX is 
available from January 1985.
54
   
 Table 4.9 reports momentum returns for J=6, K=3 (Panel A), J=K=6 (Panel B) and 
J=6, K=12 (Panel C) strategies. The new results remain essentially unchanged even when we 
orthogonalize the CB index with respect to future macroeconomic conditions and VIX. For 
example, as seen in Panel B, momentum profits in optimistic sentiment states are highly 
significant at a monthly average of 2.42%. They decline to 1.51% in mild sentiment periods 
and to an insignificant 0.27% in pessimistic periods. Similar results obtain in Panels A and C. 
These findings suggest that the sentiment measure used in our analysis is not forecasting 
future macroeconomic activity, which, in turn, explains momentum profits.  
 
4.3.8 An Alternative Sentiment Index 
 
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results to an alternative index for investor 
sentiment using the monthly measure constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007).
55
 
These authors suggest that investor sentiment can be captured from various market-based 
variables that relate to investors‟ propensity to purchase stocks.  They construct a sentiment 
time series using six sentiment-revealing variables: trading volume (measured as total NYSE 
turnover),
56 
dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, number and first day returns in 
IPOs, and the equity share in new issues.  Because these variables are partly related to 
economic fundamentals, they regress each of these sentiment proxies against growth in 
industrial production, real growth in durable consumption, non-durable consumption, services 
consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and use the residuals 
                                                 
54
 We use both the ways to construct the VIX described in Whaley (2008, footnote 9 pp. 4) and get identical 
results. The reported results are based on the first method of Whaley (1988).  
55
 This index is available from Jeffrey Wurgler‟s website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/).  
56
 To remove the time trend from the turnover, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) use log turnover minus a five 
year moving average. 
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from this regression as the sentiment proxies.  The overall sentiment index is the first 
principal component of the six sentiment proxies.  For more detail on the construction of the 
index, see Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007).  This time series is available on a monthly basis 
from October 1965 to December 2007.  
Table 4.10, reports Panel A, Table 2-equivalent momentum results for optimistic and 
pessimistic periods, using the Baker and Wurgler sentiment measure.  Aside from the 
replacement of the CB index with the Baker and Wurgler measure, all calculations remain the 
same as those in Table 2, with the small difference that in this table we combine the Mild 
sentiment category with the Optimistic sentiment category.  We do this because Mild and 
Optimistic sentiment states yield very similar momentum profits, thus by pooling them 
together we gain statistical power without losing important information.
 57
  
Consistent with our earlier baseline findings, the new evidence confirms the 
difference in momentum profits between optimistic and pessimistic investor states even when 
we use an alternative investor sentiment index.  Specifically, in Panel B (J,K=6), these results 
show that momentum profits in optimistic periods are equal to an average monthly return of 
1.59%, whereas in pessimistic periods they drop to an insignificant 0.30%. Similar results are 
seen in Panel A for the J=6,K=3 (Panel B: J=6,K=12) momentum strategy where the 
corresponding momentum profits in optimistic periods are 1.71% (0.97%), reducing to an 
insignificant 0.23% (-0.01%) in pessimistic periods.
58
 These findings corroborate our 
previous results and show that they are not driven by the choice of sentiment index.  
 
 
 
                                                 
57
 When momentum profits are partitioned to three sentiment categories, and J,K=6, the optimistic sentiment 
category yields average momentum profits equal 1.40% and the mild sentiment category 1.67%. The 
corresponding figures for Panels A (K=3)  and C (K=12) are 1.54% and 1.80% and 0.70% and 1.05%.   
58
 We obtain very results when we use 20%-20% sentiment states. 
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4.3.9 Alternative Lags for Optimistic and Pessimistic Sentiment  
 
 In our analysis so far, we classify each formation period as pessimistic or optimistic 
using a rolling average of the residual sentiment level during a three-month window prior to 
the beginning of the holding period.  In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results 
to average sentiment calculated as the average of the two and four months prior to the end of 
the formation period.
59
  
As shown in Panels A (2 sentiment lags) and B (4 sentiment lags) of Table 4.11, our 
main results hold for this alternative sentiment specification.  Momentum strategies in 
optimistic periods consistently yield significant average monthly profits of 1.95% (Panel A) 
and 2.10% (Panel B).  These profits, however, decline substantially in pessimistic periods, 
equaling 0.46% (Panel A), and 0.62% (Panel B).  Overall, these results confirm that our 
baseline findings are robust to a different definition of investor sentiment.  
 
4.4 Momentum Profits, Investor Sentiment and Long-Run Returns 
 
 A central prediction of behavioral theories such as Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) is that momentum profits reflect unrealistic expectations, and thus 
revert in the long run.  Since in the previous section we documented that momentum profits 
are only significant when investors are optimistic, we would expect these profits to reverse 
over longer horizons. In this section, we examine the pattern of momentum profits in event 
time, six years (Panel A), 5 years (Panel B), 4 years (Panel C) and 3 years (Panel D) after 
portfolio formation.  
Table 4.12 presents the results.  As expected, momentum profits revert only after 
optimistic periods, regardless of whether returns are risk-adjusted.  For portfolios constructed 
                                                 
59
 The calculation of these rolling averages uses equal weights.  
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in optimistic formation periods using raw returns, this reversal, as shown in Panel A1, is 
equal to an average monthly return of -0.56%.  The corresponding figure for CAPM (FF)-
adjusted returns is -0.56% (-0.45%).  However, for portfolios formed in pessimistic periods, 
as expected, there is no reversal.  The momentum returns are equal to -0.02% and 0.00% for 
raw and CAPM adjusted returns respectively, and 0.11% for Fama-French adjusted returns. 
Similar findings are shown in Panels B,C and D, confirming that our conclusion is not 
dependent on the holding horizon. 
An noteworthy result that surfaces in Table 4.12 is that while mild sentiment 
portfolios experience significant reversals when we focus on raw (-0.17%) or CAPM (-
0.18%) adjusted returns, these momentum profits become insignificant when they are 
adjusted using the Fama-French 3 factor model (-0.02%).  This result suggests that the 
reversal in the mild sentiment portfolio is related to the HML and/or SMB factor, and thus is 
not abnormal in the context of the 3-factor model.
60
  This finding appears to be in line with 
Fama and French (1996), who show that the 3-factor model can price the long-run reversals 
documented by De bondt and Thaler (1985). However, the FF 3-factor model cannot explain 
the economically and statistically significant reversals in the optimistic sentiment momentum 
portfolios. 
Another striking pattern in Table 11 is that, regardless of the risk adjustment 
technique, the monotonic pattern in the short-run returns of the 10 optimistic momentum 
portfolios (i.e., returns increasing from the loser to the winner portfolio) completely reverts in 
the long-run as returns are decreasing from the loser to the winner portfolio.  A similar, albeit 
less pronounced, pattern is seen in mild sentiment periods.  On the contrary, however, the 
long-run returns of the pessimistic momentum portfolios are virtually indistinguishable. 
                                                 
60
 This does not necessarily mean it is rational in the sense that its strictly driven by covariance with state 
variables, as there is evidence suggesting that returns are affected by characteristics (Daniel and Titman 1997), 
and/or mispricing (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 2001), rather than factor loadings. 
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This finding reveals an intimate link between short-run momentum and long-run 
reversal.  The trading actions of optimistic investors lead to short-run momentum by pushing 
prices away from fundamental values.  As these expectations fail to materialize, investor 
sentiment subsides with momentum profits fading away, and stock prices reverting to 
fundamental values in the long run.  This finding provides support to the behavioral model of 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), which predicts that short-run momentum and 
long-run stock price reversal commonly arise from investors‟ behavioral biases.  
These results provide an important link between short-run price momentum and long-
run reversal.  Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
document such links.  The former authors show that momentum profits revert after UP 
markets, where short-run momentum is significant.  However, they also find that momentum 
profits revert after DOWN markets, and the difference in the reversals between UP and 
DOWN markets is not significant.  Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that trading volume 
also predicts reversals, albeit differently for winners and losers.
61
  Our study corroborates this 
evidence by showing that investor sentiment predicts a significant difference in the long-run 
performance of momentum portfolios.  
 
4.5 Further discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
  Does investor sentiment affect financial asset prices?  This issue is enduring and has 
taken on renewed significance in the context of dramatic rises and falls in the stock market 
during this decade. For this reason both academics and practitioners are taking an interest in 
how investors‟ psychology can affect financial markets.   
  Price momentum is perhaps the most puzzling pattern in the data. Our analysis 
                                                 
61
 They find that momentum portfolios comprised of high volume winners and low volume losers exhibit 
reversals, whereas the opposite classifications result to continuations. 
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provides support to the notion that investors‟ sentiment does affect the stock market, and thus 
should be accounted for when attempting to forecast stock returns. In addition, our results 
highlight the role of limits to arbitrage, in the persistence of mispricings.  
  Specifically, we show that momentum is only significant when investors are 
optimistic. These are periods where stocks are generally overpriced. Traditional arbitrage 
arguments, would suggest that rational investors would spot the mispricing and short sell the 
overpriced stocks. However, because arbitrage costs (in the form of fees and noise trader risk) 
are high, rational investors cannot do this effectively, allowing the momentum mispricing to 
persist. However, in the long run prices slowly gravitate to fundamental values, therefore 
causing reversals.  
  As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) patterns in the data that seem like profit 
opportunities (like momentum) persist because of high arbitrage costs. In other words, 
arbitragers do spot them, but because it is very costly to arbitrage these portfolios, it is not 
forceful enough to completely eliminate the mispricing. Our results, coupled with those of 
Hvidkjaer (2006) who finds that momentum is related to individual traders (Hvidkjaer 2006) 
and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) that momentum is stronger amongst smaller stocks 
which are more difficult to arbitrage, support this interpretation and highlight the intimidate 
interplay between investors‟ psychological biases and the limits to arbitrage as the drivers of 
price predictability. 
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Figure 1 
Investor sentiment (CB) from 1966-2008 
 
This figure plots three series.  The first is the raw data of consumer confidence provided by the Conference Board. The second series is the 3-month rolling average of 
the residual from regressing the CB index series on the following set of macroeconomic variables: growth in industrial production, real growth in durable 
consumption, non-durable consumption, services consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator.  
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                                                                                                        Table 4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the raw time series of consumer confidence, as compiled by Conference Board. Panel B 
presents the 3 month rolling average of the component of investor sentiment that is orthogonal to macroeconomic conditions. To 
derive this component we regress raw sentiment on growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, non-durable, and 
services consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and then use the residuals from this regression to 
calculate the 3-month rolling average.  The sample period is April 1967 to December 2008. 
 
 
Panel A: CB consumer confidence        
 Mean ζ Q1 Median Q3 Minimum Maximum N 
 97.40 23.06 82.59 98.00 110.60 38.62 144.71 501 
         
Panel B: CB consumer confidence orthogonal to macroeconomic variables   
 -0.06 19.96 -13.13 -1.32 11.91 -52.89 44.13 501 
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Table 4.2  
Momentum Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment 
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period April 1967 until December 2008.  At the beginning 
of each month all stocks are ranked based on their cumulative returns over the previous J months.  Portfolio 1 includes the loser stocks and portfolio 10 the winner stocks. The winner stocks are 
bought and the loser stocks sold, and this position is held for K months.  Monthly holding period returns come from overlapping strategies and are computed as an equal- weighted average of returns 
from strategies initiated at the beginning of this month, and the previous K-1 months.  We allow one month between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period, and 
delete all stocks that are priced less than one $1 at the beginning of the holding period.  Sentiment is measured using the time series of consumer confidence sentiment index constructed by 
Conference Board.  We regress this series on growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, non-durable, and services consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession 
indicator, and use the residuals from this regression as the sentiment proxy.  In order to identify whether a particular formation period was optimistic or pessimistic, in each month t we calculate the 
average sentiment level for the previous 3 months, using a weight of 3/6 for month t, a weight of 2/6 for month t-1 and a weight of 1/6 for month t-2.  In Panel A (B) (C) the top 30% (20%) (40%) 
observations of this rolling average time series are the high sentiment periods, and the bottom 30% (20%) (40%) the low sentiment periods.  To identify each holding period month as optimistic and 
pessimistic, we calculate how many of the K formation periods were of high and low sentiment.  If all K formation periods were classified as optimistic (pessimistic) the holding period month is 
classified as optimistic (pessimistic). To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time series of average monthly momentum profits on 
Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no intercept.  To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress 
average monthly momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy variable and an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable with a constant.  The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and 
the difference between profits derived after optimistic and pessimistic periods are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel A: 30%-30% Sentiment States     
Panel A1:J=6,K=3             
Optimistic (n=133) -0.85 -0.05 0.36 0.53 0.68 0.78 0.96 0.90 1.09 1.42 2.27 [5.06] 
Mild (n=246) -0.24 0.53 0.81 0.91 0.97 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.14 1.20 1.44 [4.67] 
Pessimistic (n=121) 1.86 2.07 2.21 2.14 2.08 1.97 1.91 1.84 1.89 2.15 0.29 [0.56] 
           Opt.-Pes 1.98 [2.90] 
Panel A2: J,K=6             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.48 0.17 0.52 0.67 0.86 0.95 1.10 1.10 1.26 1.51 2.00 [5.66] 
Mild (n=286) -0.28 0.34 0.63 0.77 0.86 0.91 0.99 1.05 1.12 1.18 1.46 [5.66] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 2.12 2.41 2.45 2.31 2.24 2.21 2.11 2.13 2.21 2.45 0.34 [0.77] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.66 [2.96] 
Panel A3 :J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=109) -0.27 0.20 0.49 0.62 0.78 0.86 0.94 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.27 [3.50] 
Mild (n=337) 0.38 0.75 0.95 1.02 1.10 1.12 1.18 1.22 1.25 1.23 0.85 [4.14] 
Pessimistic (n=54) 2.05 2.25 2.21 2.12 2.11 2.05 2.00 2.00 2.06 2.14 0.09 [0.22] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.18 [2.20] 
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Table 4.2 , continued 
 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel B: 20%-20% Sentiment States     
Panel B1:J=6,K=3             
Optimistic (n=92) -0.67 -0.09 0.30 0.47 0.60 0.71 1.01 0.87 1.10 1.55 2.22 [3.83] 
Mild (n=327) -0.24 0.56 0.86 0.98 1.04 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.14 1.22 1.46 [5.10] 
Pessimistic (n=81) 2.21 2.31 2.36 2.20 2.14 2.03 1.90 1.91 2.07 2.32 0.11 [0.25] 
           Opt.-Pes 2.11 [2.87] 
Panel B2: J,K=6             
Optimistic (n=84) -0.43 -0.04 0.25 0.40 0.58 0.67 0.91 0.85 1.08 1.44 1.87 [4.17] 
Mild (n=353) -0.06 0.60 0.90 1.03 1.12 1.16 1.20 1.27 1.30 1.38 1.44 [6.24] 
Pessimistic (n=63) 1.80 2.11 2.07 1.89 1.84 1.83 1.77 1.77 2.02 2.20 0.40 [1.04] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.47 [2.48] 
Panel B3 :J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=100) 0.04 0.42 0.66 0.76 0.91 0.95 1.06 1.09 1.11 1.18 1.14 [3.11] 
Mild (n=301) 0.23 0.65 0.89 0.99 1.07 1.11 1.19 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.01 [4.62] 
Pessimistic (n=99) 1.40 1.61 1.62 1.55 1.56 1.53 1.47 1.46 1.51 1.51 0.11 [0.41] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.03 [2.28] 
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Table 4.2 , continued 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel C: 40%-40% Sentiment State     
Panel C1:J=6,K=3             
Optimistic (n=172) -1.51 -0.53 -0.07 0.12 0.29 0.39 0.57 0.52 0.65 0.87 2.38 [6.09] 
Mild (n=170) 0.24 0.91 1.16 1.27 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.35 1.42 1.48 1.24 [2.97] 
Pessimistic (n=158) 1.63 1.88 2.00 1.94 1.89 1.81 1.75 1.71 1.83 2.08 0.45 [1.05] 
           Opt.-Pes 1.93 [3.33] 
Panel C2: J,K=6             
Optimistic (n=149) -0.99 -0.23 0.17 0.36 0.58 0.68 0.85 0.90 1.05 1.26 2.25 [6.83] 
Mild (n=227) 0.05 0.65 0.93 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.15 1.18 1.24 1.26 1.21 [4.12] 
Pessimistic (n=124) 1.56 1.82 1.89 1.82 1.83 1.85 1.80 1.85 1.93 2.21 0.65 [1.83] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.60 [3.29] 
Panel C3 :J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=124) -0.65 -0.08 0.24 0.38 0.57 0.66 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.80 1.45 [3.91] 
Mild (n=304) 0.50 0.83 1.04 1.11 1.18 1.20 1.26 1.30 1.32 1.31 0.81 [3.71] 
Pessimistic (n=72) 1.96 2.13 2.06 1.95 1.93 1.89 1.84 1.84 1.89 2.00 0.04 [0.14] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.41 [2.87] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
Table 4.3 
Momentum Profits Conditional on Different Market States and Investor Sentiment 
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period April 1967 until December 
2008.  Panel A shows momentum strategies implemented in UP markets, whereas Panel B momentum strategies implemented after DOWN markets.  The state of the market is 
the return of the value weighted market index including dividends 36 (Panel A1,B1), 24 (A2,B2) and 12 (A3,B3) months prior to beginning of the holding period, as measured 
by Cooper et al (2004).  We allow one month between the end of the formation period and the holding period, and delete all stocks that are priced less than one $1 at the 
beginning of the holding period.  Sentiment is defined as in table 2. To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time 
series of average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no intercept.
 
 To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment periods 
are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy variable and an Optimistic sentiment 
dummy variable with a constant.  In this table J, K=6.  
    Momentum Portfolio     
     Panel A: UP markets     
Panel A1: 36-month market 1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Optimistic (n=113) -0.60 0.11 0.48 0.63 0.82 0.90 1.05 1.08 1.24 1.52 2.12 [4.73] 
Mild (n=254) -0.27 0.39 0.70 0.83 0.95 1.00 1.06 1.14 1.22 1.28 1.55 [5.18] 
Pessimistic (n=69) 1.15 1.74 1.88 1.80 1.75 1.73 1.61 1.62 1.74 2.01 0.87 [1.51] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.25 [1.72] 
Panel A2: 24-month market             
Optimistic (n=103) -0.75 -0.02 0.36 0.54 0.75 0.82 0.98 1.01 1.18 1.45 2.21 [4.86] 
Mild (n=252) -0.34 0.37 0.69 0.83 0.95 1.01 1.09 1.18 1.29 1.40 1.74 [6.01] 
Pessimistic (n=76) 1.50 1.94 2.00 1.91 1.86 1.84 1.74 1.74 1.89 2.16 0.66 [1.25] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.55 [2.22] 
Panel A3: 12-month   market             
Optimistic (n=87) -0.50 0.30 0.71 0.85 1.08 1.15 1.34 1.42 1.62 2.03 2.53 [6.16] 
Mild (n=206) 0.06 0.69 0.93 1.00 1.09 1.12 1.17 1.24 1.36 1.49 1.43 [5.36] 
Pessimistic (n=86) 1.81 2.22 2.29 2.16 2.11 2.10 2.01 2.01 2.14 2.42 0.61 [1.49] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.92 [3.29] 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
    Momentum Portfolio     
     Panel B: DOWN markets     
Panel B1: 36-month market 1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Optimistic (n=8) 1.20 0.95 1.00 1.31 1.43 1.57 1.80 1.39 1.53 1.46 0.26 [0.10] 
Mild (n=32) -0.36 -0.11 0.02 0.37 0.22 0.24 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.40 0.76 [0.60] 
Pessimistic (n=24) 4.91 4.33 4.09 3.78 3.65 3.60 3.55 3.59 3.55 3.72 -1.20 [-0.82] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.46 [0.50] 
Panel B2: 24-month market             
Optimistic (n=18) 1.06 1.27 1.40 1.44 1.49 1.66 1.79 1.59 1.71 1.87 0.80 [0.45] 
Mild (n=34) 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.05 -0.19 -0.45 -0.62 [-0.48] 
Pessimistic (n=17) 4.88 4.52 4.47 4.11 3.93 3.86 3.77 3.86 3.65 3.75 -1.12 [0.61] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.92 [0.75] 
Panel B3: 12-month   market             
Optimistic (n=34) -0.45 -0.16 0.03 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.49 0.27 0.33 0.18 0.63 [0.47] 
Mild (n=80) -1.17 -0.58 -0.15 0.20 0.27 0.38 0.52 0.57 0.50 0.37 1.54 [1.74] 
Pessimistic (n=7) 5.95 4.67 4.42 4.15 3.81 3.60 3.41 3.54 3.02 2.86 -3.09 [-1.03] 
           Opt.-Pes. 3.72 [1.13] 
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Table 4.4 
Momentum Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment orthogonal to macroeconomic variables and lagged market returns 
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period April 1967 until December 2008.  At the beginning 
of each month all stocks are ranked based on their cumulative returns over the previous J months.  Portfolio 1 includes the loser stocks and portfolio 10 the winner stocks. The winner stocks are 
bought and the loser stocks sold, and this position is held for K months.  Monthly holding period returns come from overlapping strategies and are computed as an equal- weighted average of returns 
from strategies initiated at the beginning of this month, and the previous K-1 months.  We allow one month between the end of the formation period and the beginning of the holding period, and 
delete all stocks that are priced less than one $1 at the beginning of the holding period.  Sentiment is measured using the time series of consumer confidence sentiment index constructed by 
Conference Board.  We regress this series on growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, non-durable, and services consumption, growth in employment, an NBER recession indicator, 
and the lagged market return for 36 months(Panel A), 24 months (Panel B) and 12 months (Panel C) ending in the month in which sentiment is measured. The residuals from this regression are the 
sentiment proxy. The remaining calculations are as in Table 4.2 
 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell t-stat. 
     Panel A: 36 month market     
Panel A1:J=6,K=3              
Optimistic (n=133) -1.13 -0.31 0.09 0.31 0.47 0.57 0.76 0.68 0.87 1.16 2.29 
[5.03] 
Mild (n=252) 0.41 1.01 1.26 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.39 1.39 1.47 1.59 1.18 
[3.62] 
Pessimistic (n=115) 0.75 1.28 1.47 1.43 1.47 1.43 1.31 1.28 1.37 1.53 0.78 [1.83] 
           Opt.-Pes 1.51 [2.43] 
Panel A2: J,K=6              
Optimistic (n=117) -0.47 0.14 0.48 0.65 0.84 0.93 1.07 1.07 1.24 1.48 1.95 
[3.11] 
Mild (n=296) 0.21 0.71 0.97 1.07 1.12 1.15 1.21 1.27 1.34 1.43 1.22 
[4.56] 
Pessimistic (n=87) 0.58 1.29 1.46 1.44 1.51 1.52 1.45 1.47 1.56 1.76 1.17 
[3.11] 
           Opt.-Pes. 0.78 [1.49] 
Panel A3 :J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=103) -0.18 0.19 0.45 0.57 0.74 0.82 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.98 1.16 
[3.06] 
Mild (n=346) 0.40 0.79 1.02 1.09 1.16 1.19 1.26 1.30 1.32 1.30 0.90 
[4.12] 
Pessimistic (n=51) 1.82 1.99 1.88 1.73 1.77 1.68 1.58 1.56 1.68 1.79 -0.03 
[-0.07] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.19 [2.07] 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel B: 24-month market     
Panel B1:J=6,K=3              
Optimistic (n=135) -1.10 -0.26 0.15 0.36 0.51 0.61 0.82 0.73 0.92 1.22 2.33 
[5.18] 
Mild (n=244) 0.18 0.85 1.11 1.19 1.20 1.20 1.24 1.24 1.28 1.35 1.18 
[3.59] 
Pessimistic (n=121) 1.19 1.57 1.74 1.68 1.71 1.68 1.58 1.56 1.70 1.94 0.74 [1.89] 
           Opt.-Pes 1.59 [2.65] 
Panel B2: J,K=6              
Optimistic (n=120) -0.65 0.03 0.37 0.56 0.74 0.83 0.98 0.98 1.14 1.36 2.01 
[5.66] 
Mild (n=292) 0.14 0.64 0.92 1.02 1.09 1.13 1.20 1.26 1.33 1.42 1.28 
[4.80] 
Pessimistic (n=88) 1.07 1.69 1.78 1.71 1.73 1.75 1.64 1.66 1.74 1.94 0.88 
[2.54] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.13 [2.28] 
Panel B3 :J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=106) -0.23 0.19 0.46 0.59 0.74 0.82 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.99 1.22 
[3.29] 
Mild (n=345) 0.51 0.87 1.07 1.15 1.22 1.24 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.36 0.85 
[3.96] 
Pessimistic (n=49) 1.24 1.54 1.53 1.39 1.41 1.36 1.30 1.26 1.33 1.39 0.15 
[0.44] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.07 [2.10] 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel C: 12 month market     
Panel C1:J=6,K=3              
Optimistic (n=133) -0.85 -0.05 0.36 0.53 0.68 0.78 0.96 0.90 1.09 1.42 2.27 
[5.06] 
Mild (n=245) -0.28 0.49 0.77 0.88 0.94 0.98 1.01 1.01 1.11 1.16 1.45 
[4.68] 
Pessimistic (n=122) 1.82 2.03 2.17 2.10 2.04 1.93 1.87 1.81 1.85 2.10 0.28 [0.55] 
           Opt.-Pes 1.99 [2.93] 
Panel C2: J,K=6              
Optimistic (n=121) -0.48 0.17 0.52 0.67 0.86 0.95 1.10 1.10 1.26 1.51 2.00 
[5.66] 
Mild (n=285) -0.30 0.33 0.62 0.77 0.86 0.91 0.98 1.04 1.11 1.17 1.46 
[5.65] 
Pessimistic (n=94) 2.13 2.42 2.45 2.31 2.25 2.22 2.11 2.13 2.21 2.47 0.34 
[0.79] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.66 [2.97] 
Panel C3 :J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=109) -0.27 0.20 0.49 0.62 0.78 0.86 0.94 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.27 
[3.50] 
Mild (n=337) 0.38 0.75 0.95 1.02 1.10 1.12 1.18 1.22 1.25 1.23 0.85 
[4.14] 
Pessimistic (n=54) 2.05 2.25 2.21 2.12 2.11 2.05 2.00 2.00 2.06 2.14 0.09 
[0.22] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.18 [2.20] 
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Table 4.5 
 Regressions of Momentum Profits on Market Returns and Investor Sentiment 
 
Market is the return of the value weighted market index 36, 24 and 12 months prior to beginning of the holding period, and market return
2
 is the square term of the market return.  
For each momentum profit observation (which corresponds to K formation periods due to overlapping strategies) we calculate average sentiment (defined as in Table 2) in the K 
formation periods.  T- statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. In this table J, K=6.  
 
  36-month market return 24-month market return 12-month market return 
 Parameter Estimate t- statistic Adj.R2
 
Estimate t- statistic Adj.R2
 
Estimate t- statistic Adj.R2
 
Panel A: Cooper et al regression with sentiment:  Mom. profits = b0 + b1*Sentiment + b2*Market + b3*Market
2
 + u  
Constant b0 0.0099 3.13 0.0291 0.0137 4.58 0.026 0.0141 5.02 0.013 
Sentiment b1 0.0002 2.36   0.0003 3.02   0.0003 3.05  
Market return b2 0.1143 3.61   0.0905 2.50   0.0666 1.78  
Market return
2 b3 -0.3804 -3.30   -0.4783 -2.51   -0.480 -1.64   
Panel B: Cooper et al regression with sentiment in UP markets: Mom. profits = a0 + b1* Sentiment + b3*UPmarket ret. + b4*UPmarket ret.
2
 + u   
Constant b0 0.0027 0.31 0.005 0.0103 1.29 0.009 0.0089 1.39 0.022 
Sentiment b1 0.0002 1.75   0.0002 2.15   0.0003 2.70  
Market return b2 0.1831 1.66   0.1819 1.24   0.2211 1.40  
Market return
2 b3 -0.5259 -1.66   -0.8778 -1.49   -1.406 -1.59   
Panel C: Horse race between market returns and sentiment:   Mom. profits = b0 + b1*Market + b2* Sentiment + u 
Constant b0 0.0076 2.01 0.015 0.0093 2.72 0.014 0.0115 4.17 0.010 
Market return b1 0.0476 2.15   0.0520 1.92   0.0525 1.55  
Sentiment  b2 0.0002 2.27   0.0002 2.80   0.0003 3.07  
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Table 4.6 
 Momentum Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment and Trading Volume  
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period April 1967 until December 2008.  At the 
end of the formation period we rank stocks in deciles based on cumulative returns in the previous J months, as well as their average monthly turnover (total volume/shares outstanding) 
over the same period.  We then independently form 10 portfolios based on past returns and 3 portfolios based on volume, which we hold for K months using overlapping strategies. 
Sentiment is defrined as in Table 2. In this table we use 30%-30% cut-off points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment. To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state 
respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time series of average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no intercept.
 
 To test if 
mean profits in Optimistic sentiment periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy 
variable and an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable with a constant.  The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits after optimistic and pessimistic sentiment in the volume 
portfolios, and the difference between profits derived after optimistic and pessimistic periods are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. In this table J, 
K=6.  
    Momentum Portfolio     
 1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Panel A:High Volume             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.50 0.12 0.28 0.29 0.50 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.91 1.32 1.82 [4.11] 
Mild (n=286) -0.52 0.22 0.47 0.61 0.71 0.77 0.88 0.88 0.99 1.05 1.57 [5.13] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 1.27 1.87 2.00 1.84 1.81 1.87 1.78 1.86 1.94 2.25 0.98 [2.02] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 0.84 [1.27] 
Panel B:  Mid-Volume             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.49 0.49 0.88 0.85 1.00 1.06 1.15 1.18 1.44 1.87 2.37 [6.99] 
Mild (n=286) -0.32 0.31 0.63 0.78 0.86 0.93 0.95 1.07 1.12 1.31 1.62 [6.16] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 2.44 2.42 2.38 2.24 2.24 2.12 2.07 2.08 2.15 2.58 0.13 [0.32] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 2.24 [4.16] 
Panel C: Low Volume             
Optimistic (n=121) 0.36 0.24 0.54 0.79 1.02 1.04 1.18 1.32 1.44 1.94 2.30 [6.37] 
Mild (n=286) 0.18 0.57 0.80 0.92 0.97 1.00 1.09 1.15 1.26 1.32 1.14 [4.60] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 2.85 2.76 2.75 2.60 2.47 2.46 2.37 2.53 2.70 2.90 0.04 [0.10] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 2.26 [4.11] 
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Table 4.7 
Momentum Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment and Firm Size 
 
 This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period April 1967 until December 
2008. Panel A shows momentum strategies implemented on the 50% smallest companies in the sample and Panel B in the 50% largest.  Size is measured as price x shares 
outstanding at the end of the formation period.  Size decile breakpoints are from Kenneth French‟s data library.  We allow one month between the end of the formation 
period and the holding period, and delete all stocks that are priced less than one $1 at the beginning of the holding period.  Sentiment is defined in Table 2. In this table we 
use 30%-30% cut-off points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment. To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the 
time series of average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no intercept.
 
 To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment 
periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy variable and an Optimistic 
sentiment dummy variable with a constant.The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and the difference between profits derived after optimistic and pessimistic 
periods are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. In this table J, K=6. 
 
    Momentum Portfolio    
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Panel A:Small Cap.             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.67 0.07 0.36 0.62 0.84 0.90 1.08 1.11 1.28 1.47 2.14 [6.16] 
Mild (n=286) -0.48 0.20 0.54 0.74 0.89 0.99 1.06 1.16 1.24 1.23 1.72 [6.48] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 2.13 2.51 2.65 2.65 2.55 2.51 2.48 2.52 2.52 2.58 0.46 [0.88] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.68 [2.69] 
Panel B:Large Cap.             
Optimistic (n=121) 0.35 0.60 0.73 0.85 0.78 0.87 0.96 0.86 1.05 1.21 0.86 [2.17] 
Mild (n=286) 0.22 0.55 0.69 0.75 0.80 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.96 1.03 0.81 [3.05] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 1.80 1.87 1.87 1.91 1.80 1.64 1.67 1.62 1.72 2.07 0.26 [0.60] 
           Opt.-Pes. 0.60 [1.01] 
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Table 4.8 
Risk-adjusted Momentum Profits Conditional on Investor Sentiment  
 
This table presents risk adjusted momentum profits calculated from CAPM, Fama-French and Conditional CAPM models. For each momentum portfolio and holding period 
month we form a time series of returns, which we regress on excess market return when we risk adjust according to the CAPM, and excess market return, the SMB and HML 
factors when we risk adjust according to the Fama-French 3 factor model.  For the CCAPM we allow beta to differ depending on the average sentiment in the 6 formation 
periods that correspond to each portfolio return observation (see equation 3).  Using these loadings and the factor realizations in each month, we estimate the monthly excess 
return for each portfolio. The data on market returns, the risk free rate and the SMB and HML factors are from Kenneth French‟s data library.  Sentiment is defined as in 
Table 2. . In this table we use 30%-30% cut-off points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment. To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are 
equal to zero, we regress the time series of average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no intercept.
 
 To test if mean 
profits in Optimistic sentiment periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy 
variable and an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable with a constant. The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and the difference between profits derived 
after optimistic and pessimistic periods are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. In this table J, K=6. 
    Momentum Portfolio    
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Panel A:CAPM             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.83 -0.13 0.24 0.41 0.61 0.69 0.85 0.84 0.98 1.20 2.03 [5.46] 
Mild (n=286) -0.52 0.14 0.44 0.60 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.93 0.97 1.49 [5.93] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 0.72 1.22 1.34 1.25 1.22 1.20 1.10 1.09 1.11 1.21 0.48 [1.10] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.55 [2.68] 
Panel B:FF             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.87 -0.25 0.10 0.26 0.47 0.55 0.71 0.72 0.90 1.21 2.08 [5.39] 
Mild (n=286) -0.82 -0.14 0.19 0.35 0.47 0.53 0.61 0.67 0.74 0.80 1.61 [6.83] 
Pessimistic (n=93) -0.46 0.18 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.51 0.96 [2.30] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.12 [1.95] 
Panel C: Conditional CAPM             
Optimistic (n=121) -0.83 -0.12 0.25 0.41 0.61 0.70 0.85 0.84 0.99 1.20 2.03 [5.46] 
Mild (n=286) -0.52 0.13 0.43 0.59 0.68 0.74 0.81 0.87 0.92 0.96 1.48 [5.92] 
Pessimistic (n=93) 0.64 1.09 1.19 1.09 1.06 1.04 0.95 0.95 0.98 1.11 0.47 [1.07] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.56 [2.70] 
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Table 4.9 
Momentum Profits Conditional on Sentiment Orthogonal to Current, Future Macroeconomic Conditions, and VIX 
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period January 1985 until December 2008. 
The description of the momentum strategy is defined in Table 2. Sentiment is measured using the time series of consumer confidence sentiment index constructed by Conference Board.  
We regress this series on growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, non-durable, and services consumption, growth in employment, an NBER recession indicator,  one 
quarter ahead growth in industrial production, durable, non-durable, and services consumption, and  employment and the closing level of the VIX at the last day of the month in which 
sentiment is measured. We use the residuals from this regression as the sentiment proxy.  In this table we use 30%-30% cut-off points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment. To test 
whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time series of average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild 
sentiment dummies, with no intercept.
 
 To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly 
momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy variable and an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable with a constant.  The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and the 
difference between profits derived after optimistic and pessimistic periods are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1.  
 
    Momentum Portfolio   
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Panel A:J=6,K=3              
Optimistic (n=67) -0.95 0.01 0.56 0.77 0.81 0.90 1.11 0.94 1.11 1.33 2.27 [3.09] 
Mild (n=142) -0.66 0.35 0.67 0.72 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.97 1.62 [3.59] 
Pessimistic (n=63) 1.04 1.20 1.28 1.29 1.36 1.26 1.21 1.08 1.24 1.40 0.36 [0.66] 
                      Opt.-Pes 1.91 [2.09] 
Panel B: J,K=6              
Optimistic (n=54) -1.44 -0.47 0.06 0.27 0.48 0.52 0.72 0.68 0.84 0.98 2.42 [4.34] 
Mild (n=167) -0.53 0.26 0.58 0.68 0.79 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.99 1.51 [4.73] 
Pessimistic (n=51) 1.88 1.88 1.82 1.73 1.69 1.66 1.61 1.67 1.82 2.15 0.27 [0.43] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 2.15 [2.52] 
Panel C: J=6,K=12             
Optimistic (n=74) -0.43 0.12 0.39 0.46 0.58 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.13 [2.53] 
Mild (n=125) -0.05 0.38 0.70 0.80 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.09 1.06 0.92 0.97 [3.22] 
Pessimistic (n=74) 1.05 1.25 1.23 1.14 1.15 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.19 1.26 0.21 [0.57] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 0.92 [1.61] 
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Table 4.10  
Momentum Profits Conditional on an Alternative Investor Sentiment Index 
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period October 1965 until December 
2007 The momentum strategy is defined in table 2. Sentiment is measured using the monthly sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2007), using trading volume 
(measured as total NYSE turnover),
 
dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, number and first day returns in IPO‟s, and the equity share in new issues.  Because these 
variables are partly related to economic fundamentals, Baker and Wurgler regress each proxy against growth in industrial production, real growth in durable, non-durable, and 
services consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and use the residuals from this regression as the sentiment proxies.  The overall sentiment 
index is the first principal component of the six sentiment proxies.  In order to identify whether a particular formation period was optimistic or pessimistic we follow the same 
procedure as that outlined in Table 2. In this table we use 30%-30% cut-off points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment and we group the Mild sentiment and Optimistic 
sentiment categories together. To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time series of average monthly 
momentum profits on an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable and a Pessimistic sentiment dummy variable, with no intercept.
 
 To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment 
periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable with a constant.   
The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and the difference between profits derived after optimistic and pessimistic periods are calculated using Newey-West 
standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. In Panel A K=3, in Panel B=6 and in Panel C K=12.. 
    Momentum Portfolio     
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
Panel A: J=6, K=3             
Optimistic (n=371) -0.24 0.54 0.85 0.96 1.04 1.09 1.14 1.12 1.27 1.46 1.71 [6.87] 
Pessimistic (n=136) 1.96 2.06 2.07 2.02 1.87 1.77 1.84 1.83 1.87 2.18 0.23 [0.46] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.48 [2.69] 
Panel B: J=6, K=6             
Optimistic (n=387) -0.18 0.47 0.76 0.88 0.98 1.04 1.1 1.14 1.25 1.4 1.59 -0.18 
Pessimistic (n=120) 2.31 2.34 2.29 2.21 2.11 2.04 2.1 2.15 2.28 2.61 0.3 [0.21] 
                      Opt.-Pes. 1.29 [2.86] 
Panel C: J=6, K=12             
Optimistic (n=411) 0.21 0.62 0.84 0.91 1.01 1.05 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.17 0.97 [5.16] 
Pessimistic (n=96) 2.80 2.66 2.55 2.48 2.39 2.30 2.41 2.48 2.62 2.78 -0.01 [-0.02] 
            Opt.-Pes. 0.98 [1.88] 
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Table 4.11  
Momentum Profits Conditional on Different Specifications of Investor Sentiment 
 
This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all NYSE/AMEX stocks for the time period April 1967 until December 2008.  We 
allow one month between the end of the formation period and the holding period, and delete all stocks that are priced less than one $1 at the beginning of the holding period.  
Sentiment is defined in Table 2. In this table we use 30%-30% cut-off points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment.  In order to identify whether a particular formation period was 
optimistic or pessimistic, in each month t we calculate the average sentiment level for the previous 2 (Panel A) and 4 (Panel B) months. To test whether momentum profits in each 
sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time series of average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no 
intercept.
 
 To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment periods are different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on a Mild 
sentiment dummy variable and an Optimistic sentiment dummy variable with a constant. The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and the difference between profits 
derived after optimistic and pessimistic periods are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to K-1. In this table J, K=6. 
    Momentum Portfolio    
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.]. 
   Panel A: Lag 2 sentiment     
Optimistic (n=118) -0.46 0.19 0.50 0.66 0.84 0.93 1.10 1.10 1.27 1.49 1.95 [5.48] 
Mild (n=294) -0.25 0.36 0.66 0.80 0.89 0.94 1.00 1.06 1.11 1.18 1.42 [5.73] 
Pessimistic (n=89) 2.14 2.45 2.47 2.32 2.26 2.24 2.16 2.19 2.32 2.59 0.46 [0.99] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.49 [2.56] 
   Panel B: Lag 4 sentiment     
Optimistic (n=122) -0.43 0.23 0.60 0.76 0.95 1.03 1.20 1.18 1.37 1.66 2.10 [5.66] 
Mild (n=280) -0.30 0.30 0.61 0.76 0.85 0.90 0.96 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.37 [5.25] 
Pessimistic (n=97) 1.97 2.32 2.33 2.19 2.13 2.12 2.04 2.08 2.23 2.59 0.62 [1.69] 
           Opt.-Pes. 1.48 [2.83] 
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Table 4.12  
Long-run Profits of Momentum Portfolios Conditional on Investor Sentiment 
 
This table presents long-run event time returns for momentum portfolios formed after optimistic and pessimistic periods. J and K in this table are equal to 6. For each 
momentum portfolio we define an event period 13 months after the initial formation period. From this event date month onwards we estimate the average monthly return of 
this portfolio in the following 6 years.  The final return of each portfolio is the geometric average of these monthly average profits.  Panel A uses raw returns, Panel B 
CAPM adjusted returns and Panel C returns adjusted according to the Fama-French 3 factor model.  Sentiment is defined as in Table 2. In this table we use 30%-30% cut-off 
points for optimistic and pessimistic sentiment.  To test whether momentum profits in each sentiment state respectively are equal to zero, we regress the time series of 
average monthly momentum profits on Optimistic, Pessimistic and Mild sentiment dummies, with no intercept.
 
 To test if mean profits in Optimistic sentiment periods are 
different from profits in Pessimistic sentiment periods we regress average monthly momentum profits on a Mild sentiment dummy variable and an Optimistic sentiment 
dummy variable with a constant. The t-statistics of the significance of momentum profits and the difference between profits derived after optimistic and pessimistic periods 
are calculated using Newey-West standard errors, where the lag is set to the number of overlapping strategies, which is 6. 
    Momentum Portfolio     
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
    Panel A: 6 years holding period     
Panel A1: Raw              
Optimistic (n=121) 1.04 0.93 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.48 -0.56 [-7.78] 
Mild (n=218) 1.39 1.40 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.35 1.33 1.31 1.22 -0.17 [-2.62] 
Pessimistic (n=82) 1.07 1.22 1.22 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.23 1.19 1.17 1.05 -0.02 [-0.18] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.54 [-4.03] 
Panel A2: CAPM              
Optimistic (n=121) 1.05 0.91 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.61 0.48 -0.56 [-8.26] 
Mild (n=218) 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.72 -0.18 [-2.63] 
Pessimistic (n=82) 0.34 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.52 0.34 0.00 [0.03] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.56 [-4.29] 
Panel A3: FF              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.63 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.18 -0.45 [-5.64] 
Mild (n=218) 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.40 -0.02 [-0.25] 
Pessimistic (n=82) 0.18 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.29 0.11 [1.16] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.56 [-4.50] 
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Table 4.12. Continued  
    Momentum Portfolio     
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel B: 5 years holding period     
Panel B1: Raw              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.92 0.82 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.52 0.37 -0.55 [-6.82] 
Mild (n=228) 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.30 1.21 -0.18 [-2.30] 
Pessimistic (n=84) 1.13 1.28 1.29 1.31 1.32 1.30 1.30 1.27 1.22 1.08 -0.05 [-0.37] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.50 [-3.36] 
Panel B:2 CAPM              
Optimistic (n=121) 1.02 0.89 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.59 0.47 -0.55 [-7.15] 
Mild (n=228) 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.80 0.66 -0.18 [-2.28] 
Pessimistic (n=84) 0.34 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.53 0.32 -0.02 [-0.16] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.53 [-3.56] 
Panel B3: FF              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.63 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.20 -0.43 [-4.78] 
Mild (n=228) 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.40 0.00 [-0.01] 
Pessimistic (n=84) 0.10 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.22 0.12 [1.07] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.55 [-3.82] 
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Table 4.12. Continued.  
    Momentum Portfolio     
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel C: 4 years holding period     
Panel C1: Raw              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.49 0.32 -0.49 [-5.79] 
Mild (n=233) 1.36 1.36 1.37 1.35 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.32 1.30 1.20 -0.17 [-1.86] 
Pessimistic (n=91) 1.13 1.28 1.29 1.29 1.30 1.27 1.27 1.24 1.20 1.06 -0.06 [-0.54] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.43 [-2.90] 
Panel C2: CAPM              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.96 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.66 0.60 0.48 -0.49 [-6.26] 
Mild (n=233) 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.62 -0.17 [-1.83] 
Pessimistic (n=91) 0.37 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.53 0.33 -0.04 [-0.33] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.45 [-3.12] 
Panel C3: FF              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.60 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.21 -0.38 [-4.34] 
Mild (n=233) 0.36 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.37 0.01 [0.14] 
Pessimistic (n=91) 0.10 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.22 0.13 [1.13] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.51 [-3.58] 
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Table 4.12. Continued 
    Momentum Portfolio     
  1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [t-stat.] 
     Panel D: 3 years holding period     
Panel D1: Raw              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.58 0.49 0.32 -0.37 [-3.62] 
Mild (n=245) 1.31 1.29 1.31 1.29 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.27 1.15 -0.16 [-1.66] 
Pessimistic (n=91) 1.05 1.25 1.28 1.28 1.29 1.26 1.27 1.25 1.20 1.07 0.02 [0.08] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.39 [-1.81] 
Panel D2: CAPM              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.84 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.60 0.47 -0.38 [-3.88] 
Mild (n=245) 0.73 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.57 -0.16 [-1.65] 
Pessimistic (n=91) 0.37 0.62 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.68 0.60 0.41 0.05 [0.24] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.43 [-1.97] 
Panel D3: FF              
Optimistic (n=121) 0.57 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.36 0.28 -0.29 [-2.82] 
Mild (n=245) 0.31 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.35 0.04 [0.46] 
Pessimistic (n=91) -0.03 0.22 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.24 0.27 [1.44] 
            Opt.-Pes. -0.56 [-2.61] 
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5. Decision heuristics and Bayesian updating 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Bayesian updating is at the core of rational decision making. Various psychological 
studies present evidence that people systematically violate this paradigm.  The economic 
implications of this evidence can be severe. For example, a maintained assumption in 
neoclassical models of asset prices, such as the CAPM or the APT, is that investors update their 
expectations of assets‟ risk returns profiles in a Bayesian manner. However, the evidence 
presented by psychologists rejects this assumption and points to the existence of systematic 
mispricings in the marketplace, as expectations, and hence prices, are updated in a biased 
manner. Research in behavioural finance implements these findings from psychology in models 
of asset prices in an attempt to explain the apparent anomalous behaviour of asset prices [see for 
example Daniel et al (1998), Odean (1998) and Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)].   
However, the validity of these models crucially depends on the robustness of the 
evidence of non-Bayesian updating. One view held by experimental economists, is that this 
evidence of non Bayesian updating is debatable, because they are generally documented in 
experiments which do not comply with certain methodological requirements that have been 
documented to affect subjects‟ behaviour. However, because these anomalies are potentially 
relevant to economic theory, economists seek to examine their validity in experiments that 
satisfy these requirements [see for example Grether and Plott (1979)]. In this spirit we report 
results from economics experiments designed to test the validity of a behavioural theory of non-
Bayesian updating proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992), which has been used to model the 
behaviour of asset prices [Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)].  
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Griffin and Tversky (1992) (hereafter GT) find that people over-predict probabilities 
when the information available is of high strength (salience) and low weight (predictive 
validity/credence), and under-predict when strength is low and weight is high. They use the 
following example to explain what they mean by these words: Suppose you receive a 
recommendation letter for a recent PhD graduate written by an assistant professor stating that the 
graduate is outstanding. This letter is of high strength because its tone is warm. However, its 
weight is low because the assistant professor is inexperienced in assessing the future potential of 
graduates. Conversely, suppose that a highly experienced professor writes the letter saying that 
the student‟s research potential is satisfactory.  In this case the strength of the letter is lower as 
the tone is less enthusiastic about the candidate. However, because the professor has seen many 
graduates in his career, the weight of the letter is high. GT hypothesize that people focus 
excessively on the strength of the information available and not as much as they should on the 
weight, resulting in overconfidence (underconfidence) when the former is high (low) and the 
latter low (high).    
This property of the GT hypothesis is particularly appealing to finance because it can 
explain the (puzzling) positive and negative serial correlation in prices. That is, when the 
information is of low strength and high weight, investors will underreact inducing positive 
correlation. Conversely, when the information is of high strength and low weight investors will 
overreact, inducing negative correlation. This appealing property of the GT hypothesis has been 
utilized by asset pricing theories such as Barberis et al (1998) and Sorescu and Subrahmanyam 
(2006).  
However, because the experiments reported by GT do not fulfil the methodological 
requirements of a controlled experiment advanced by economists, their robustness is debatable. 
This makes the economic applications less relevant. Specifically, three features of the GT 
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experiment can be seen as problematic: subjects were not incentivised to make correct decisions, 
the task involved responses to hypothetical and unnatural events, and subjects were implicitly 
assumed to be risk neutral throughout. 
It is often argued that the design of incentives in experiments should encourage subjects 
to be accurate. That is, the payment of subjects should be directly related to their choices, and, 
whenever possible, the potential payoff from making the right choice should exceed the cost of 
making it [Smith (1982)]. These requirements are proposed because various experiments show 
that behaviour can change when accuracy is encouraged with monetary incentives [e.g., see 
reviews by Harrison (2006) and Harrison and Rutström (2008)]. A notable example is Grether 
(1980), who conducts an experiment to test whether agents form probabilities according to the 
representativeness heuristic, identified by Kahneman and Tverky (1972, 1973) in experiments 
that did not provide financial incentives. He concludes that the presence of incentives makes 
subjects behave as Bayesians. In the experiments designed by GT subjects‟ payments were 
independent of their choices. Given that “hypothetical bias” has been found to reduce 
behavioural anomalies, it is not clear whether their findings are robust to the presence of 
financial incentives.  
Further, economic decisions are based on naturally-occurring, observable events. For 
example, investors in stock markets use information such as the recent earnings performance of 
companies and elect whether to purchase the stock. In insurance markets people use the available 
information to asses the likelihood of certain events, such as floods, in order to decide whether to 
buy insurance. This information can be the occurrence of past floods, the location of their 
residence and prevailing weather conditions. In these cases the information used is natural in the 
sense that people have experienced it occurring. However, in the design of GT subjects are 
presented with information about a hypothetical event and asked to use this information to 
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estimate a probability. The hypothetical event is that a biased coin is tossed a number of times, 
with a particular outcome emerging. Based on this information subjects are asked to estimate the 
probability of the bias favouring heads or tails. This design can be seen as unnatural because the 
event in question did not actually occur; therefore we cannot be certain that the process of 
“visualising” it does not, in and of itself, affect responses. In addition the task itself is difficult to 
grasp because subjects are asked to visualize a biased coin and evaluate a probability in terms of 
the bias favouring either side, not of the coin landing heads or tails. Arguably, this can confuse 
subjects since it is difficult to imagine such a coin. Also, the fact that subjects were explicitly 
asked to express a probability is itself problematic because the term has been debated amongst 
statisticians for years.  
Finally, GT implicitly assume risk neutrality throughout. This is a very strong 
assumption, because virtually all experiments designed to estimate peoples‟ risk preferences 
conclude that subjects are generally risk-averse [see Harrison and Rutström (2008) for a review]. 
In the presence of risk aversion, stated or revealed probabilities will be distorted by the impact of 
risk attitude on the expected payoff, therefore will not correspond to true beliefs [Savage (1971), 
Kaldane and Winkler (1988)].  Since GT implicitly assume risk neutrality throughout, we do not 
know whether their findings are robust to different risk preference specifications.  
Despite these methodological concerns with the evidence for the hypothesis advanced by 
GT, researchers have used it to construct economic models [Barberis et al. (1998), Sorescu and 
Subrahmanyam (2006)]. This chapter contributes to the literature by taking a step back and 
examining whether this hypothesis holds when the previous methodological shortcomings are 
addressed. In this manner we test whether it is robust as an alternative decision-making model to 
Bayesian updating.   
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We implement an incentive compatible design, where subjects are encouraged to provide 
accurate responses. We rely solely on natural frequencies as the information used by subjects is 
generated in the experiment. We avoid explicitly asking subjects to estimate a probability, and 
instead implement a betting task that allows extraction of subjective beliefs, as in Fiore et al 
(2008). Finally, we go beyond risk neutrality and estimate probabilities allowing for risk 
aversion. 
 Our results broadly support the original findings of GT. We find that when the 
information presented to subjects is of high strength and low weight, elicited probabilities are 
higher, compared to instances that the information is of low strength and high weight. 
Specifically, we find that strength outweighs the effect of weight on judgment roughly by a 
factor of 2. Since, according to Bayes Rule, strength and weight should affect judgment equally, 
our findings suggest that the strength-weight hypothesis captures the process with which beliefs 
are updated more accurately than Bayesian Updating.  
However, one important difference between our results and those reported by GT is that 
we find a much smaller spread between elicited probabilities from information of high strength 
and low weight, and elicited probabilities from information of low strength and high weight. For 
example, GT in one particular instance find an alarmingly large spread of 25% between 
probabilities that should be equal. In our analysis the corresponding figure is 4.7%. Of course 
comparing point estimates between different experiments is not ideal, but we suggest that the 
implementation of an incentive compatible design, the use of naturally occurring information, 
and controlling for risk attitudes, reduce the behavioural effects identified by GT. 
Apart from the methodological contributions already highlighted the systematic 
deviations from Bayesian Updating found in this chapter challenge the argument used by Fama 
(1998) that market prices are formed as if investors update their expectations using Bayes law [in 
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the spirit of Friedman (1952)]. Rather, our findings show that decision makers as a group behave 
in a manner that leads to biased expectations. Since arbitrage forces are constrained (see 
discussion in section 2.4), the marketplace implication of this finding is that prices will be set 
according to the strength and weight of the information set, and not according to fundamental 
values. Therefore, our analysis, by establishing the robustness of the psychological mechanism 
that triggers biased expectations initially proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992), increases our 
understanding about the price formation process. 
  Section 2 explains the experimental design, and the way we operationalize strength and 
weight. Section 3 explains how we jointly estimate risk attitudes and subjective probabilities, and 
presents the results from this joint estimation. It also explains in detail the model we use to 
estimate the exact effect of strength and weight on elicited beliefs.  Section 4 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5. 2 Experimental Design 
 
The format of our experiment was chosen so that we embed the elicitation procedure in 
tasks that allow us to elicit subjects‟ beliefs about events that differ in strength and weight, train 
subjects to understand the belief elicitation technique, and identify attitudes towards risk. In no 
particular order, we performed two tasks in this experiment. The first task was aimed at 
identifying risk attitudes, and the second to elicit their subjective beliefs for events that differ in 
strength and weight. 
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5.2.2 Characterizing Attitudes Towards Risk 
 
The first series of tasks were designed to reveal attitude towards risk. This information 
will be useful when we estimate subjects‟ subjective beliefs allowing for risk aversion.  For this 
purpose we use a series of binary choice tasks, following Hey and Orme (1994). Each lottery 
consists of one, two or three monetary prizes, with four possible monetary values, £0, £5, £10 or 
£15. Table 5.1 displays a typical lottery pair. In our experiment we divided these 60 tasks into 3 
groups of 20, and each subject made choices for one of these groups. At the end of the task one 
of the twenty choices of each subject was selected at random and played out for money. 
Appendix 1 shows the instructions given to subjects for this particular task. 
   
5.2.3 Eliciting Subjective Beliefs  
 
 
The second task of our experiment is aimed at eliciting beliefs for events of different 
strength and weight. In designing these events we allow them to occur randomly. The task 
involves two boxes, one white and one blue, each containing ten-sided dice, shown in Figure 5.1. 
The white box contains dice with six white sides and four blue sides, and the blue box contains 
dice with six blue sides and four white sides.
62
 The number of dice in the boxes varies in the 
experiment, but the two boxes always contain the same number of dice. In the beginning of each 
round we roll a six-sided dice, with three blue sides and three white sides. If a blue (white) side 
comes up, we roll all the dice in the blue (white) box and announce the outcome. For example, 
suppose that the two boxes contain 3 dice each, and that after we roll the six-sided die we get a 
white face. This means that we roll all the dice in the white box and announce the outcome; for 
example, 2 dice showing a white face and 1 dice showing blue. This information is announced 
                                                 
62 We use 0.6 and 0.4 because these are the probabilities used by GT. Figure 5.1 shows pictures of the boxes and dice. 
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and written on a whiteboard. Because the process of rolling the six-sided die and the dice in the 
chosen box takes place behind a screen, the task for subjects is to consider the information 
provided and update their belief of the white box being chosen initially.   
With no additional information from the rolling of dice from the chosen box, the 
probability of either box being used is 0.5. By announcing the outcome, this prior should be 
updated in accordance with Bayes Rule.  GT suggest that, contrary to Bayes Rule, individuals are 
more sensitive to the strength of the evidence (how many white or blue sides came up as a 
proportion of the total number of dice that were rolled) as opposed to the weight (how many dice 
were rolled in total). In our experiment we test this conjecture by comparing subjects‟ betting 
patterns for dice patterns that have the same posterior but differ in strength and weight.  For 
example, if we roll 5 dice and get 4 dice with a white face and 1 dice with a blue face, the 
posterior probability of the white box being used is the same (0.77) as when we toss 9 dice and 
get 6 white and 3 blue. Bayes Rule predicts that the elicited probabilities in these two cases 
should be identical. However, GT predict that, because the strength of the former pattern is 
greater, 3/5 >  3/9, and the weight smaller, 5 < 9, beliefs will be updated more strongly when we 
get 4 white and 1 blue as opposed to 6 white and 3 blue.  
When the outcome from rolling all the dice in the chosen box is announced, subjects are 
asked to consider the chances that this box is the blue or the white box, and place a series of bets. 
From the betting behaviour of each subject in each round we can deduce their subjective belief of 
either box being used.  They are given a £3 stake with which they place a bet in each of 19 
different betting houses that give different odds on the white or blue box being chosen. The £3 
from one bookie is not transferable to another bookie.  Since the probabilities that the bookies 
assign to the two events are the inverse of the odds, assuming no house take, these bookies are 
essentially placing different probabilities on the white or the blue box being used.  
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Table 5.2 shows the betting sheet where subjects are asked to place their bets.  For each 
bookie (row), subjects consider the odds offered and their subjective probability for the two 
events, i.e., the blue or the white box being chosen, and place their £3 stake on either the blue or 
the white box for each bookie. The illustration in Table 5.2 shows a subject that was willing to 
bet on the white box until the fourth bookie, which offers 5 to 1 odds that the white box is being 
used, and switches to betting on the blue box from bookie 5 onwards. Assuming no house take 
the probability assigned to the event that the dice come from the white box from the 4
th
 bookie is 
the inverse of the odds, i.e., 1/5=0.20, and from the 5
th
 bookie 1/4=0.25. Thus, assuming risk 
neutrality, we have trapped the subjective probability of the subject in the closed interval [0.20, 
0.25]. 
The intuition of this design is that, when the probability for the white box offered is lower 
than 0.20, the odds offered make the expected value of a bet on the white box, i.e., the subjective 
probability multiplied by the payout, greater than that of a bet on the blue box. Therefore, the 
subject bets on the white box. However, when the offered probability exceeds the subject‟s 
subjective belief, the expected value of a bet on the white box is less than that of a bet on the 
blue, therefore the subject switches bet. A detailed example of the theoretical foundation of this 
method is given in the next section.  This method of belief elicitation has been developed by 
Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström (2007), and assumes that subjects are capable of 
forming subjective beliefs in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler (1992; p. 747). Such decision 
makers behave as if they employ subjective probabilities of events and utilities of outcomes that 
are independent of the assignment of outcomes to events.
63
 
                                                 
63
 This requirement is not strong in our data because a violation of probabilistic sophistication arises in conditions of ambiguity, 
which depend on whether relevant information about the probabilities of interest is missing (see Ellsberg 1961). In our design all 
the relevant information is revealed, therefore ambiguity does not arise.   
147 
 
 The betting process is repeated 30 times in each session for each subject. We play 4 
rounds where the boxes contain 3 dice, 14 rounds where the boxes contain 5 dice, 6 rounds with 
9 dice, and 6 rounds with 17 dice. This distribution of sample sizes was chosen to ensure that we 
observe roughly the same amount of “extreme” samples.64 A subject from each session was 
chosen randomly to act as a monitor. The monitor was in charge of rolling and counting the dice, 
as well as announcing the outcome. 
We performed 12 sessions in total. In order to control for possible framing effects, in half 
of the sessions we conducted the risk task first, followed by the belief task. In the belief task, we 
presented the sample sizes in ascending order (i.e., first 4 rounds of 3, then 14 rounds of 5, etc) 
and in descending order (6 rounds of 17, 6 rounds of 9, etc). Therefore we have an overall 2x2 
design, with 4 treatments in total. 
Our instructions illustrate the factors that affect betting in real prediction markets, such as 
betting on a horse race with different bookies, and drawing parallels between such naturally 
occurring events and our task. Subjects first read these instructions quietly; we then read them 
aloud and allow time for questions. These instructions are shown in Appendix 2. We play 3 
practice rounds, with the boxes containing 4 dice, prior to starting the real betting task, so that 
subjects become accustomed to the process. In order to determine payment to the subject at the 
end of the 30 rounds we randomly choose one particular round and bookie and play that bet for 
real. For example, each subject filled out 30 betting sheets, such as the one shown by Table 5.2. 
At the end we first randomly choose for each subject one of these betting sheets, and then 1 of 
the 19 bookies within that selected sheet. If, for that particular bookie, the subject placed the 
                                                 
64 For example, the patterns that are the most difficult to get are (5,0) with probability of occurring equal to 0.044, pattern (7,2) 
with probability 0.091, and pattern (11,6) with probability 0.104. Based on these probabilities we chose the frequency of each 
sample size so that we roughly equalize their expected occurrence in each session.  
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allocated £3 on the box that was actually chosen, he got paid the amount that corresponds to the 
odds offered by that bookie. 
We recruited 111 subjects from the University of Durham, U.K. Subjects were recruited 
using the computerized ExLab interface (http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu), after being solicited in general 
terms to register with ExLab for paid experiments. All subjects received a £5 show up fee. Apart 
from the tasks described above, each subject completed a survey of demographic characteristics, 
shown in Appendix 3. Payments for the experiment totalled £2,692 an average payment of 
£24.26 per subject. 
 
5.2.4 Estimating the exact effect of strength and weight on elicited beliefs 
 
 
In order to illustrate the model with which we estimate the effect of strength and weight 
on elicited beliefs, we use an example concerning two hypotheses (similar to the white or blue 
box being chosen) A and B where P(A) + P(B)=1. In this case A can be that the white box is 
chosen, which includes dice with 0.6 probability of a white side and 0.4 probability of a blue 
side, and B can be that the blue box is chosen, which contains dice with 0.4 probability of a 
white side and 0.6 probability of a blue side.  The task therefore is to determine the likelihood of 
A in comparison to the likelihood of B. Ceteris paribus our expectation of A is P(A) and of B, 
P(B). These probabilities in a Bayesian framework are called the priors. 
  Suppose that we observe an information signal C. In our case C is the pattern that emerged, 
(i.e., w dice showing a white face and n-w dice showing a blue face) from tossing the dice in the 
chosen box at the beginning of each round. Bayes rule is the method with the priors should be 
combined with the new data, to get a posterior belief in terms of the hypotheses A and B. In other 
words the rule reveals how the occurrence of C should influence our expectation of A and B. 
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Formally the rule states that:  
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Then if we divide the above with the corresponding probability of the likelihood of P(B/C) we 
get: 
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  Equation (5.2) shows the likelihood ratio. Each hypothesis, therefore, is distributed 
binomially with parameters n, p. In terms of our experiment, C is the sample of n dice that we 
rolled from the chosen box. The two competing hypotheses are that the dice came from the white 
box or the blue box.  
                                            wnw
w
n
ACP 4.06.0)/(                                                            (5.3) 
Equation (5.3) yields the probability of W white dice and n-w blue dice, from the white 
box. P(B/C) is the corresponding probability of the particular pattern coming from the blue box. 
Dividing P(C/A) by P(C/B) gives: 
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Taking logs of both sides: 
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Because n = W + B, substituting for –n yields: 
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Now multiply and divide by n yields: 
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The right hand side is the probabilities elicited from subjects‟ responses in the belief task 
modified to log-odds form. If they are Bayesian they should be explained by the right hand side, 
which was derived from Baye‟s Theorem. The two dimensions that GT suggest are sample size 
(weight), n, and strength (w – b)/n, i.e., the amount of dice showing a white face minus the 
amount of dice showing a blue face, all divided by the total amount of dice rolled. In order to 
decompose we take logs of both sides, which yields: 
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The coefficients a and β that are derived from the above regression are in effect the importance 
that the individuals have given to strength and weight. Under the null the coefficients should be 
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equal to 1, because Bayes Rule predicts that they should affect judgment equally. Under the GT 
hypothesis α > β.  
 
5.3 Results 
 
 5. 3.1 Elicited Beliefs From The Raw Data 
 
 We present the results of our experiment in two stages. First we analyze the raw 
responses from our belief task, which can be interpreted as elicited beliefs under the assumption 
of risk neutrality. Of course these beliefs will be biased if subjects are in fact risk averse or risk 
seeking. However, we explicitly show the elicited beliefs under the assumption of risk neutrality 
in order to highlight the effect of risk attitude on elicited beliefs, and how inferences crucially 
depend on the assumptions one makes about the shape of the utility function. In a second stage 
we relax this assumption, and define a joint likelihood over the responses to the risk and the 
belief task, allowing us to generate maximum likelihood estimates of both risk aversion 
coefficients and subjective beliefs.  
Table 5.3 shows the composition of the different dice patterns, their strength and weight 
characteristics, the Bayesian probability of the white box given their occurrence, and the number 
of times subjects placed bets for each of them. We group together the patterns that have the same 
posterior probability, but differ in their strength and weight characteristics. Unless otherwise 
stated, when we refer to elicited or posterior probability we mean the probability of the white 
box being used.  We have 6 such groups with a posterior probability of 0.12, 0.23, 0.4, 0.6, 0.77 
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and 0.88. The patterns that yield a posterior of 0.12 are (0, 5),
65
 (2, 7) and (6, 11), the patterns 
that yield a posterior of 0.23 are (0, 3), (1, 4), (3, 6) and (7, 10), the patterns that yield a posterior 
of 0.4 are ((1, 2), (2, 3), (4, 5) and (8, 9), and vice versa for posteriors of 0.6, 0.77 and 0.88.
66
 For 
example suppose that the boxes contain 5 dice, and after we roll the dice from the chosen box we 
observe 4 dice showing a white face and 1 dice showing a blue face (call this information 
“data”). The conditional probability that the box chosen initially was the white is: 
 
P(Data / White)P(White)
P(White / Pattern) =
P(Data)
                                              (5.9) 
 
Substituting: 
0.26*0.5
P(White / Data) = = 0.77
0.17
                                                       (5.10) 
 P(Data/White) is the probability that we obtain (with replacement) 4 dice showing a 
white face and 1 showing a blue face from the white box. P(White) is the probability that we use 
the white box, i.e, the prior, and P(data) is the probability that observe this particular data from 
either box.  
If subjects update their beliefs using Bayes Rule, elicited beliefs for each pattern within 
each of the groups with the same posterior should be equal. However, under the hypothesis 
proposed by GT, we should observe that probabilities are higher when strength is high and 
weight is low.  
                                                 
65 When we refer to a pattern of (3,0) we mean rolling 3 dice and  getting 3 dice showing a white side and 0 dice showing a blue 
side. Similarly (1,4) means rolling 5 dice, where 1 dice shows a white face and 4 dice show a blue face.  
66 We observed 6 instances with a pattern of (13,4), 4 instances with a pattern of (12,5), 1 instance with a pattern of (14,3), 1 
instance with a pattern of with (9,0), 1 instance with a pattern of (8,1), 4 instances with a pattern of (5,12), 4 instances with a 
pattern of (4,13), 1 instance with a pattern of (3,14), 2 instances with a pattern of (1,8) and 1 instance with a pattern of (2,15). 
These 25 pattern compositions do not appear in the GT study so we do not include them in our tables. However, we include them 
in the analysis to estimate the probabilities.  Excluding them altogether from the analysis does not change any of our findings. 
153 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of raw elicited beliefs for each pattern when we group 
the patterns by posterior probability. We calculate raw elicited beliefs using subjects switch 
points. To illustrate, Table 5.2 shows the betting behaviour of a particular subject who switches 
to betting on the blue box from bookie 5 onwards. Assuming that the subject is risk neutral, this 
means that the subjective belief of this subject of the white box being used lies between 0.20 and 
0.25, therefore the midpoint equals (0.20 +0.25)/2.
67
 We perform this calculation for all subjects 
in our sample for the particular dice pattern, and plot the distribution of raw elicited beliefs in 
Figure 5.2. The vertical bar in each panel shows the probability implied by applying Bayes rule 
without error. 
 The raw elicited beliefs in groups of patterns with equal posterior probability do not 
appear to be equal, at least under the maintained assumption that subjects are risk neutral. To 
illustrate, Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of switch points for patterns with 5, 9 and 17 dice 
rolled that have a posterior probability of 0.88, namely (5, 0), (7, 2) and (11, 6). It appears that 
subjects tend to get the probability right when the sample is (5, 0), and underestimate the 
probability as the sample size (i.e., the weight) increases to 9 and 17. This finding suggests that 
subjects, under the assumption of risk neutrality, update their beliefs more strongly when the 
pattern is of high strength and low weight, despite the fact that Bayes rule indicates that the 
probabilities in these cases are equal.   
The top right Panel of Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of switch points for patterns with 
5, 9 and 17 dice rolled that have a posterior probability of 0.12, namely (0, 5), (2, 7) and (6, 11). 
This figure is the mirror image of Figure 1.1. The elicited probability of the blue box, 1 – elicited 
probability of the white, is larger when the pattern is (0, 5) and decreases for patterns (2, 7) and 
(6, 11).   
                                                 
67 If a subject bets on the white box for all the bookies his subjective belief lies in the interval (0.95 + 1)/2. If the subject bets on 
the blue box for all bookies his subjective belief is (0.05)/2. 
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  Similar findings can be seen in the remainder of figure 5.2. Generally, subjects tend to be 
close to Bayesian probabilities when the pattern is of high strength and low weight, and 
underestimate those probabilities as the sample size (i.e., weight) decreases. An interesting 
finding is that the strength-weight effect on raw risk neutral beliefs appears to decline as the 
posterior probability moves towards 0.5. For example, the left-middle and left-bottom panels of 
Figure 5.2 show that the distributions of the switch points for patterns with posterior probabilities 
0.6 and 0.4 do not significantly diverge. This suggests that the strength-weight effect is more 
influential when the patterns require a large update of the prior. 
 In order to formally derive an average subjective probability for each pattern we use 
interval regression techniques. The dependent variable is the interval which contains the belief of 
each subject in each round, and the independent variables are dummies for the various dice 
patterns, dummies for the order of the risk and the belief task (task=1 if risk task was conducted 
first) and the order with which the various sample sizes (n=3, 5, 9, 17) were presented in the 
belief task (Descending=1 in descending order). 
Table 5.4 shows the results from the estimation. From the 22 patterns that we elicit 
probabilities, the hypothesis that they formed according to Bayes Rule is accepted at the 1% 
confidence interval for 9 cases. These cases mainly correspond to dice patterns that are of high 
strength and low weight, or when the Bayesian probability is close to 0.5. In order to compare 
the effects of strength and weight on the elicited probabilities we split them into 6 groups of 
equal posterior. In all 6 groups the hypothesis that the probabilities of the different patterns are 
equal is rejected at the 1% level of confidence. Rather, the results show that elicited probabilities 
are higher when strength is high and weight is low.  To illustrate, consider the group with 
posterior probability 0.77. The elicited probability decreases monotonically from an average of 
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0.773 for the high strength low weight sample (3,0) to an average of 0.659 for the low strength 
high weight sample (10,7), a difference of 12.6 percentage points.  
The first three panels in Table 5.4 correspond to dice patterns that point to the blue box 
being more likely, for example (0,3), (1,4) etc. To make direct comparisons with the elicited 
probabilities in the bottom 3 panels, one must subtract these probabilities from 1. For example, 
for the group of patterns with posterior probability of 0.12, the elicited probability for the high 
strength, low weight pattern (0,5) is 1- 0.122 = 0.878 and for the low strength, high weight 
sample (6,11) 1-0.250=0.75. 
The order and ascending/descending dummies show that elicited probabilities are higher 
by roughly 1.4 percentage points (p-value 0.043) when the belief task is conducted after the risk 
task, and by 1.9 percentage points (p-value 0.009) when the dice are presented in descending 
order. This suggests that the design of the experiment induces framing effects, although these are 
not substantial enough quantitatively.   
 
5. 3.2 Joint Estimates of Beliefs and Preferences Towards Risk  
 
In the previous section we elicit unconditional estimates of subjective probabilities 
assuming that our subjects are risk neutral. If they are risk averse or risk seeking the probabilities 
we elicit will not correspond to their true beliefs. Consistent with the general evidence from 
comparable experiments, we expect subjects will generally exhibit modest risk aversion. In this 
case elicited probabilities will be larger than true beliefs because, as shown by Andersen et al. 
(2007), a risk-averse individual will continue betting on her favoured alternative (i.e. the blue or 
the white box being used) beyond the bookie that corresponds to her subjective belief. This is 
because the subject‟s utility function is concave in the payoffs, so a larger expected payout from 
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the least favoured alternative is required to make the subject switch and bet on it. To illustrate, 
suppose we have two subjects, one risk averse and one risk neutral, who, after observing a 
particular dice pattern, believe that the probability of the white box being used is 0.75. Assume 
that the risk averse subject has a CRRA utility function defined over the gain domain of payouts 
y as: 
 
ryyU r 1/)( 1                                                      (5.11) 
where r is the coefficient of risk aversion and y ≥ 0. With this specification r = 0 implies risk 
neutrality, r > 0 implies risk aversion and r < 0 implies risk seeking. Table 5.5 shows how these 
two individuals place their bets on the white or the blue box for each bookie, given their belief, 
the odds offered by each bookie, and their preferences over risk. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.5 
show the payout that each bookie offers for either the white or the blue box. The risk neutral 
person cares about the expected value (EV)
68
 of the bet, and will bet on the white if EV (W) > 
EV (B), as shown by columns 4 and 5. This risk neutral person will bet on the white box for 
bookies 1-15 and switch to betting on the blue box for all remaining bookies, as shown by the 
column BET RN. The risk averse person cares about expected utility (EU)
69
 and will bet on the 
white box if EU (W) > EU (B).
70
 Because this person‟s utility function is concave in the payoffs, 
he continues betting on the white box past the bookie that corresponds to his belief, and switches 
to betting on the blue box only for the last bookie, as shown by column BET RA. In general, the 
                                                 
68 For example the EV of a bet on the white for a bookie that pays £30 for a £3 pounds stake for an individual that believes that 
the probability of the white 0.6 is 0.6 x 30.    
69 The EU of a bet on the white for a particular bookie is the probability weighted utility of the payout the bookie offers for a bet 
on the white. For example suppose that the bookie offers £30 for a £3 bet on the white, and that the subject believes that the 
probability of the white is 0.6. The EU of this bet is 0.6 x (30)1-r /1-r, where r is the subject‟s coefficient of risk aversion. 
70 The calculations of expected utility in Table 6 assume that the risk averse subject has risk aversion coefficient of 0.57. This is 
the average predicted value from experiments reported in Harrison, Johnson and, McInnes and Rutström (2005), and is consistent 
with estimates obtained by many other experimenters with comparable samples and stakes (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002).   
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more risk averse the subject is, the more delayed his switch will be. This example illustrates that 
the observed behaviour of a subject that is risk neutral is very different from the observed 
behaviour of a subject who holds exactly the same beliefs and is risk averse.  
We specify a joint likelihood where we simultaneously estimate risk attitudes and 
subjective beliefs. We assume a CRRA utility function defined by (5.11). The coefficient of risk 
aversion of this utility function can be estimated using maximum likelihood and a latent 
structural model of choice, such as Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Suppose that there are K 
possible outcomes in a lottery. The lotteries we present to our subjects in the risk task of our 
experiment have K ≤ 3. The probability for each outcome, pK, is exogenously induced by the 
experimenter, so the expected utility of each lottery is the sum of the probability weighted 
utilities of each outcome in each lottery i:  
                                     
K
k
Kki upEU
1
][                                                     (5.12) 
We calculate the EU for each lottery pair, assuming some trial value for the parameter r, and 
define the index: 
 
                                         R LEU = EU -EU                                                    (5.13) 
where EUR is the expected utility of the right lottery and the EUL is the expected utility of the left 
lottery. This latent index, based on latent preferences, is then linked to observed choices using a 
cumulative normal distribution function Ф (∙). This probit function takes any argument between 
and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. The agent chooses R if EU + ε >0, 
where ε is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance ζ2. Thus we have the 
probit link function, showing the probability that R is chosen, as 
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prob (chooselottery R) = P( EU + ε > 0) =
P(ε / σ > - EU / σ) = Φ( EU / σ)
                               (5.14) 
The index defined by (3.3) is linked to observed choices by specifying that the R lottery is 
chosen when EU + ε > 0, which is implied by (3.4). Thus the likelihood of the observed 
choices, conditional on EUT and CRRA specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r 
given the above statistical specification and observed choices. The conditional log likelihood is: 
 
1 1 1i iiln L(r; y, X) [ln ( EU) I(y ) (ln ( EU) I(y )]              (5.15) 
 
where I (∙) is the indicator function,  yi=1(-1) denotes the choice of the option R (L) lottery in risk 
aversion task i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics, reflecting age, sex, and so on, and 
treatment characteristics, i.e., whether the risk task preceded the belief task or whether the dice in 
the belief task were presenting in descending or ascending order. The parameter r is defined as a 
linear function of the characteristics in the vector X.  
 Equation 5.15 is the joint density of all the observations in our sample (i.e., the choices 
made) conditional on r, which we estimate from the data, and the individual and treatment 
characteristics. An important feature of the model is that it allows subjects to make some errors 
in their evaluations of the lotteries. The notion that subjects are subject to such errors has already 
been incorporated in the design in equation (5.14), where we acknowledge that the subjects 
chooses the lottery with the highest EU with less than certainty. These errors are traditionally 
interpreted as deriving from sampling error. In addition, we might posit an explicitly behavioural 
error, where a subject with a particular r may in some cases choose the lottery that provides 
lower utility simply by confusion. We capture such noise in the data using the Fechner error 
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specification, used widely in the literature [Hey and Orme (1994)]. This transforms the index in 
(5.13) to: 
LR EUEUEU                                                      (5.16)   
   where μ > 0 is a structural “noise” parameter used to capture any errors in judgment. As μ→ ∞, 
EU  in (5.16) converges to 0 for any finite value of EUR and EUL, and so the probability of 
either choice converges to ½. This means that for any given r, the differences between the EU of 
the two lotteries are less predictive of choices. As μ → 0, EU  in (5.16) converges to the 
“undistorted” difference between EUR and EUL, so the probability of either choice converges to 
0 or 1. This means that for any given r, the differences between the EU of the two lotteries are 
fully predictive of choices.   
 Table 5.6 shows the estimates for r and μ when we estimate the risk aversion coefficient, 
as explained above. We include the dummy variable task which equals one if the Risk Attitude 
(RA) task preceded the Belief Elicitation (BE) task and zero otherwise, and two dummies 
(Group2 and Group3) to flag the different groups of lottery tasks we presented to our subjects. 
We also include dummy variables to capture any effect of demographic characteristics
71
 on risk 
attitudes. These are:  female (equals to 1 if the subject is female and 0 otherwise), teenager (1 if 
subject is less than 20 years old and 0 otherwise), white (1 if the subject described himself as 
white and 0 otherwise), British (1 if the subject is a British citizen and 0 otherwise), high income 
(1 if the subjects earn more than £10,000 per year and 0 otherwise), graduate (1 if the subject is 
a postgraduate and 0 otherwise) and math  (1 if the subject studies Economics, Finance, 
Engineering, Mathematics, Computer or Physical Sciences and 0 otherwise).  
                                                 
71 The demographics questionnaire is shown in Appendix 3.  
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 The estimation reveals that on average the subjects in our sample are risk averse. The 
coefficient of task is 0.186 (p-value 0.066), indicating that our subjects become more risk averse 
when the BE task precedes the RA task. These order effects are common in the literature 
[Harrison et al (2005)] and indicate potential wealth effects. For example, when the RA task 
follows the BE task subjects already know their payment for the first part of the experiment. This 
may affect their responses in the RA task. The coefficient of the Group2 dummy is insignificant, 
but the coefficient of the Group3 dummy is -0.114 and significant (p-value 0.062). This means 
that subjects were less risk averse, if in the RA task they made choices using the third group of 
lotteries. In terms of demographics, all coefficients are insignificant except female (0.199 with p-
value 0.007) and high income (0.147 with p-value 0.007), showing that females and high income 
subjects are more risk averse than males and low income subjects.  
The analysis in this section shows that the assumption of risk neutrality is not appropriate 
for our data. This justifies eliciting subjective beliefs by taking into account the curvature of the 
utility function. In fact, even if we had shown that subjects were statistically risk neutral, the 
presence of any uncertainty in that claim (viz., a non-zero standard error in the estimate of r) 
would require that we jointly estimate risk attitudes and beliefs to ensure that we accurately 
characterize the uncertainty in estimated beliefs.    
 
    5. 3.3 Eliciting beliefs after controlling for preference towards risk 
 
 This section explains in more detail the steps in the procedure to elicit risk attitudes and 
subjective beliefs jointly. From Table 5.2 a subject who selects to bet on the white box being 
used for any given bookie receives EU: 
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)|( AonbetusedWifpayoutUEU AW
                                (5.17) 
where πA is the subject‟s belief of the likelihood of event A. The payouts that enter the utility 
function correspond to the odds given by each particular bookie, as shown by Table 5.2. For 
example, in Table 5.2, for the first bookie, the individual bets on the white box being used. The 
EU of this bet is πA x U(£60) + (1 - πA) x U(£0), where πA is the subject‟s personal belief of the 
white box being chosen initially.  Since we observe the choice for each subject and bookie we 
can calculate the likelihood of that choice given values for r, πA and μ. We need r to evaluate the 
utility function in (5.11), we need πA to calculate the EU of (5.17), and we need μ to calculate the 
index in (5.16). The joint elicitation problem is to find values for these three parameters that best 
explain the choices in both the risk and the belief tasks. Since probabilities are bounded between 
[0,1], we constrain the probability estimates to vary in this interval.
72
  
Table 5.7 shows the results when we perform joint estimation. Panel A presents the 
estimated risk aversion coefficient, and the effects of the dummy variables that flag treatment 
and subject characteristics. The estimate of the relative risk aversion coefficient is 0.629 (p-value 
< 0.001), which is larger than the coefficient depicted in Table 5.5 derived from only the 
responses in the RA task. The coefficient of the dummy task is -0.027 (p-value 0.096), which 
indicates that subjects become less risk averse when the BE task precedes the RA task. The 
dummy for high income subjects is positive (0.033) and significant (p-value 0.040), showing that 
subjects from richer families are slightly more risk averse. All other demographic-related 
dummies do not have any significant effect on risk attitudes.  
                                                 
72
 We use the technique discussed in Harrison and Rutström (2008) and transform the elicited parameter, say k, as πA=1/(1 + e
K).  
This transformation allows the estimated parameter, k, to vary freely between , and returns a value in the closed interval [0, 
1]. 
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In terms of elicited beliefs, the dummies task and Descending are negative (-0.025 and -
0.026 respectively) and significant (p-values of 0.037 and 0.026 respectively), showing that that 
elicited probabilities are lower when the BE task precedes the RA task or when the samples in 
the BE task are presented in descending order.  
Panel B of Table 5.7 shows the elicited probabilities for the various patterns, their 
strength- weight characteristics, and the “correct” posterior probabilities implied by applying 
Bayes Rule. The various dice patterns are placed into 6 groups according to their correct 
probabilities.  If subjects use Bayes Rule to update their beliefs, elicited probabilities in each of 
the 6 groups of patterns should equal this correct probability. If, however, subjects update their 
beliefs according to the hypothesis advanced by GT, we should observe that in each group 
elicited beliefs are updated more strongly as the strength of the pattern increases, and that 
subjects are overconfident (underconfident) when strength is high (low) and weight is low (high).   
 The hypothesis that elicited probabilities are equal to the probabilities implied by 
applying Bayes rule is rejected for all patterns. This means that regardless of the strength or the 
weight of the particular pattern, elicited beliefs are not updated according to Bayes Rule. The GT 
hypothesis predicts that within groups of patterns that yield the same posterior, elicited beliefs 
will be higher when the strength of the pattern is high. We test this prediction by comparing 
elicited probabilities in the 6 groups of patterns that have the same posterior, but differ in 
strength and weight. The hypothesis that elicited probabilities in the six groups are equal is 
rejected in all cases. The results show that elicited probabilities in each group increase, as the 
strength of the pattern increases. For example, consider the patterns that yield a posterior 
probability of 0.88. The pattern with the lowest strength is (11, 6), followed by the pattern (7, 2) 
and the pattern (5, 0). Elicited probabilities for these patterns are 0.569, 0.633 and 0.655 
respectively, showing a significant difference of 8.6 percent between elicited probabilities for the 
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low/high strength patterns. The same relationship between strength and elicited probabilities can 
be seen from the remainder groups of patterns in Table 5.6. For example, for patterns that yield a 
posterior probability of 0.77, the elicited probability for the high strength pattern (3,0) is 4.7 
percentage points higher when compared to the low strength pattern (10,7). This finding suggests 
that subjects, contrary to Bays Rule, update their beliefs more strongly as the strength of the 
pattern increases, as suggested by GT. 
 
5.3.4 Estimating maximum likelihood parameters of the effect of strength and weight on   elicited 
beliefs 
 
We now turn to estimating the coefficients of α and β, as shown in Equation 5.8. We can 
estimate these coefficients in a structural maximum likelihood model of betting behaviour. 
Assume, for now, that w > b. Then if we know α and β we can evaluate the RHS of (5.8) as γ, 
and obtain: 
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Rearranging: 
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Transforming both sides: 
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Let the RHS of (5.21) be δ, so we have: 
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Which immediately gives us: 
1
)/( DWP                                                                        (5.23) 
This instead of estimating P(W/D) directly, we can estimate α and β, and given the 
characteristics of the choice (n, w, b, and the prior 0.6) calculate P(W/D) and evaluate the EU of 
the bet as before.    
One point when we do the above estimations is that the specifications in (5.18-5.23) are 
fine when the white dice exceed the blue dice. However, when the blue dice exceed the white 
dice, P(B/D) > P(W/D). This means that the ratio of these probabilities in the numerator of the 
left hand side expression of (5.8) will be less than one. Being less than one, we can only take its 
logarithm once, as logs of negative numbers are undefined. Similarly, when blue > white, the 
strength expression on the right hand side of (5.8) will be negative, so its logarithm is also 
undefined.  
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In order to get around this issue we always define the log likelihood ratio in the 
numerator of the left hand side expression in (5.8) with the probability of the most likely box, as 
suggested by the sample revealed, being the numerator. Therefore, when we have more blue dice 
than white dice, in which case the blue box is more probable,  we transform (5.8) to: 
 
)
)(
log()log(
)
4.0
6.0
(
)
)/(
)/(
(
n
wb
na
Log
DWP
DBP
Log
Log                                       (5.24) 
 
In GT‟s design, because their data were hypothetical, they always supported the same 
hypothesis, so such issues did not arise. However, because our data are randomly generated in 
the experiment, we need to define the variables in (5.8) according to the particular pattern that 
emerges, so we can estimate a and b.  
If we use (5.24) and make the same transformations as before we get: 
 
1
)/( DBP                                                                      (5.25) 
 
Table 5.8 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of alpha and beta, the coefficient of 
risk aversion and the behavioural error term. The coefficients of both strength and weight are 
significantly different from 0. More importantly, they are significantly different from each other 
in the direction predicted by the GR hypothesis, i.e., that α < β (α =0.267 and β =0.738, both with 
p-value <0.001). This result provides further support to the hypothesis advanced by GT that 
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subjective probabilities are more responsive to the strength of the information presented than the 
weight.  
Our analysis can be seen to extend that of GT‟s as we estimate the parameters in a model 
of maximum likelihood, whereas they use their elicited beliefs as the dependent variable in (5.8) 
and estimate α and β using OLS. Econometrically this can be seen as problematic because 
elicited probabilities are essentially estimates of latent beliefs and as such they entail uncertainty. 
Using them as dependent variables in a regression does not account for this uncertainty, which 
may lead to false conclusions in terms of the relevant coefficients. Our approach remedies this 
limitation as we estimate α and β from the choices made in a more rigorous manner using 
maximum likelihood. In addition we allow for risk aversion, thus controlling for the effect of the 
concavity of the utility function on the effects of strength and weight on elicited beliefs. The fact 
that the GT hypothesis survives these controls demonstrates its robustness as an alternative 
decision making model to Bayesian updating.  
 
5.4. Further Discussion 
 
Our study belongs in a category of studies in experimental economics that attempt to 
examine whether the various behavioural biases documented by psychologists are robust. This is 
an important exercise, especially with the expansion of the field of behavioural finance, which 
incorporates these biases into asset pricing theories. If these biases are not genuine, and reflect 
the shortcomings and limitations of the experimental design employed by psychologists, then 
their application in economics will produce erroneous results. 
This is not to say that the results produced by experiments in psychology are not 
interesting to economists. The issue is that psychologists‟ primary interest is to analyse peoples‟ 
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first response to a situation, and not their economic behaviour, which arguably involves careful 
deliberation and real consequences.  Therefore, in order to apply the results from psychology into 
economics, it is important to establish their validity in an environment that simulates an 
economic decision.  
Our finding that the bias in subjects‟ beliefs is much smaller compared to the bias 
documented in the original study of Griffin and Tversky (1992) suggests that the methodological 
design of an experiment can affect the outcome. However, at the same time, the fact that the GT 
hypothesis survives the scrutiny that is usually advocated by economists indicates that 
psychological studies produce robust results. In any case the general message of our analysis is 
that psychological theories should not be automatically dismissed from economics based on 
methodological limitations, but rather should stimulate further research.
73
    
 
5.5. What do these results mean for financial markets? 
 
This chapter has highlighted that beliefs are more sensitive to the extremity of the 
information presented rather than its predictive validity. This section explores the relationship of 
this finding with some of the empirical finance literature.  
  Tetlock (2006) shows that the power of the language used in a very popular column in 
the Wall street journal predicts market wide movements, indicative of overreaction. Similarly, 
Barber and Loeffler (1993) show that stocks that are recommended by a panel of analysts in the 
„dartboard column‟ exhibit statistically and economically significant abnormal returns, and 
subsequent reversals. This evidence suggests that investors focus too much on eye-grabbing 
information signals without too much consideration on their predictive validity, as we have 
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 The role of these methodological limitations is vastly debated between psychologists and economists, with mixed 
results. For example, Read (2005) suggests that monetary incentives do not guarantee that subjects will expense a 
higher effort in the experimental task.    
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documented in the experiment. Shiller (2004) suggests that the media is a source of high strength 
and low weight information, and acts as a propagating factor of mispricings during stock market 
booms and crashes. For example, stories of successful investments in the late 90‟s exacerbated 
the market‟s potential for profits and contributed to the dot com boom and subsequent crash. A 
striking example of the irrationality of the expectations that prevailed at the time is given by 
Cooper et al. (2001) who show that companies that simply changed their name to imply a 
technology involved firm during the dot com bubble, experienced higher abnormal returns. This 
reflected the consensus which was that due to the rapid of expansion of the internet, the profit 
capacity of technological firms was limitless. 
 Odean and Barber (2005) also support the salient information hypothesis. They use a data 
sample comprised of individual transactions that allow analysis of the buying and selling 
behaviour of investors. They motivate their study by acknowledging that the buying decision is 
fundamentally different than the selling decision. Individual investors when considering stocks to 
buy are faced with thousands of alternatives and are thus unable to consider all of them. Thus 
they rely on attention that is triggered by the salience of news. However when selling, people 
only consider the stocks which they already own, a much easier task.  They use proxies for 
salient news, for example extreme trading volume and extreme returns, and whether the stock 
appeared in the news (using the Nexis database). They find that buying behaviour is strongly 
affected by salient news, which would score highly on the strength dimension in the terns of 
Griffin and Tversky (1992).
 74
  
 Klibanoff, Lamont and Wizman (1998) test the performance of U.S closed-end country 
funds. In their sample they include funds, which entail a commonly traded stock, that invest in 
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  The behaviour of professional investors was not found to be prone to this kind of „attention‟ bias.  
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39 countries. A closed end funds entails a Net Asset Value. The authors test how the market 
price of the stocks included in the fund reacts to changes to the NAV, when salient news is 
present and otherwise. In a „rational‟ context the elasticity of the asset price and the NAV should 
be 1 (or close to it) with or without news, as the latter is a measure of the fundamental value of 
the firm. Unconditionally the authors observe that the elasticity is 0, 64 that indicates that the 
price is not very responsive to NAV. However in the presence of salient information (appeared in 
the cover of Times) for a particular country that potentially affects the NAV, the price elasticity 
of NAV for the particular fund rises significantly to 83%. This shows that the response of the 
market, in the presence of salient news is much more dramatic. 
 Fehle, Tsyplakov and Zdorovtsov (2005) document that companies that advertise during 
the Super Bowl in the U.S (an event with an immense audience), experience a positive effect on 
their price consequently. This is a clear irrationality because advertising is a piece of information 
that glamorizes a company without yielding any substantive information in terms of earnings 
capacity. Rather the existence of a salient yet uninformative event appears to affect prices.     
 All these results suggest that the characteristics of the information set available influence 
the resulting choices, much like we have documented in our experiment. Investors focus 
excessively on the saliency of the information, and tend to undermine its predictive validity.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Bayesian updating is at the core of rational decision making. A large number of studies in 
psychology and decision making show evidence that people systematically violate this paradigm 
[see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982)]. This evidence has been heavily applied in the area 
of behavioural finance. However, supporters of neoclassical theories often view these results 
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sceptically because the psychological experiments that document them generally do not account 
for certain features that have been shown to affect subjects‟ responses, such as financial 
incentives, naturally occurring information and risk attitudes. Given that these factors have been 
shown to affect subjects‟ economic behaviour, it is vital that we examine whether these 
behavioural biases are robust to these controls before we apply them in economic models of asset 
prices.  
Griffin and Tversky (1992) present evidence to support one such hypothesis of non-
Bayesian updating. This hypothesis suggests that when the information used is high extremity 
and low predictive validity subjects overreact to it, whereas if it is of low extremity and high 
predictive validity subjects underreact to it. Financial theories (Barberis et al 1998, Sorescu  and 
Subrahmanyam 2006) have utilised the capacity of this hypothesis to identify the conditions that 
spur over and under reaction amongst investors to explain the “anomalous” behaviour of prices. 
However, as mentioned, economists view this evidence sceptically because the studies 
that document them entail certain methodological shortcomings. Particularly the GT study can be 
criticised on three accounts: 
  
1. The payments of subjects were not clearly linked to their performance, so 
subjects were not incentivised to provide accurate responses. 
2. The information used by subjects to update their beliefs was hypothetical. 
3. Subjects were assumed to be risk neutral throughout 
In this study we contribute to the literature by taking a step back and re-examining 
whether the GT hypothesis holds after we address all these limitations. In this manner we 
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provide evidence whether this theory provides a viable model of subjective probability 
formation, which can be used to explain the behaviour of asset prices.  
We clearly link the performance of subjects to their payments, so that they are 
incentivised to perform the task to the best of their ability. Secondly, the information that 
subjects used to update their beliefs is endogenously generated in the experiment so that subjects 
are not required to visualize or imagine anything. Lastly, we go beyond risk neutrality and 
estimate subjective beliefs whilst allowing for risk aversion.  
Our results broadly support the hypothesis of GT. We find that elicited probabilities are 
higher when the information used by subjects is of high strength and low weight. Particularly, we 
find that the effect of strength on elicited probabilities outweighs the effect of weight by roughly 
a factor of 2. This result is a clear violation of Bayesian updating as this rule prescribes that these 
two elements of the information set should have an equal effect on elicited probabilities.  This 
evidence suggests that the evidence provided in the original study of GT were not due to the 
methodological shortcomings of their experimental design, but rather reflect a genuine feature of 
human behaviour under uncertainty. 
However, our design does present some key differences. Firstly, we show that the 
magnitude of the bias is reduced substantially in our study. For example in Table 5.1 of their 
paper they find that for samples with posterior probability of 0.77, overconfidence is equal to 8% 
for the high strength low weight sample (3,0) and underconfidence is 17.5% for the low strength 
high weight (10,7). This suggests a bias in the magnitude of 25.5%. In our analysis, under the 
assumption of risk neutrality the corresponding figure is 11.4%. Once we allow for risk aversion, 
as theory and evidence prescribe, the bias reduces further to 4.7% (similar results hold for all 
patterns). These differences are striking, and suggest that the implementation of an experimental 
design more compatible with economic decision making reduces the strength-weight heuristic 
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found by GT on elicited beliefs. This demonstrates that it is prudent to confirm whether 
behavioural biases arise in experiments that successfully simulate economic decisions before we 
actually use them in asset pricing models.     
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Table 5.1: An example of a lottery pair 
 
 
 
 
13% chance of £0  (numbers 1-13)  
87% chance of £5  (numbers 14-100)  
37% chance of £0    (numbers 1-37) 
37% chance of £5    (numbers 38-74) 
26% chance of £15  (numbers 75-100) 
 
Your choice: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
£0
£5
£0
£5
£15
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Figure 5.1 Boxes and Ten-Sided Dice. 
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Table 5.2: The table in which subjects place their bets 
 
       
Bookie Stake 
Odds offered 
Earnings including the 
stake of £3 
I will bet on 
(circle) 
White Blue White Blue 
1 £3 20.00 1.05 £60.00 £3.15 W        B 
2 £3 10.00 1.11 £30.00 £3.33 W        B 
3 £3 6.67 1.18 £20.00 £3.54 W        B 
4 £3 5.00 1.25 £15.00 £3.75 W        B 
5 £3 4.00 1.33 £12.00 £4.00 W        B 
6 £3 3.33 1.43 £10.00 £4.29 W        B 
7 £3 2.86 1.54 £8.58 £4.62 W        B 
8 £3 2.50 1.67 £7.50 £5.00 W        B 
9 £3 2.22 1.82 £6.66 £5.46 W        B 
10 £3 2.00 2.00 £6.00 £6.00 W        B 
11 £3 1.82 2.22 £5.46 £6.66 W        B 
12 £3 1.67 2.50 £5.00 £7.50 W        B 
13 £3 1.54 2.86 £4.62 £8.58 W        B 
14 £3 1.43 3.33 £4.29 £10.00 W        B 
15 £3 1.33 4.00 £4.00 £12.00 W        B 
16 £3 1.25 5.00 £3.75 £15.00 W        B 
17 £3 1.18 6.67 £3.54 £20.00 W        B 
18 £3 1.11 10.00 £3.33 £30.00 W        B 
19 £3 1.05 20.00 £3.15 £60.00 W        B 
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Table 5.3:  Composition, strength and weight characteristics, Bayesian 
probability and number of observations of the various dice patterns 
 
Total Dice 
(n) 
No White 
(w) 
No blue 
(b) 
Strength 
|(w-b)/n| 
Bayesian 
Probability 
of white 
No of 
observations 
5 0 5 1.00 0.12 72 
9 2 7 0.56 0.12 110 
17 6 11 0.29 0.12 47 
3 0 3 1.00 0.23 77 
5 1 4 0.60 0.23 218 
9 3 6 0.33 0.23 112 
17 7 10 0.18 0.23 106 
3 1 2 0.33 0.4 110 
5 2 3 0.20 0.4 412 
9 4 5 0.11 0.4 117 
17 8 9 0.06 0.4 82 
3 2 1 0.33 0.6 154 
5 3 2 0.20 0.6 394 
9 5 4 0.11 0.6 87 
17 9 8 0.06 0.6 44 
3 3 0 1.00 0.77 55 
5 4 1 0.60 0.77 227 
9 6 3 0.33 0.77 95 
17 10 7 0.18 0.77 73 
5 5 0 1.00 0.88 45 
9 7 2 0.56 0.88 53 
17 11 6 0.29 0.88 81 
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of risk neutral beliefs from raw data for each pattern for each group with same posterior probability 
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Table 5.4: Maximum Likelihood estimates of Risk Neutral Subjective Beliefs 
 
Interval regression estimates of elicited probabilities 
              Panel A: Effect of task order and ascending/descending designs on elicited probabilities. 
 
 Parameter Estimate 
 
St. error p-value 95% conf. interval   
 πA        
 task 0.0147 0.007 0.043 0.000 0.029   
 Descending 0.0186 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.033   
         
           Panel B:  Strength, weight, Bayesian probability and elicited probabilities 
White 
dice 
D 
 
 
 
white 
(w) 
Blue 
dice 
d 
blue 
(b) 
Strength 
|(w-b)/n| 
Weight 
(n) 
Bayesian 
Prob. 
Elicited 
Prob. 
(πA ) 
St. error 95% conf. interval 
0 5
1.00 5 0.12 0.122 0.027 0.087 0.156 
2 7 
0.56 9 0.12 0.164 0.026 0.138 0.189 
6 11 
0.29 17 0.12 0.250 0.032 0.198 0.301 
0 3 
1.00 3 0.23 0.201 0.029 0.170 0.232 
1 4 
0.60 5 0.23 0.222 0.024 0.198 0.246 
3 6 
0.33 9 0.23 0.248 0.026 0.218 0.278 
7 10 
0.18 17 0.23 0.320 0.027 0.291 0.348 
1 2 
0.33 3 0.40 0.333 0.025 0.304 0.361 
2 3 
0.20 5 0.40 0.352 0.021 0.330 0.373 
4 5 
0.11 9 0.40 0.393 0.022 0.364 0.421 
8 9 
0.06 17 0.40 0.406 0.023 0.373 0.439 
2 1 
0.33 3 0.60 0.623 0.020 0.592 0.653 
3 2 
0.20 5 0.60 0.586 0.020 0.562 0.609 
5 4 
0.11 9 0.60 0.551 0.023 0.518 0.585 
9 8 
0.06 17 0.60 0.552 0.028 0.506 0.598 
3 0 
1.00 3 0.77 0.773 0.019 0.734 0.812 
4 1 
0.60 5 0.77 0.714 0.021 0.676 0.752 
6 3 
0.33 9 0.77 0.673 0.032 0.618 0.727 
10 7 
0.18 17 0.77 0.659 0.027 0.616 0.700 
5 0 
1.00 5 0.88 0.805 0.029 0.749 0.861 
7 2 
0.56 9 0.88 0.793 0.026 0.744 0.842 
11 6 
0.29 17 0.88 0.716 0.026 0.664 0.767 
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Table 5.5: Comparison of bets between a risk neutral and a risk averse agent with the same beliefs. 
 
B
Bookie Payout of W Payout of B EV(W) EV(B) BET RN 
 
EU(W) 
 
EU(B) BET RA 
1 60 Not 60 45 0.79 W 10.14 0.95 W 
2 30 3.33 22.5 0.83 W 7.53 0.98 W 
3 20 3.54 15 0.89 W 6.32 1 W 
4 15 3.75 11.25 0.94 W 5.59 1.03 W 
5 12 4 9 1 W 5.08 1.06 W 
6 10 4.29 7.5 1.07 W 4.69 1.09 W 
7 8.58 4.62 6.44 1.16 W 4.4 1.12 W 
8 7.5 5 5.63 1.25 W 4.15 1.16 W 
9 6.66 5.46 5 1.37 W 3.94 1.21 W 
10 6 6 4.5 1.5 W 3.77 1.26 W 
11 5.46 6.66 4.1 1.67 W 3.62 1.31 W 
12 5 7.5 3.75 1.88 W 3.48 1.38 W 
13 4.62 8.58 3.47 2.15 W 3.37 1.47 W 
14 4.29 10 3.22 2.5 W 3.26 1.56 W 
15 4 12 3 3 W 3.17 1.69 W 
16 3.75 15 2.81 3.75 B 3.08 1.86 W 
17 3.54 20 2.66 5 B 3 2.11 W 
18 3.33 30 2.5 7.5 B 2.93 2.51 W 
19 3.15 60 2.36 15 B 2.86 3.38 B 
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Table 5.6: Maximum Likelihood estimates of risk aversion 
 
      Assuming CRRA and EUT preferences 
 
Parameter 
 
Estimate 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard error 
 
 
p-value 95% conf. interval 
           
constant 0.458 0.110 0.00 0.243 0.674 
Group2 0.015 0.057 0.79 -0.096 0.126 
Group3 -0.114 0.062 0.066 -0.236 0.007 
Raorder 0.186 0.062 0.002 0.065 0.307 
Female 0.199 0.074 0.007 0.055 0.344 
Teenager -0.078 0.061 0.2 -0.199 0.042 
White 0.169 0.117 0.149 -0.061 0.399 
British -0.227 0.138 0.101 -0.498 0.044 
High Income 0.147 0.054 0.007 0.041 0.254 
Graduate -0.111 0.103 0.279 -0.313 0.090 
Math -0.106 0.070 0.134 -0.244 0.032 
      
μRA 0.901 0.08 0.000 0.745 1.06 
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Table 5.7: Maximum Likelihood estimates of Risk Averse Subjective Beliefs 
Assuming EUT and CRRA utility function. 
 
Panel A: Risk aversion coefficients, demographics and elicited beliefs 
Parameter Estimate  p-value  St. error 95% conf. interval 
r 0.629 0.066 0 0.5 0.757 
task -0.027 0.016 0.096 -0.059 0.005 
Female 0.021 0.017 0.228 -0.013 0.055 
Teenager -0.011 0.017 0.521 -0.044 0.022 
White 0.026 0.029 0.371 -0.031 0.084 
British 0.053 0.062 0.388 -0.068 0.174 
High Income 0.033 0.016 0.04 0.001 0.065 
Graduate -0.006 0.037 0.879 -0.078 0.067 
Math -0.002 0.017 0.912 -0.036 0.032 
      πA 
     task -0.025 0.012 0.037 -0.048 -0.001 
Descending -0.026 0.012 0.026 -0.049 -0.003 
Female 0.002 0.016 0.925 -0.031 0.034 
Teenager 0.01 0.011 0.336 -0.011 0.032 
White -0.018 0.025 0.471 -0.067 0.031 
British -0.017 0.032 0.601 -0.079 0.046 
High Income -0.016 0.014 0.243 -0.044 0.011 
Graduate 0.028 0.025 0.269 -0.021 0.077 
Math 0.003 0.015 0.858 -0.026 0.031 
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Table 5.7: Continued 
 
      
Panel B: Pattern strength, weight and elicited risk averse beliefs. 
No white    No Blue    Strength     Weight   Bayesian Elicited Prob.     St. error 
95% confidence 
interval 
(w) (b) |(w-b)/n| (n) Prob. (πA )       
2 1 0.33 3 0.6 0.522 0.009 0.505 0.54 
3 2 0.2 5 0.6 0.506 0.007 0.493 0.52 
5 4 0.11 9 0.6 0.491 0.009 0.474 0.508 
9 8 
0.06 17 0.6 0.499 0.01 0.48 0.519 
3 0 1 3 0.77 0.606 0.013 0.58 0.632 
4 1 0.6 5 0.77 0.57 0.011 0.549 0.59 
6 3 0.33 9 0.77 0.552 0.015 0.522 0.581 
10 7 
0.18 17 0.77 0.542 0.01 0.522 0.562 
5 0 1 5 0.88 0.655 0.024 0.607 0.703 
7 2 0.56 9 0.88 0.633 0.018 0.597 0.669 
11 6 
0.29 17 0.88 0.569 0.015 0.54 0.599 
1 2 0.33 3 0.4 0.425 0.007 0.412 0.438 
2 3 0.2 5 0.4 0.43 0.006 0.419 0.441 
4 5 0.11 9 0.4 0.443 0.007 0.43 0.455 
8 9 
0.06 17 0.4 0.442 0.007 0.429 0.456 
0 3 1 3 0.23 0.38 0.007 0.367 0.394 
1 4 0.6 5 0.23 0.389 0.005 0.379 0.4 
3 6 0.33 9 0.23 0.398 0.007 0.385 0.411 
7 10 
0.18 17 0.23 0.421 0.007 0.408 0.434 
0 5 1 5 0.12 0.359 0.008 0.343 0.374 
2 7 0.56 9 0.12 0.374 0.007 0.361 0.388 
6 11 0.29 17 0.12 0.394 0.008 0.379 0.41 
5 
1 5 0.12 0.359 0.008 0.343 0.374 
 
 
Table 5.8: Maximum Likelihood estimates of coefficients of strength, weight and risk aversion 
                                                              
Assuming EUT and CRRA preferences 
 
 Estimate Standard error p value 95% conf. interval 
r 0.699 0.015 <0.001 0.669 0.729 
alpha 0.267 0.033 <0.001 0.201 0.332 
beta 0.738 0.038 <0.001 0.662 0.814 
Lnmu -1.262 0.124 <0.001 -1.51 -1.022 
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Appendix 5.1: Instructions for the Risk Aversion task 
 
Stage 2: INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 We will now continue with Stage 2 of the experiment. 
 This stage is about choosing between lotteries with varying prizes and chances of 
winning. You will be shown 20 lottery pairs, and from each pair you will choose the lottery you 
prefer. You will actually get the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and will be paid 
according to the outcome of that lottery, so you should think carefully about your preferences. 
 On the accompanying sheet there is an example lottery pair.   
 The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the roll of a 100-sided die that is 
numbered from 1 to 100.   The numbers that will determine each outcome are shown below each 
lottery.  
 In the example the left lottery pays five pounds (£5) if the number is between 1 and 40 (a 
40% chance), and it pays fifteen pounds (£15) if it is between 41 and 100 (a 60% chance).  
 The lottery on the right pays five pounds (£5) if the number drawn is between 1 and 50 (a 
50% chance), ten pounds (£10) if the number is between 51 and 90 (a 40% chance), and fifteen 
pounds (£15) if the number is between 91 and 100 (a 10% chance).  
 
 The size of the pie slices represent the chances of earning each payoff.   
 
 Each lottery pair will be shown on a separate sheet of paper. On each sheet you should 
indicate your preferred lottery by ticking the appropriate box. After you have worked through all 
the lottery pairs, please raise your hand.  
 
You will then roll a 20-sided die to determine which pair of lotteries will be played out, 
and the 100-sided die to determine the outcome of the chosen lottery.  
 
 For instance, suppose the lottery on the accompanying page was chosen to pay off and 
you rolled a 42 on the 100-sided die.  If you had picked the lottery on the left you would win 
£15, while if you had picked the lottery on the right you would have won £5.   
 
 Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things: 
• which lottery pair is chosen to be played out using the 20-sided die; 
• which lottery you selected, the left or the right, for the chosen lottery pair;  
• the outcome of that lottery when you roll the 100-sided die. 
 
 This is not a test of whether you can pick the best lottery in each pair, because none of the 
lotteries are necessarily better than the others. Which lotteries you prefer is a matter of personal 
taste.  
 
Please work silently, and think carefully about each choice.  
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All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the £5 show-up fee that you receive just for 
being here.  
 
 
Appendix 5.2: Instructions for the Belief Elicitation task. 
 
Stage 3: INSTRUCTIONS 
 
What you will do 
 
 In this stage of the experiment you will be betting on the outcomes of uncertain events.  
Usually we bet on events like football matches or elections, but in this task the events will be 
random choices made by the experimenter between two boxes, one blue and the other white.  
The experimenter will not tell you which box was chosen.  At the start each box will have the 
same chance of being chosen, but once it has been chosen the experimenter will give you some 
information to help you work out the chances that it was blue or white.  Armed with this 
information, you will make bets on which box was chosen.    
 
 The procedure, which is summarized on the accompanying picture, is as follows.  The 
experimenter will first choose the box by rolling a 6-sided die with three blue and three white 
sides.  If blue comes up he will choose the blue box, if white comes up he will choose the white 
one.  
 
 Both the white and blue boxes contain several dice, each having 10 sides.  Both boxes 
have the same number of dice, which will vary over the course of the experiment.  The dice in 
the blue box always have 6 blue sides and 4 white ones, while those in the white box have 4 blue 
sides and 6 white ones.   
 
The experimenter will roll all the dice in the chosen box and tell you how many blue and 
white sides came up.  He will not tell you which box was chosen. 
 
Because the dice in the blue box have more blue sides than those in the white box, 
knowing the number of blue and white sides that come up can help you work out the chances that 
each box was chosen.  For example, if more blue sides come up this means it is more likely to be 
the blue box, and if more white sides come up it is more likely to be the white box.   
 
Once you have the information about the dice rolls, you will then make bets on which 
box was chosen.  
 
About betting 
 
  You will be making bets with several betting houses or “bookies,” just as you might bet 
on a football game or a horse race.    
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To familiarize you with betting, we will illustrate how it works with the example of a 
horse race.    
 
Imagine a two horse race between Blue Bird and White Heat.   Several bookies offer 
different odds for both horses. The table below shows the odds offered by three bookies along 
with the amounts they would pay if you staked £10 on the winning horse.  The earnings are 
calculated by multiplying the odds by the stake.  In this experiment you will be making bets on 
which box was chosen using a table like this.  At this point you should take some time to 
study the table.   
 
Bookie Stake  
Odds offered  
Earnings including the stake 
of £10 
Blue Bird White Heat Blue Bird White Heat 
A £10 5.00 1.25 £50.00 £12.50 
B £10 3.33 1.43 £33.33 £14.30 
C £10 2.00 2.00 £20.00 £20.00 
 
 
Below are three important points about betting. 
 
1. Your belief about the chances of each outcome is a personal judgment that 
depends on information you have about the different events.  For the horse 
race, you may have seen previous races or read articles about them.  In the 
experiment the information you have about whether the blue or white box was 
chosen will be how many blue and white faces came up.   
 
2. Even if you believe Event X is more likely to occur than Event Y, you may 
want to bet on Y because you find the odds attractive. For example, even if 
you believe White Heat is most likely to win you may want to bet on Blue Bird 
because you find the odds attractive.  To illustrate, suppose you personally believe 
that Blue Bird has a 40% chance of winning and White Heat has a 60% chance of 
winning. This means that if you bet £10 on Blue Bird with Bookie A you believe 
there is a 40% chance of receiving £50.00 and a 60% chance of receiving nothing.  
You may find this more attractive than betting on White Heat, which you believe 
offers a 60% chance of 12.50 and a 40% chance of nothing. 
 
     
3. Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to 
gamble.  There is no right choice for everyone.  In a horse race you might want to 
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bet on the longshot since it will bring you more money if it wins, but you also 
might want to bet on the favorite since it is more likely to win something.   
 
For each bookie, whether you would choose to bet on Blue Bird or White Heat will 
depend on three things: your judgment about how likely it is each horse will win, the odds 
offered by the bookie, and how much you like to gamble or take risks.    
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Your choices 
 
Now you are familiarized with odds, we can go back to the experimental betting task.  
Recall that the experimenter will first make a random choice of a blue or white box.  Then he 
will roll the dice in the chosen box and tell you how many white and blue sides came up.  Then 
you will consider the chances that the box chosen was blue or white, and make a series of bets.   
 
You have a booklet of record sheets.  Each record sheet shows the bookies you will be 
dealing with, and the odds they offer.  There are 19 bookies on each sheet, and each offer 
different odds for the two outcomes.   Take a minute to look at one such record sheet, shown 
on the next page.  
 
 There will be 30 separate events, and 19 bookies offer odds for each event.  You will 
make bets at all 19 bookies for all 30 events.   
 
For each bet, you have a £3 stake, and the record sheet shows the payoffs you will 
receive if you bet on the box that was actually chosen.    
 
There is a separate record sheet for each of the 30 events.  On each sheet you should 
circle W or B to indicate the bet you want to make with all 19 bookies.   
 
One and only one of the bets in the entire experiment will pay off for real.  
Therefore, please consider each bet as if it is the only one that will be paid out.  After you have 
placed all your bets, you will roll a 30-sided die to determine which event will be played out, and 
a 20-sided die to determine which bookie will determine your earnings.  
 
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the £5 show-up fee that you receive just for 
being here. 
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A diagrammatical illustration of the betting task provided to subjects. 
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Appendix 5.3. The Demographics questionnaire completed by subjects.  
 
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your 
answers and your responses are completely confidential. Please think carefully about each 
question and give your best answers.  
 
1. What is your age? ____________ years 
 
2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.) 
 
01     Male  02 Female 
 
3. Which of the following categories best describes you?  (Circle one number.) 
01     British     
02      Irish   
03     Any other white background      
 04     White and Black Caribbean 
05     White and Black African 
06      White and Asian    
07 Any other mixed background 
08 Indian 
09 Pakistani 
10 Bangladeshi 
11 Any other Asian background 
12 Caribbean 
13 African 
14 Any other Black background 
15 Chinese 
16 Any other ethnic group 
17 Not stated 
18 Prefer not to say 
 
4.  What is your main field of study? (Circle one number.) 
 01 Accounting 
 02 Economics 
 03 Finance 
04 Business Administration, other than Accounting, Economics, or Finance 
05 Education 
06 Engineering 
07 Health and Medicine 
08 Biological and Biomedical Sciences 
09 Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences 
10 Social Sciences or History 
11 Law 
12 Psychology 
13  Modern Languages and Cultures 
14 Other Fields 
 
5.  What is your year of studies?  (Circle one number.) 
01     First year 04 Masters 
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02     Second year 05 Doctoral 
03 Third year      
 
 
 
6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? (Circle one number) 
 01 Bachelor‟s degree 
02 Master‟s degree 
03 Doctoral degree 
04 Professional qualification 
 
 
7. As a percentage, what is your current average mark if you are doing a Bachelor‟s degree, 
or what was it when you did a Bachelor‟s degree? This mark should refer to all your 
years of study for this degree, not just the current year. Please pick one by rounding up or 
down to the nearest number: 
01 Above 70% 
02 Between 60 - 69% 
03 Between 50 - 59% 
04 Between 40 - 49% 
05 Less than 40% 
06 Have not taken courses for which grades are given. 
 
8. What is your citizenship status? 
01 British Citizen 
02 EU Citizen (non-British Citizen) 
03 Non-EU Citizen 
 
  
9. Are you currently: 
01 Single and never married? 
02 Married? 
03 Separated, divorced or widowed? 
 
10. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any 
dependents. Do not include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as 
dependents. 
_________________ 
 
 
 
11. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before tax 
earned in the calendar year 2007 by the people in your household (as “household” is 
defined in question 10). 
[Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, 
scholarship support, student loans, parental support, social security, alimony, and child 
support, and others.] 
01 Less than £10,000 
02 £10,000 – £19,999 
03 £20,000 – £29,999 
04 £30,000 - £49,999 
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05 Over £50,000 
 
 
12. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before tax 
earned in the calendar year 2007 by your parents.   
 [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, 
social security, alimony, and child support, and others.]  
 
01 Less than £10,000 
02 £10,000 – £19,999 
03 £20,000 – £29,999 
04 £30,000 - £49,999 
05 Over £50,000 
06 Don‟t Know 
 
 
 
13. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one number.) 
 00 No 
 01 Yes 
 
 If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? _______ cigarettes.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
 Behavioural finance is a relatively new field that attempts to apply concepts from 
psychology and behavioural economics in financial markets. By doing so it has been able to 
explain phenomena that appear puzzling to the traditional neoclassical model. In this thesis we 
expanded the literature in behavioural finance, by drawing from findings in decision science and 
proposing behavioural hypotheses that examine how investors use information and invest in 
financial assets. 
 In the third chapter, we examine whether ambiguity aversion affects the pricing of analyst 
forecasts. The importance of analyst earnings forecasts on investment decision is highlighted by 
Dreman (1998) who states that “Investors, from the managers of multi-billion- dollar   pension 
funds to the average Joe, act quickly on changes in analyst forecasts, which are flashed 
immediately by the financial media. Near-term earnings estimates, as noted, are the major 
trigger for investment decisions today”, (Dreman (1998), pp 90).  Given the large effects that 
analyst forecasts exert on investment decisions and asset prices Kothari (2001) states that “It is 
important to develop refutable hypotheses on the basis of behavioural theories of inefficient 
financial markets and to perform tests [in terms of the efficiency with which analyst forecasts are 
transmitted into prices] that discriminate between efficient and inefficient market hypotheses”, 
Kothari (2001, pp120-121). Responding to this observation we examine whether ambiguity 
aversion affects the pricing of analyst forecasts, inducing price predictability. 
 Measuring ambiguity using company size, we find that prices around analyst forecasts 
suggest the presence of ambiguity aversion. When investors cannot confidently estimate the 
behaviour of forecast accuracy (something we illustrate quantitatively), they respond 
pessimistically, setting prices too low and inducing an ambiguity premium. This study expands 
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the analyst forecast literature, by examining a behavioural hypothesis of the pricing of analyst 
forecasts. In addition, it explains the size premium, an important CAPM anomaly. Finally, it is 
first empirical study of ambiguity aversion in the literature.  
 In the fourth chapter we examine whether investors sentiment, measured using the survey 
of consumer confidence compiled by Conference Board, affects the behaviour of price 
momentum, another important puzzling in the data that is inconsistent with the CAPM. This 
pattern has been attributed to market frictions, risk premia and investors‟ behavioural biases. 
Providing evidence that clearly support any of these theories resolves the tension around this 
issue, and helps identify the origins of this puzzling pattern. In this chapter we examine whether 
price momentum is related to investors sentiment, a behavioural attribute.  
 The results indicate that momentum is only significant when investors are optimistic, and 
that these hedge portfolios experience long run reversals. This result is robust to controls to 
microstructure biases and risk adjustments. It is in line with the behavioural explanation of 
momentum put forward by Daniel et al (1998), supporting the notion that the foundations of 
momentum are behavioural.  
 In the fifth chapter we design an experiment to test the validity of a theory of non-
Bayesian updating proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992). This theory is a cornerstone in the 
decision making literature as it parsimoniously explains over and under confidence in beliefs, 
and has been used to explain evidence of over and under reaction in the stock market [Barberis et 
al (1998)]. A general limitation of studies in psychology, however, is that they do not simulate an 
economic environment; hence their application in economic models is debatable. Various 
experiments that have been designed to test the effect of behavioural biases in economic settings 
have documented mutation or even elimination of the bias (i.e., Grether 1980). Thus, our 
experiment tests whether this important theory holds for economics decisions, and thus 
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justifiable used to explain asset prices. Our results suggest that the theory generally holds, but we 
do document a dramatic decrease of the bias, compared to the original results of GT.    
 The findings from all empirical chapters demonstrate that systematic deviations from 
Bayesian updating can occur due to ambiguity aversion, investor sentiment and decision 
heuristics. Because arbitrage is not limitless [Shleifer and Vishny (1997)] these systematic 
violations of Bayesian updating can affect asset prices, inducing price predictability. This 
contradicts the notion that deviations from the Bayesian model are unsystematic, and will thus be 
washed out during the process of information aggregation [Fama (1998)]. Rather, these results 
extend the field of behavioural finance by providing new evidence that support the view that 
price predictability is related to investors‟ psychology [Hirshleifer (2001)]. 
 The main message that stems from the thesis is that the neoclassical model that assumes 
rational expectations is incomplete. The behavioural attributes identified in the three empirical 
chapters of the thesis highlight the incompleteness of the neoclassical model, and suggest that 
our theories will become more descriptive if we acknowledge the bounded rationality of 
investors.    
  
6.1 Caveats  
 
 As is usually the case in social sciences, the empirical tests conducted in the thesis have 
limitations. An obvious caveat of the behavioural explanations provided in the third and fourth 
empirical chapters, is that these patterns in prices may actually reflect compensation for risk 
bearing, and they only seem anomalous because we have not yet identified the correct 
equilibrium model of expected returns. This is a common argument proposed by economists who 
want to dismiss evidence of market inefficiency [see Fama (1998)]. However, in my opinion this 
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approach, although plausible, is unscientific. Even though it is possible that a rational model may 
actually explain these patterns, it is not appropriate to dismiss them a priory without any strong 
evidence that such a model exists. Therefore, until this model arrives, results such as these 
documented in this thesis pose a challenge to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
 In addition, in the fifth chapter the subjects used were university students. Although this 
is almost the norm in such experiments, there is an issue whether the responses of the students 
are representative of the entire population, and particularly market participants. If investors learn 
from their mistakes and gradually become Bayesians the application of such results in financial 
markets is spurious. However, the evidence on this issue is mixed as various studies have shown 
that professional investors also exhibit behavioural biases. For example, Coval and Shumway 
(2005) and Haigh and List (2005) show that futures traders are myopically loss averse. In fact 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) conclude that experienced subjects are equally likely to exhibit the 
strength-weight heuristic.   Such evidence suggests that it is not conclusive that experienced 
traders are automatically Bayesians.  
 Another caveat of the experiment in the fifth chapter is that the parametric methods used 
to elicit utilities and subjective probabilities are by no means the only ones available. For 
example, there are various non-parametric alternatives to measure utilities besides the parametric 
method suggested by Hey and Orme (1994), such as the trade-off method proposed by Wakker 
and Deneffe‟s (1996) and the two-step method proposed by Abdellaoui (2000). The main benefit 
from non-parametric estimations is that the conclusions drawn do not depend on the functional 
form chosen, which in the fifth chapter it is assumed to be a simple CRRA utility function in the 
domain of EUT. If, however, subjects make decisions in the risk task according to any other 
model besides the simple CRRA model our results may lack generality. However, because the 
Griffin and Tversky (1992) hypothesis involves comparing elicited probabilities depending on 
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the strength and weight of the evidence, the choice of utility model does not seriously limit the 
generality of our conclusions. This is because, although risk attitude affects elicited beliefs, it is 
merely an identical transformation of all elicited probabilities regardless of the functional form 
chosen, and thus cannot in principle capture a strength-weight effect. By using a simple 
parametric CRRA utility function we demonstrate the non-trivial effect of risk attitudes on 
subjective beliefs, without a significant loss of generality in terms of the conclusions drawn 
about the Griffin and Tversky (1992) hypothesis.
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 It is worth briefly expanding on another appealing characteristic of the trade-off method 
for utility elicitation proposed by Wakker and Deneffe‟s (1996), apart from being non-
parametric. Because it does not involve any deliberation about probabilities it is not sensitive to 
misspecifications of risk attitudes due to subjects‟ confusion about probabilities.  Our design of 
eliciting utilities assumes subjects understand and use probabilities correctly, and if they do not 
produces erroneous estimates of risk attitudes. However, assuming that subjects understand the 
explicitly given probabilities in the risk task may not be particularly troublesome as they are 
fairly transparent. For example, as shown in Table 5.1, probabilities correspond to the coloured 
areas in the pie charts, which are clearly illustrated. In addition, they are well explained by the 
means of the 100-sided die that we use to decide subjects payments. For example, the probability 
of receiving £5 in the left panel of Table 5.1 is 87%, which amounts to rolling the 100-sided die 
and obtaining any number between 1 and 87. This procedure is quite transparent and is unlikely 
to raise misconceptions that will bias the results. However, having said that, misconceptions are 
possible, so we raise a flag that our results assume that subjects understand probabilities.   
 Another caveat of our design is that it does not incorporate probability weighting, as 
suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) or Quiggin (1992). Although for utility elicitation 
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 However, the point estimates of the subjective probabilities are sensitive to the model chosen. 
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the same argument as above still applies, i.e., that a utility model with probability weighting will 
transform all elicited subjective probabilities in the same manner thus in general will not be able 
to explain a strength-weight effect, it is possible that probability weighting of subjective 
probabilities is somehow a function of strength and weight. This is an interesting empirical 
question, which we plan to address in the future. 
 
6.2 Implications for future research  
 
 The empirical results in all three chapters imply directions for future research. The third 
chapter showed that ambiguity aversion affects the pricing of analyst forecasts. However, the 
literature is lacking a study that examines comprehensively the effect of ambiguity aversion in 
the cross section of stocks. Perhaps the definition of ambiguity we have provided in this study, 
namely the richness of the available information, can serve as a basis on which a more general 
measure of ambiguity can be constructed so that we can examine whether ambiguity affects the 
cross section of prices.  
 The fourth chapter demonstrated that momentum is only significant during optimistic 
periods. Given that the momentum anomaly is correlated with other anomalies, it is interesting to 
observe what other phenomena investor sentiment can explain. For example, the value premium 
is negatively correlated with momentum, which suggests that it arises when investors are 
pessimistic.  An investigation of this issue is of great importance as it can highlight whether a 
puzzling phenomenon such as the value premium is related to sentiment induced mispricing. 
 The fifth chapter analyzes beliefs from information signals that point to potential gains. 
However, in financial markets a large fraction of the information set points to contingencies that 
involve potential losses, and we do not know whether the strength-weight heuristic mutates when 
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investors are using such signals. Because in the behavioural literature it well documented that 
“bad is stronger than good” (see Bumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer and Vohs 2001), a mutation 
of the strength-weight heuristic depending on the domain of the decision is entirely plausible and 
worth investigating.    
 In addition, rational decision making does not necessarily imply Bayesian 
Updating. Rather, in its most general form, it implies that agents make choices according to some 
“well-behaved” underlying utility function that satisfies the axioms of rational choice.  Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) is one such decision making model, but assumes that decision makers have 
complete knowledge of the probabilities that are associated with future contingencies. In our 
experimental framework subjects must compute these probabilities using dice data. Therefore, 
the framework of their decision is more fitting to a Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model as 
outlined by Savage (1972), in which beliefs are idiosyncratic to each individual. Importantly, as 
explained by Savage, SEU decision makers need not form probabilities according to Bayes Rule. 
All that SEU demands is that the decision-maker behaves as if using the mean of the distribution 
of beliefs, regardless of where these beliefs come from. Savage [1972; p. 57] explains: 
 
According to the personalistic view [of SEU], the role of the mathematical theory 
of probability is to enable the person using it to detect inconsistencies in his own 
real or envisaged behaviour. It is also understood that, having detected an 
inconsistency, he will remove it. An inconsistency is typically removable in many 
different ways, among which the theory gives no guidance for choosing. Silence 
on this point does not seem altogether appropriate, so there may be room to 
improve the theory here. 
 
The psychological heuristic proposed by Griffin and Tversky [1992] can be viewed as one such 
suggestion to improve the theory, with many other alternatives possible. An interesting question 
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that merits investigation is to contrast different SEU specifications in terms of the processes that 
determine the subjective probabilities.  
 
6.3 Closing note 
 
 This thesis, as many other studies in this field, demonstrates that the behaviour of 
investors can actually affect asset prices. This highlights that the neoclassical model, although 
mathematically very elegant, in reality is very simplistic because it disregards the fact that 
decisions are a complicated mix of emotions, perceptions and experiences. I would like to close 
the thesis using a very famous quote from John Maynard Keynes in his 1936 book “The General 
Theory of Employment Interest and Money”, which nicely summarizes the “behavioural” nature 
of decision-making. He notes that: 
  "Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on 
spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or 
economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of 
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal 
spirits - a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted 
average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities." (Keynes 1936, pp 161-
162.) 
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7. Appendices 
 
The appendices aim to expand on certain debates in the field of behavioural finance, so as to give 
the interested reader a better understanding of the issues in the field. They also provide a 
literature review on several topics in behavioural finance that are not directly relevant to the 
main body of the thesis.     
 7.1 Heterogeneous expectations & behavioural asset pricing 
 
 Most asset pricing theories assume that the market has arrived at a homogenous Bayesian 
expectation of the assets risk and return profile, thus determining the fair value of the asset.  
 Rationality in the marketplace is based on two microeconomic models that have rational 
(i.e., in the context of the EMH) pricing implications. Firstly, in strict rational expectations 
suggested by Loucas (1972), investors have perfect foresight; they always interpret information 
correctly and identically which leads to a Bayesian evolution of prices. This is equivalent to 
expected utility maximisation as set out by Von-Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Secondly, 
rational decision making can occur even if agents do not know the objective probabilities if 
future contingencies but behave according to the axioms laid out by Savage (1954) in Subjective 
Utility Theory (SUT). Contrary to EUT, SUT does not require that all investors arrive at 
identical distributions. They are allowed to have subjective priors which they blend with the new 
evidence. If this combination occurs according to the rule of Bayes‟ and under certain conditions  
(see Blume and Easley 2002),
 76
 Subjective Utility Theory (SUT) leads to rational pricing. 
 This type of rational market is depicted in the diagram below: 
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 These conditions are that a) the a prior belief includes the true model that generates return or rational priors where 
the investor has knowledge of the true model and b) the investor correctly anticipates  his future beliefs. 
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                           Diagram 7.1. Asset market with homogenous expectations.  
  Suppose that p* represents the true equilibrium price of an asset at a particular point in time 
given its risk and return profile. 
 
Formally:  
*
t t
t+i
t+j t
t+1
p =d E (CF )/Ω                                     (7.1) 
 The price of the asset at time t is the discounted expectation of the future cash flows, CF, 
given the information available at time t, , where the expectations are rational  in the sense of 
Lucas or Savage.  The discount factor depends on the risk properties of the asset‟s returns. A 
riskier (less risky) asset will have a larger (smaller) discount factor and thus a lower (higher) 
price.   DD‟ is the infinitely elastic demand curve for the asset.77 This reflects the fact that the 
market has analyzed the information matrix Ω, and understood its implications on the risk/return 
profile of the security. Since only one true equilibrium relationship between risk/return can exist 
given a particular set of fundamentals (properly inferred from information), a horizontal demand 
curve implies that the market  has a homogenous expectation of the cash flows and discount 
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 Infinitely elastic means that demand at any other price other than p* demand is 0. 
P* 
Quantity 
DD‟ 
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factor, therefore understands that the „fair‟ price is p*. Asset demand, therefore, at any other 
price level above p* is zero.
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 This kind of analysis implicitly states that the forces of demand and supply do not affect 
the asset pricing process, as prices only change in response to changes in fundamentals. For 
example in diagram 1 if new information in terms of the future cash flows and/or their riskiness 
arrives in the market, the demand curve would shift to the new implied price level. Individual 
investors would take positions according to their risk aversion and markets would be at 
equilibrium.   Indeed Ross (1987) makes the point that the forces of demand and supply have 
little application in financial markets, acknowledging that in neoclassical finance investors do 
not speculate; rather they have complete and correct knowledge of risk/return profiles and 
simply take positions according to their risk tolerance. 
 However, the evidence that have accumulated indicate that the functioning of financial 
markets may not be as in figure 1 and particularly point to investors having heterogeneous 
beliefs about the „fair‟ market price.  These heterogeneous beliefs may arise because different 
groups of investors use different information sets to form expectations, as in Hong and Stein 
(1999) and Peng and Xiong (2006), or because some groups do not process the information as 
efficiently as other groups (Blume and Easley 2002, Kahneman and Tversky 1982).
79
 Indeed 
both cases make sense. With the vast amount of assets and information that exists, the 
complicated interrelationships that pertain within the information set and the fact that attention is 
scarce, (see Kahneman 1973) it seems unlikely that investors have at their disposal the complete 
information set when valuing securities. Moreover, the quality of the valuation made by 
investors depends on the knowledge and experience they posses in the marketplace. Less 
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 If price is less that p* the entire market will spot a profit opportunity, rash to buy the stock, thus bid the price up to 
p*. 
79
 Brav and Heaton (2002) and Brandt (2003) show that theories based on cognitive biases and theories based on 
incomplete information are difficult to distinguish empirically. 
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experienced participants may not be in a position to process the information correctly and may in 
fact rely on simple heuristics and rules of thumb in order to arrive at decisions.  
 This evidence suggests that the assumption that markets homogenously analyze the 
information set may be flawed as it is conceivable that different groups of investors have 
different beliefs in terms of what is the „fair‟ price of the asset. Furthermore, since at any point 
given the available information and fundamentals only one risk and return profile describes the 
company, heterogeneous expectations imply that at least some investors have erred in their 
valuations. 
 The issue is then whether these irrational investors affect asset prices. The fact that 
arbitrage cannot immediately automatically flatten out the demand curve has been discussed in 
section (2.4). A second aspect to the arbitrage story is that irrational traders will lose money, 
therefore slowly extinct and prices will be correctly set by the rational investors.  This prediction 
is confirmed by Sandroni (2000) who shows that in a Loucas tree economy only consumers with 
rational expectations survive. Moreover he shows that if not rational consumers exist, consumers 
whose forecasts are persistently wrong in the presence of learners, are driven out of the market. 
Similar results are reached by Blume and Easley (2000) who show that in complete markets 
where consumers have a common discount factor, those with correct beliefs drive those with 
incorrect beliefs out of the market and thus steer prices towards fundamentals. The intuition of 
these models is that agents, being expected (or subjective) utility maximisers allocate their 
wealth on the events they deem as more likely. Therefore when the true state is revealed only the 
agents that predicted correctly will accumulate wealth.  
 This view, however, is challenged on two accounts. Firstly, experimental psychologists 
challenge the notion that completely rational investors exist as numerous experimental studies 
find that behavioural biases pertain even when experienced professionals are used (Oskamp 
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(1965), Baumann, Deber and Thompson (1991), Kidd (1970), Schumway and Coval (2005)). 
Secondly, a literature has evolved that demonstrates that irrational traders need not be driven out 
of the market. For example, De Long et al (1990) propose a model with rational arbitragers and 
irrational traders, and conclude that in equilibrium both types of traders affect returns. Some 
studies even suggest that irrational traders (through their excessive risk taking) may drive smart 
money out of the market, (Kyle and Wang (1997), Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), Benos (1998) and 
Blume and Easley (2002)). Therefore based on this evidence, Friedman‟s (1953) argument that 
“dumb” money will eventually be driven out of the market is not uncontroversial. 
   This implies that demand curves are downward sloping, as in figure 2 below. Prices then 
become a wealth-weighted average of these expectations and conceivably diverge from 
fundamentals. For example, suppose that we have two groups of investors, 1 and 2. Due to the 
reasons highlighted above group 1 believes that the asset should be priced at P1 and group 2 at 
P2, therefore the demand curve is downward sloping, as shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              
                              Diagram 7.2 Market with heterogeneous expectations 
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Price 
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The resulting price, given heterogeneous expectations, will be a wealth-weighted average of the 
valuations of the two groups of investors. If group 1 invests 1W   in the stock and group 2 2W  
then resulting price is given by equation 7.2, as shown below: 
 
                  
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
W W
Pˆ= P+ P
W +W W +W
                                (7.2) 
 As this equation shows, the extend that each group affects the stock depends on the 
relationship between 1W  and 2W . If the group with the erroneous beliefs, say 2, invests heavily in 
the stock, its influence, and thus the mispricing will be greater. 
 Empirical evidence for downward sloping demand curves come from Shleifer (1986). He 
shows that the stocks that were recently listed in an index, such as the S & P 500, experience a 
positive price run-up. He says that there exists no reason to expect that the inclusion per se 
causes a change in fundamentals that warrants this price change. Rather, demand for stocks, due 
to the various tracker funds, rises after the inclusion of the stock in the index. Shleifer interprets 
this as evidence of an initially downward sloping demand curve that has shifted outwards.   
Similarly, Wugler and Zhuravskaya (2002) state that perfect riskless arbitrage requires the 
existence of perfect substitute assets. For example the arbitrager in order to not assume any risk 
from his arbitrage activities takes two actions. Firstly he trades in a manner that exploits the 
perceived mispricing. Secondly he performs an equal and opposite act on a perfect substitute so 
that his position in the market is perfectly hedged.  Wugler and Zhuravskaya (2002) state that 
downward sloping demand curves are a consequence of „arbitrage risk‟ due to the lack of perfect 
substitutes. In effect this paper confirms the theoretical proposition of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997). 
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 These findings are in direct contradiction with Ross‟s claim that demand and supply do 
not affect market prices. If a group of investors, for example, increases its demand for a security 
for whatever reason and if the amount invested is large enough the price of the asset will change. 
Therefore prices not only change as a response to changes in fundamentals but rather they 
change because a particular group has changed its valuation of the asset. This opens the door to a 
completely new perspective that allows prices not only to equal rationally discounted cash flows 
but to reflect expectational equilibria, [Kandel and Pearson (1995), Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998), La Porta (1996)], thus justifying “behavioural” asset pricing.  
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 7.2 Do investors systematically over or under react? 
 
 
On the theoretical level researchers have identified various factors that cause investors to 
systematically over or under react [e.g. Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al (1998) and Odean 
(1998)].  If these models are correct and return reversals and continuations are due to systematic 
misperceptions of information, empirical studies should be able to demonstrate that, in response 
to particular information signals, prices either trend or revert. This is important because 
ultimately empirical work will determine whether the behavioural explanation of return 
predictability is valid. As noted by Barberis and Thaler (2002 pp.61) “There is only one 
scientific way to compare alternative theories, behavioural or rational, and that is with empirical 
tests.”  
Fama (1998) challenges the validity of behavioural models as he reviews the literature on 
return predictability from past information and concludes that overreaction is as likely as 
underreaction; he argues therefore that behaviour is randomly split between these models of 
behaviour, thus behavioural finance does not yield any valuable insights.  In order for 
behaviouralists to overcome Fama‟s critique they must indentify parsimoniously the conditions 
that spur over and under reactions amongst investors, as predicted by the theoretical models.  
We identify three studies in the literature that explicitly attempt to examine when 
investors may over or under react.  Chan, Kothari, and Frankel (2004) review the behavioural 
literature and suggest that the phenomena of conservatism (Edwards 1968) and 
representativeness (Kahneman 1974) are key ingredients of behavioural explanations. Their 
attempt is to construct measures of past company performance, which will serve as the 
information signals that investors misperceive. Particularly they state that investors will 
overreact, due to representativeness, to companies which have experienced consistent positive or 
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negative performance. On the contrary, due to conservatism, when a firm has a short period of 
good or bad performance, investors will underreact and cause returns to trend. The authors use 5 
and 1 year measures based on sales and income per share. They conclude that no evidence of 
return reversals or return continuations is found.
80
 The authors state that this evidence does not 
support the behavioural model. They state however, that these results apply only to their sample 
and their calculated measures; therefore they do not preclude the existence of these biases in the 
marketplace under different conditions. 
  Kadiyala and Rau (2004) examine whether the over or under reaction models of 
behaviour fits the corporate events of seasoned equity offerings, stock/cash financed acquisitions 
and share repurchases. They suggest that these events can be classified to good or bad 
information. For example share repurchases and cash finance acquisitions convey good news and 
SEO‟s and stock financed acquisitions bad news. They also control for the earnings surprise 
prior to such events in an attempt to see whether people overreact when bad performance (i.e. 
negative surprise) is coupled with bad news and vice versa. Similarly to Chan et al (2004) they 
only find return drifts which depend mainly on the earnings surprise. Therefore they do not 
identify conditions that may drive investors to under or over react. 
An innovative paper that provides evidence of both return reversals and continuations is 
Chan (2003). He uses a sample in which he distinguishes stocks „with news‟ (any news in the 
media) and „no news‟. He then scrutinizes the data to many different tests and concludes that the 
„with news‟ stocks experience drifts and the „no news‟ stocks, which have experienced large 
price swings, undergone return reversals. This paper is a major breakthrough because the author 
produces these opposite return patterns in the same data set, which suggests that these behaviors 
may not be random, as suggested by Fama (1998). However it makes no predictions of the 
                                                 
80
 The authors state that some evidence for return continuations are found, which however are sensitive to the post-
earnings announcement drift. 
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conditions that drive over or under reaction. For example the stocks that experience large price 
swings and subsequent reversals probably involve some kind of news, which the study did not or 
could not observe. Therefore, an open question remains in terms of identifying factors that may 
drive investors to systematically over or under react. 
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7.3 Further literature on market anomalies 
 
 The purpose of the appendix is to provide more details for some important market 
anomalies that have been associated with investors‟ behavioural biases. 
 
7.3.1 Price Momentum 
 
 As explained, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document the phenomenon or price 
momentum. Stocks that performed well in the recent past (winners) continue to outperform 
stocks that performed poorly. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that a „momentum‟ strategy 
that is long in past winners and short in past losers earns a substantial abnormal return. The 
robustness of this strategy has been established in different markets and is currently being widely 
exploited by the investment community. 
 Possible explanations for this anomaly are a) slow information diffusion, b) 
„underreaction‟ and c) positive feedback trading. In terms of the former Hong and Stein (1999) 
construct a model where information diffuses gradually in the market.  Some groups may have 
access to the same information prior to other groups. This creates non-synchronous trading 
effects that show up as momentum in prices. Hong and Stein (2000) empirically confirm this 
prediction. Therefore it seems logical that to an extend the phenomenon of momentum depends 
on market frictions.   
 The behavioural explanation of the phenomenon of momentum is that investors 
systematically exhibit conservatism-driven behaviour when assessing news. This implies that 
since, information is „irrationally‟ discounted the time period required for its implications to be 
reflected in asset prices is prolonged. This translates to a drift, as opposed to a jump, towards 
fundamentals. In a very important paper Zhang (2006) shows that the momentum increases in 
information uncertainty. He argues that if investors systematically display conservatism in 
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general they will do so even more when the information is of lower quality. He forms two- way 
portfolios based on momentum and various measures of information uncertainty, such as size, 
age, analyst coverage, volatility, and shows that the returns increase in information uncertainty 
(IU), and shows that momentum increases with IU. These results support the underreaction story.  
 In terms of positive feedback trading Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)  rigorously 
test a number of hypotheses that aim to determine whether momentum is a consequence of an 
underreaction to public information, such as earnings and revisions in analyst forecasts, (earnings 
momentum) or to a series of private information (price momentum), or to positive feedback 
trading. They find no evidence for the latter as no reversals actually occur. In terms of earnings 
and price momentum the authors find that no strategy subsumes the other as they both capture 
different effects. The authors conclude that investors underreact to both public information for 
short- term earnings as well as private information that relates to long-term profitability.  
 
7.3.2 The B/M effect 
 
 An anomaly observed in the marketplace is that the Book to Market ratio explains 
average returns. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) state that high B/M (value) stocks 
systematically outperforms low B/M (growth) because investors suffer from the extrapolation 
bias (representativeness heuristic). Growth stocks entail good news, which however are falsely 
extrapolated in the future. Investors become too optimistic for these stocks leading to over 
pricings. The converse holds for value stocks. The fact that value predictably outperforms 
growth, according to Lakonishok et al (1994), reflects the correction process towards the true 
fundamental values. Supportive evidence for this come from La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) as they show that the surprise after earnings announcements is systematically 
more positive for value, as opposed to growth stocks, reflecting that investors were pessimistic 
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for the former and optimistic for the latter. Daniel and Titman (2006) decompose the B/M factor 
to a backward and forward looking component and show that the optimism, which generates the 
phenomenon, stems from an overreaction to the forward looking component. However Fama and 
French (1993) argue that the B/M factor captures financial distress and is thus a source of 
undiversifiable risk. Fama and French (1996) extend the CAPM to an ICAPM with three factors, 
a size (SMB) and a B/M (HML) based factors.  Petcova (2006) offers support that the HML and 
the SMB factors correlate with proxies for changes in investment opportunities, thus justifying 
the ICAPM explanation given by Fama and French (1996) to their three-factor model. Petcova 
and Zhang (2005) show that value is riskier than growth, therefore claim that the out 
performance of the former does not constitute irrationality. In addition Doukas, Kim and 
Pantzalis (2002) test the error in expectations hypothesis proposed by Lakonishok et al (1994) 
and find contradictory evidence.         
 
7.3.3 Post-Earnings announcement drift 
  
 The seminal paper of Ball and Brown (1978) demonstrated a drift in security prices after 
earnings announcements. Returns for companies that have announced earnings above (below) 
market expectations exhibit a positive (negative) momentum. These results have spawned the 
appearance of a massive literature. A representative study, for example Foster, Olsen and Shevlin 
(1984), finds the drift pertains 60 days after the announcement and a strategy that‟s aims to 
exploit it, by taking a long position in the „good news‟ portfolio and short in the „bad news‟ 
portfolio, makes a substantial abnormal annual return of 25%. Similar results are reported by 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Ball and Kothari (1991), Rendleman, Jones and Latane 
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(1982) and more recently Chordia and Shivakumar (2005), Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman 
(2003), Livnat (2003), Garfinkel and Sokobin (2005).  
 The robustness of the profitability of this trading strategy across markets and time periods 
is a major source of debate amongst academics. Eugene Fama, the most influential supporter of 
Efficient markets, has referred to the post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) as the „father of 
all anomalies‟. 
 Why are these findings troublesome? In the light of the efficient market hypothesis, as 
put forward by Fama (1970), any kind of predictability is impossible. Prices are quick to respond 
correctly to information, thus maintain the martingale property. However the PEAD literature 
posits a clear violation in that prices are predictable based on whether the earnings of a company 
are below or above market expectations.   
   The model that is universally used to sort stocks in „good‟ and „bad‟ news portfolios in all 
studies that document the PEAD is the Standard Unexpected Earnings model (SUE), 
A e
t tE E
Deflator
 where E
A 
corresponds to the actual earnings per share reported at time t, E
e 
is a 
measure of what the market expects earnings to be at time t and the denominator is a 
standardising deflator, for example stock price at time t. The literature documents a monotonic 
relationship between abnormal returns and SUE. The higher (lower) SUE decile experiences the 
highest (lowest) cumulative abnormal return in the window after the announcement.    
 In terms of the PEAD literature a considerable effort is devoted in developing a more 
precise measure for the market‟s expectations. Finding such a measure will enable the 
construction of more informative „surprise‟ portfolios and hence a better understanding, and 
exploitation, of the PEAD. In the early stages of this literature research utilized findings from the 
accounting literature, Brown (1993), and used earnings forecasts from time series models a 
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proxy for the market‟s expectations (Foster (1977), Bartov (1992), Griffin (1977) Bernard and 
Thomas (1990). As the literature developed further, researchers use the consensus analyst 
forecast of the EPS as the markets expectation for the upcoming EPS (Fried and Givoly 1982, 
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1981), Brown, Foster and Noreen 
(1984), Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). Using analyst forecasts as expectations provides a better 
fit to the data. As documented by Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), the PEAD is stronger when 
expectations are defined using the I/B/E/S analyst forecasts in comparison to a time series model, 
suggesting that market expectations are better captured by analyst forecasts. 
 The general consensus in terms of the PEAD is that investors underreact when a 
company reveals higher or lower earnings than expected. Therefore, prices slowly drift toward 
fair values, generating the drift. 
 
 7.3.4. Individual trading 
  
 The most convincing evidence for the existence of behavioural biases come from a series 
of papers by Odean. He uses a unique data set that includes the trades of individual investors. He 
can thus identify which stocks were bought and sold at which point in time, therefore his sample 
allows inference in terms of whether these investors are rational. Odean (1999) shows that 
investors trade too much and suffer capital losses in the process. Neoclassical finance assumes 
that investors have rational expectations. This implies that investors would only trade if the 
marginal benefit from doing so exceeds the marginal cost, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Odean 
finds that the securities that are bought do not outperform the securities that were sold by enough 
to cover the costs of trading. Moreover, and much more worryingly for the case of neoclassical 
finance, the securities that were sold, on average, outperform the securities that were bought. 
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This implies that the information set was completely misinterpreted by investors and that their 
expectations were largely biased. For example suppose that the return of a stock will be 2% in 
the following month, implying that the news for this particular company at this moment is good. 
The rational agent will form an expectation of 2%. However an agent that forms an expectation 
of 1.7% is biased in a neoclassical sense but in reality he is quasi-rational (i.e. does not err 
substantially). He understands that the information is positive, but misjudges the magnitude. If 
however the investor believes that the stock will lose –1.5%, as appears to be the case in Odean‟s 
sample, the investor was unable to understand the nature of the information set.  
 Barber and Odean (2000) partition this sample in quintiles based on trading activity and 
test the common stock performance of the different groups. They find that the group that trades 
the most makes the lowest return, a finding that again contradicts the argument of Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980). Further,  Odean and Barber (2002) show that the traders that switch from phone 
to online accounts trade much more and make lower returns. The finding from this study is clear 
and puts into perspective the findings of the other two papers. Traders, at least the „amateurs‟, 
simply do not trade on fundamentals. Rather they speculatively trade on noisy information 
signals that they fail to interpret correctly. Consequently their investment performance suffers. 
Odean attributes these findings to the overconfidence bias. He states that investors believe that 
they are better at selecting securities than what they really are, thus trade more frequently not on 
substantive information but on noise. The investment information set is a very noisy and 
dynamic platform, and this research demonstrates that agents, being computationally bounded, 
cannot form unbiased expectations.  
 Odean (1998) tests the disposition effect, put forward by Shefrin and Statman (1985), 
which states that investors are quick to sell the winning stocks in order to realize the gains and 
ride losers to long as to avoid realizing the losses. This type of behaviour stems from Kahneman 
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and Tversky‟s (1979) Prospect Theory. Odean (1998) finds that the investors in his sample 
exhibit this kind of behaviour. Winner stocks are sold very quickly, thus failing to capture future 
gains, and loser stocks are sold very late, thus exacerbating the loss. This is evidence that 
individual investors fail to form unbiased expectations. 
 Odean and Barber (2005) show that individual traders are prone to „attention‟ trading and 
that they are more likely to buy stocks which they owned previously. As a result, Odean and 
Barber (2005) show that individual traders buy high and sell low, which again contradicts 
rational expectations.  
 The research of Odean is really the most conclusive in terms of investor behaviour being 
bounded as he clearly documents deviations from neoclassical theories. A question that remains 
is whether these behavioural biases affect asset prices. The investors in Odean sample invest 
little capital, about $11,000 per year therefore despite their biased behaviour, prices may not be 
affected. Moreover the investors in Odean and Barber‟s sample, since they invest little capital, 
are most likely small individual investors. Therefore these findings cannot be expected to apply 
to large institutional investors. Some evidence exists that support this conjecture that the 
behaviour of professionals is quasi-rational. In a sample that includes both individual and 
institutional investors Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2009) show that the behaviour of the 
former is bias-prone whereas the latter appear to be rational. This suggests large investors, being 
efficient processors of information, should be able to spot mispricings and arbitrage them away. 
 However, evidence that behavioural biases pertain amongst experienced people also 
exist. For example, Coval and Shumway (2005) use a data set that contains the trades of 
professional future traders amongst the Chicago Board of Trades. The authors state that these 
traders exchange 200 million dollars worth of future contracts daily. Thus any behavioural biases 
in this group are likely to affect prices. The authors find that these traders are significantly loss-
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averse, as subsequently to losses their risk taking increases significantly so that they recover their 
position.  In terms of loss-aversion affecting prices the authors find that the market is able to 
identify the informed from the loss-averse trades; hence prices for the latter revert much more 
rapidly to their fundamental values. This finding highlights the capacity of the market to fill 
mispricings and supports that ideas of Friedman (1953) and Fama (1980), that biased trades will 
eventually be driven out of the market.  However, these results also show that prices, albeit 
temporarily, are influenced by behavioural trades so it is conceivable that in an environment 
where „behavioural volume‟ is greater the effects on prices are long lasting. In any case the 
results of Coval and Shumway (2005) leave an open question as to whether the behavioural 
biases, documented by Odean, substantially prohibit market efficiency.  
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